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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses various aspects of the integrity monitoring of GPS applied to civil 
aircraft navigation in different phases of flight. These flight phases include en route, 
terminal, non-precision approach and precision approach. The thesis includes four 
major topics: probability problem of GPS navigation service, risk analysis of aircraft 
precision approach and landing, theoretical analysis of Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (RAIM) techniques and RAIM availability, and GPS integrity monitoring 
at a ground reference station. Particular attention is paid to the mathematical aspects of 
the GPS integrity monitoring system. 
The research has been built upon the stringent integrity requirements defined by civil 
aviation community, and concentrates on the capability and performance 
investigation of practical integrity monitoring systems with rigorous mathematical 
and statistical concepts and approaches. Major contributions of this research are: 
• Rigorous integrity and continuity risk analysis for aircraft precision 
approach. Based on the joint probability density function of the affecting 
components, the integrity and continuity risks of aircraft precision 
approach with DGPS were computed. This advanced the conventional 
method of allocating the risk probability. 
• A theoretical study of RAIM test power. This is the first time a theoretical 
study on RAIM test power based on the probability statistical theory has 
been presented, resulting in a new set of RAIM criteria. 
• Development of a GPS integrity monitoring and DGPS quality control 
system based on GPS reference station. A prototype of GPS integrity 
monitoring and DGPS correction prediction system has been developed 
and tested, based on the A USN A V GPS base station on the roof of QUT 
ITE Building. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis discusses various aspects of the integrity monitoring of GPS applied to civil 
aircraft navigation in different phases of flight. These flight phases include en route, 
terminal, non-precision approach and precision approach. The thesis includes four 
major topics: probability characteristics of GPS navigation service, risk analysis of 
aircraft precision approach and landing, theoretical analysis of Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) techniques and their availability, and GPS integrity 
monitoring at a ground reference station. Particular attention is paid to the 
mathematical aspects of the GPS integrity monitoring. In the following sections, the 
background of the GPS integrity monitoring research is introduced and the objectives 
and outline of the research are successively presented. 
1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based radio positioning, navigation 
and time-transfer system developed by the US Department of Defence (US DoD). It has 
been widely used in many fields, particularly in aircraft navigation and moving vehicle 
location. To achieve the very stringent safety requirements of the civil aviation, the 
integrity and reliability issues of GPS have become extremely important. Thus, there 
has been worldwide discussion and investigation of the GPS integrity techniques to 
meet the integrity requirements for different categories of GPS users. 
In general, integrity of a radionavigation system is defined as (US DoD & US DoT, 
1988): 
The ability of a system to provide timely warning to users when the system 
should not be used for navigation. 
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The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) defines the integlity of a 
navigation system as (AWOP, 1993; Lawson, 1993): 
Integrity relates to the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the 
information supplied by the total system. Integrity risk is the probability 
of undetected [latent] failure of the specified accuracy. Integrity includes 
the ability of a system to provide timely warnings to the user when the 
system should not be used for the intended operation. 
From the definitions of the integrity of a navigation system, the following problems are 
concerned: 
• What is the integrity failure in the real environment? 
• How is the integrity requirement defined? 
• How can integrity failure be detected, and integrity failure causes be 
identified? 
The first problem is strongly dependent on the GPS navigation accuracy requirement. 
The second problem is usually dealt with by probability theory based on historical data. 
The third problem is to detect the integrity failure and identify the failure sources in 
order for the navigation system to operate safely and continually, and it is usually 
referred to as "GPS integrity monitoring" and is the focus of this thesis. 
1.2 GPS INTEGRITY MONITORING 
Principally, GPS, in itself, does not possess the integrity monitoring and assurance 
ability to meet the strict civil application requirements. It may take a few hours for the 
GPS system to update erroneous navigation messages (Gower and Mathon, 1990). 
Thus, this demands that the integrity of the GPS system is monitored in real time. 
Integrity monitoring has been an active research topic in the last decade, but especially 
in the last few years. The integrity monitoring research can be generally classified into 
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integrity requirement formulation, integrity monitoring (fault detection and isolation) 
algorithm and system development, and integrity performance evaluation of the GPS 
navigation system with a specific algorithm or monitoring system. 
The integrity requirement is usually formulated by the user community. In the civil 
aviation application of GPS, integrity requirements are specified based on strict safety 
requirements. The typical integrity requirements can be found in RTCA D0-208 (1991) 
which specified the conditions for GPS supplemental use in the en route, terminal and 
non-precision approach phases of flight , MOPS GPS/W AAS (1995) specifies the 
requirements for GPS/Wide Area Augmentation System (W AAS) application in the en 
route, terminal, non-precision approach and precision approach phases of flight. 
The stringent integrity requirements must be satisfied at each location at all times, and 
can only be met by employing integrity monitoring methods. Two kinds of GPS 
integrity monitoring methods have been widely acknowledged: receiver internal 
monitoring and receiver external monitoring. 
The internal method of the GPS integrity monitoring is based on the full use of the 
measurements accessible by the vehicle (aircraft). The measurements could be GPS 
ranging signals, altimeter altitude, or inertial navigation system (INS) output. The 
method applies statistical theory to determine whether the navigation solution is within 
the allowable accuracy range. The receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) 
(eg., Lee, 1986; Parkinson and Axelrad, 1988; Sturza, 1988) is the model for the 
internal method, and RAIM is required to be implemented within GPS receivers 
intended for aviation use (TSO C-129, 1992). 
RAIM availability evaluation has been an important topic in the GPS integrity research 
for several years. Because RAIM availability is related to the goodness of the satellite-
user geometry, some criteria for judging the geometry have been proposed with 
simulation techniques (Brown et al., 1991; Chin et al., 1992). Based on these criteria, 
the availability of GPS RAIM was studied by (eg., van Dyke, 1992; Sang et al., 1995a). 
Also, the enhancement of the GPS RAIM availability has been investigated ( eg., Misra 
et al., 1993; Lee, 1993; Michalson et al., 1994; Ananda et al, 1994; Brenner, 1995). 
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Recently, the RAIM algorithm has been extended to include receiver clock behaviour 
(Misra et al., 1995), which developed the snapshot RAIM algorithm. However, 
theoretical analysis of the RATh1 criteria has so far not been reported. 
Most of the RAIM research has focused on the phases of flight from the en route to 
non-precision approach. DIAS MASPS (1993) proposed another method to warn of 
integrity failure in the precision approach phase of flight. This warning algorithm is 
different from the RATh1 algorithm which only considers the navigation system error. 
With this warning algorithm, the rigorous analysis of risks affecting the integrity and 
continuity is performed by (Kubik, 1994; Sang et al., 1995b ). 
When using the external integrity monitoring method, the GPS signals are monitored in 
real time through a ground monitoring network independent of the GPS ground control 
segment (Brown, 1988). This method stems from the GPS futegrity Channel concept 
proposed by Braff and Shively (1985). The concept of Wide Area Augmentation 
System (W AAS) provides the integrity message, differential GPS (DGPS) 
corrections and extra ranging signals from geostationary satellites, and is currently 
under development in the US. WAAS is designed to support a precision approach 
capability down to a Category I (CAT I) decision height of 200 feet (W AAS 
Specification, 1995; MOPS GPSIW AAS, 1995). With WAAS, the navigation 
performance is enhanced to satisfy the requirements of a primary means navigation 
system. Based on this concept of W AAS, an on-line ground station GPS integrity 
monitoring system has been developed by the author at the Space Centre for Satellite 
Navigation (Kubik et al, 1996). 
It is noted from the airborne specifications and standards (eg., DIAS MASPS, 1993; 
WAAS Specification, 1995; MOPS GPSIW AAS, 1995) that both the internal and 
external methods are required as they provide a cross check of the navigation service 
integrity. 
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1.3 OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
Noting the problems defined in Section 1.1 and the integrity research in the previous 
years, the following objectives have been set up for the current thesis research: 
• Probability study of a GPS integrity monitoring system. It is aimed to 
examine the performance characteristics of the GPS navigation service using 
probability theory and to analyse the response ability of an integrity 
monitoring algorithm or system. 
• Rigorous analysis of the integrity risk for aircraft precision approach and 
landing with DGPS. The analysis should take all major elements affecting 
the integrity risk into consideration. 
• Theoretical analysis of the RAlM test power. This research is aimed at a 
theoretical study of the RAlM test power based on the application of 
statistical hypothesis testing theory and to derive new criteria for the RAlM 
performance evaluation. 
• RAIM availability evaluation. A navigation system suitable for primary 
means navigation for the en route to non-precision approach phases of flight 
is proposed. 
• Development of an on-line DGPS integrity monitoring system. This system 
should have the functions of monitoring GPS signals and predicting DGPS 
corrections to provide the required integrity and continuity performance. 
Some of these objectives were closely related to the research projects undertaken in the 
Space Centre for Satellite Navigation for the Australian Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA) (Kubik et al., 1995; McLucas et al., 1995). The last objective was realised in the 
context of a small ARC grant "Neural Networks Modelling for Time Series Prediction 
with Application to Differential GPS" (Kubik et al, 1996). 
5 
1.4 OUTLINE OF RESEARCH 
Chapter 2 presents the relevant background information on GPS navigation service. 
First, a brief overview of the GPS system is given. Then the major error sources in the 
GPS measurement are discussed. Two examples of GPS service failures due to signal 
jamming and satellite failure are presented to demonstrate the significance of the GPS 
integrity research. Finally the accuracy of GPS C/ A pseudoranges and accuracy 
dependence on satellite elevation is analysed using variance component estimate 
method. 
Chapter 3 introduces the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) concept and gives a 
brief description of the integrity monitoring method. This chapter first gives an 
introduction of the aircraft tunnel concept. Then the RNP parameters for precision 
approach and landing are discussed. As an example, the RNP risk allocation for CAT 
I precision approach using Differential Global Navigation Satellite System (DGNSS) 
is given. This risk allocation result is used in Chapter 5 where the integrity and 
continuity risk analyses of the precision approach and landing using DGPS 
navigation system is carried out. Finally, the GPS integrity requirements for the en 
route, terminal and non-precision approach phases of flight are introduced, and the 
internal and external integrity monitoring methods are briefly discussed. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the study of the probability characteristics of the GPS 
navigation service. In this chapter, we first study the relationship between the 
probability of the GPS service and the service failure time according to probability 
theory. Examples are given to explain meanings of some of the navigation 
pe1formance requirements. Then the analysis of a system's response to failure is 
carried out. The response ability of both the internal and external integrity monitoring 
methods are analysed. 
In Chapter 5, the risk analysis for the precision approach and landing with DGPS is 
presented. Following discussion of the alarm algorithm for the precision approach and 
landing in the first section, rigorous models for computing risk probabilities are derived 
based on the joint probability density function of the Flight Technical Error (FTE) and 
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the Navigation System Error (NSE). Computational results are then presented and 
compared with those given in DIAS MASPS (1993). Thus, a reasonable combination 
of NSE and FfE accuracy which guarantees the required integrity and continuity 
performance is obtained. Furthermore, the alarm rate considering the FfE characteristic 
is discussed. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to a theoretical analysis of the RAIM test power. Based on a least-
squares RAIM: algorithm, the efficiency of RAIM is discussed with the introduction of 
the Approximate Radial-Error Protected (ARP) concept. An analysis of measurement 
bias effects on position solution results in the derivation of a test statistic which relates 
the test power to the satellite-user geometry. Then a new set of geometry criteria is 
derived, which satisfies the RAIM test power requirement of 0.999. DGPS RAIM 
geometry criteria are also obtained. 
Chapter 7 contains extensive RAIM: availability evaluation results. Following a 
discussion of RAIM: availability, the stand alone GPS RAIM: availability is computed 
for the Australian Area of Interest. Then, the RAIM availability of GPS augmented 
with barometric altimetry is evaluated. Through examination of the receiver clock 
prediction behaviour, a RAIM algorithm based on the application of the receiver clock 
prediction is developed, and the RAIM: availability of GPS with augmentation of the 
receiver clock is presented. Finally, the RAIM: availability of W AAS is reported, where 
two W AAS configurations are considered. 
Chapter 8 discusses an on-line DGPS ground station integrity monitoring system. 
Following the brief discussion of the GPS Integrity Channel (GIC) concept based on 
the ground monitoring of the GPS system, the algorithm for monitoring the GPS 
signals at a ground station is developed. This is followed by the presentation of the 
DGPS correction prediction algorithm based on neutral network modelling. Finally, a 
prototype on-line DGPS ground station integrity monitoring system is described. 
Chapter 9 contains a summary of the results and main contributions of the research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GPS NAVIGATION ERROR CHARACTERISTICS 
In least-squares GPS navigation, the solution error has two components. The first 
component is the pseudorange measurement error. The other is the dilution of precision 
(DOP) factor, which describes the effect of satellite geometry on the navigation error. 
Multiplying the DOP value with the root mean square (RMS) error of the range 
measurements gives a measure of the navigation solution error. Navigation service 
failure can be caused by either bad geometry (large DOP value) or poor measurement 
quality (large RMS value), or both. 
This chapter is intended to present the relevant background infmmation on GPS 
navigation service. First, a brief overview of the GPS system is given. Then the major 
error sources in the GPS measurements are discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Section 
2.4 presents two examples of GPS service failures attributable to signal jamming and 
satellite failure. In Section 2.5, the accuracy of GPS CIA pseudorange data and 
accuracy dependence on satellite elevation angle is analysed using the Helmert variance 
component estimate method. 
2.1 GPS SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
GPS is a satellite-based radio positioning, navigation and time-transfer system 
developed by the US Department of Defence (US DoD). Two navigation accuracy 
levels are provided: the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) and the Standard Positioning 
Service (SPS). Access to the SPS is available for any user in the world (GPS SPS 
Signal Specification, 1993). 
The GPS system compnses three segments: Space, Control and User. The fully 
operational Space Segment consists of a nominal constellation of 21 satellites in six 
orbital planes, together with three active spares. Each satellite transmits on the L1 
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(1575.42 MHz) and L2 (1227.6 MHz) frequencies. The L1 carrier signal is modulated 
by both a precise and a coarse/acquisition ranging code (P code and C/ A code). The L2 
carrier signal is modulated by a P code only. Superimposed on these signals is the 
navigation data message, which contains the satellite ephemeris and satellite clock 
information. 
The Control Segment includes a number of Monitor Stations and Ground Antennas 
located around the world. The Monitor Stations use GPS receivers to track all satellites 
in view and thus accumulate ranging data from the satellite signals. The information 
from the Monitor Stations is processed at the Master Control Station to determine 
satellite orbits and to update the navigation message of each satellite. This updated 
information is transmitted to the satellites via the Ground Antennas, which are also 
used for transmitting and receiving satellite control information. 
The User Segment consists of GPS receivers that utilise data transmitted by the 
satellites to derive navigation and time information. The PPS enables users access to 
full system accuracy. The SPS guarantees 100m (95%) horizontal accuracy using CIA 
code signals on L1 (GPS SPS Signal Specification, 1993). All GPS integrity research 
for civil aviation navigation assumes that only the SPS is available to users. 
2.2 GPS NAVIGATION ERROR SOURCES 
Errors and biases affecting GPS SPS navigation accuracy include: satellite orbit error, 
satellite clock error, signal propagation delays in the ionosphere and troposphere, 
receiver measurement noise, receiver thermal noise, receiver clock error, multipath, and 
man-made biases such as selective availability (SA) and jamming. That is, the 
measured pseudorange can be expressed as: 
PR = p +Orbit+ SatClock + Iono +Trap+ RecClock +SA+ Other+ E 
(2.1) 
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where 
PR: 
p: 
Orbit: 
SatClock: 
Iono: 
Trop: 
RecClock: 
SA: 
Other: 
£: 
measured pseudorange 
distance between satellite and receiver 
satellite orbit error induced bias in the measured pseudorange 
satellite clock error induced bias in the measured pseudorange 
ionospheric delay 
tropospheric delay 
receiver clock error 
selective availability (SA) error 
other errors such as multipath, receiver thermal noise, 
signal jamming 
receiver measurement noise 
In this section, these errors and biases except SA and jamming are discussed briefly. 
SA and jamming are discussed in subsequent sections. 
SATELLITE ORBIT BIASES 
The orbit biases result from the uncertainties in the broadcast orbital information. These 
uncertainties are due to the limited orbit determination accuracy, and the limited 
prediction accuracy of the broadcast ephemeris, and the SA policy implemented by the 
USDoD. Generally, the orbit error is of the order of 10 to 50 m. Under SA conditions, 
the orbit error may exceed 100 m in extreme cases (FRNP, 1990). GPS navigation 
users use the broadcast ephemeris in computing GPS satellite position, thus the orbit 
errors result in errors in navigation solution. The orbit error can be greatly reduced by 
application of the Differential GPS (DGPS) techniques ( eg., Kremer et al., 1990). 
SATELLITE CLOCK BIAS 
The satellite clock bias is the time offset of the satellite clock with respect to GPS time. 
In addition to the satellite oscillator error, the clock bias is mainly caused by SA. 
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IONOSPHERIC EFFECT 
The ionospheric effect is caused by interference of free electrons when GPS signals 
pass through the upper layer of the atmosphere (ionosphere). The effect on range may 
vary from more than 150m (at midday, during periods of maximum sunspot activity, 
with the satellite at a low elevation with respect to the observer) to less than 5 m (at 
midnight, during a period of minimum sunspot activity, with the satellite at the zenith) 
(Wells et al., 1987). 
Dual frequency receivers can eliminate most of the ionospheric effect by making use of 
the dispersive nature of the ionospheric delay. Single frequency receivers can reduce 
the ionospheric effect by applying the standard algorithm in TCGPS (1991) and using 
the ionospheric effect coefficients from the broadcast message. This method can 
remove only about 50% of the ionospheric delay at the mid-latitude area (Wells et al., 
1987). Recently, attempts and efforts have been made to model the ionospheric effect 
by establishing a ground network known as Wide Area Augmentation System (W AAS) 
(eg., Conker et al., 1995; Mannucci et al., 1995; Mueller et al., 1995). 
TROPOSPHERIC EFFECT 
The tropospheric effect is the propagation delay caused by the refraction of GPS signal 
in the lower atmosphere (troposphere). To account for this effect, a tropospheric model 
must be used. A common model is Hopfield's tropospheric model (Hopfield, 1971). 
The standard algorithm modelling the tropospheric effect is given in TCGPS (1991). 
RECEIVER CLOCK BIAS 
The receiver clock bias is the time offset of the receiver clock with respect to GPS time. 
It is estimated along with the position parameters in the navigation solution. Thus, it 
can be removed from the measured pseudorange. 
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MULTIPATH 
Multipath means that reflected signals also reach the antenna in addition to the direct 
signals. This effect is almost inevitable for most GPS application due to all possible 
reflectors, such as buildings, water, and observing platform, etc. 
Multipath error affects both pseudorange and carrier phase measurements. The amount 
of multipath for pseudorange observation is much larger than that for a carrier phase. 
At an extreme, the pseudorange multipath may reach up to one chip length of the 
pseudorandom noise (PRN) code (293m for the CIA code, and 29.2 m for the P code) 
(Georgiadou and Kleusberg, 1988). However, in most cases, the observed multipath for 
CIA code receiver is less than 20 m. NovAtel's Narrow Correlator™ technique can 
reduce the multi path effect on the Cl A code to the submetre level (Van Dierendonck et 
al., 1992). Generally, the multipath effect on carrier phase is less than 25% of the 
carrier wavelength (Georgiadou and Kleusberg, 1988), that is about 5 em for L1 carrier 
and 6 em for L2 carrier. 
MEASUREMENT NOISE 
Typical pseudorange measurement resolution is approximately 1% of the code chip 
length, that is 3m for CIA pseudorange and 0.3 m for P code pseudorange. Currently, 
many receivers can deliver higher accuracy. For example, the NovAtel GPSCard™ 
uses the Narrow Correlator™ technique in the receiver Delay Lock Loops (Van 
Dierendonck et al., 1992). This technique allows the GPS receivers to measure the 
pseudorange at 10 em noise level on Cl A code. 
Table 2.1 gives a typical error budget for GPS CIA pseudorange according to RTCA 
D0-208 (1991). 
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Table 2.1: C/ A Pseudorange RMS Error 
Error Source RMS (m) 
Space Segment 30.5 
Control Segment 4.3 
Ionospheric Delay 10.0 
Tropospheric Delay 2.0 
Receiver Segment 7.5 
Multipath 1.2 
Other 0.5 
Total 33.3 
POSITIONING ACCURACY 
Table 2.2 lists the nominal positioning accuracy for single frequency SPS users. These 
figures are taken from GPS SPS Signal Specification (1993). 
a e .. OSIIOnmg T bl 2 2 GPS SPS P . f A ccuracy 
100m horizontal error 95% of time 
300m horizontal error 99.99% oftime 
156m vertical error 95 % of time 
500 m vertical error 99.99% of time 
2.3 SELECTIVE AVAILABILITY 
To deny access by SPS users to the full system accuracy, the US DoD intentionally 
degrades the signals transmitted from the GPS satellites. Authorised PPS users may 
remove these errors by employing SA decryption techniques. SPS users are unable to 
remove these errors and will receive a reduced standard of service (TCGPS, 1991). SA 
has been implemented in the Block II satellites to control the positioning accuracy for 
unauthorised users. It is known that SA is a combination of frequency ( or satellite 
clock) dithering and manipulation of the ephemeris data (Kremer et al., 1990). 
Dithering is intended to degrade velocity information, and causes the satellite 
pseudoranges to vary quickly with limited amplitude while ephemeris data 
manipulation causes a very large but slowly varying bias in the position solution. 
Figures 2.1 to 2.4 show the typical SA affected positioning errors and pseudorange 
residuals. 
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SA is the dominant error source in the GPS navigation solution. Some anti-SA 
algorithms have been proposed, such as modelling SA error with a second order gauss-
markov process (Chou, 1990) and with neural network technique (Wang, 1994). 
150~--------~--------~----------~--------~ 
-100 
-150~--------~--------~--------~--------~ 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 
Epoch (second) 
Figure 2.1: Example of SA Affected Latitude Errors 
60 
40 /\ j\ ~f (\ 20 f\ " \ -E .._.. 
0 V\J V\ I-0 \) I-I-w -20 \j (J) "'C :::1 
....... 
·c, 
-40 
r 
c:: 
0 
_. 
-60 
-80 
-100~------~--------~--------~------~ 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 
Epoch (second) 
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2.4 EXAMPLES OF POSITIONING ACCURACY DEGRADATION 
2.4.1 JAMMING 
J amrning is the phenomenon whereby a radio frequency signal is corrupted by another 
signal, either accidentally or deliberately (Johannessen and Asbury, 1992). 
Each GPS satellite transmits a unique 1 023-bit C/ A code at a clock rate of 1.023 MHz. 
A 50 baud navigation data message is superimposed on the L1 C/A code signal. The L1 
canier is BPSK modulated by module two combination of the C/ A code and navigation 
data message, resulting in the standard sinX/X spectrum with a 2 MHz bandwidth to 
the first null. CIA code signals received from a 0 dBi antenna are approximately 20 dB 
below the receiver's thermal noise level at the earth's surface, which is only 
approximately 3 dB greater than the minimum C/ A code signal strength ( -160 dBW ) 
specified by USDoD (Owen, 1993). 
A GPS receiver must maintain lock on the satellite signal and read the phase-modulated 
navigation data message to realise position determination. A signal-to-noise (SNR) of 
approximately 16 is required in the carrier tracking loop to demodulate the 50 Hz 
navigation data. The -157 dBW signal strength at the earth's surface is 20 dB below the 
typical receiver thermal noise level of -137 dBW in the 2 MHz signal bandwidth. For 
the employed bandwidth, a processing gain of 50 is achieved assuming a phase detector 
with the bandwidth of 20 Hz. This results in SNR of approximately 30 in the carrier 
tracking loop (Owen, 1993). 
The code tracking loop in the correlation detector has a bandwidth of less than 1 Hz 
and could therefore provide a higher SNR than the carrier tracking loop. However the 
unaided code loop cannot track satellite signals through aircraft manoeuvres. So the 
code loop must be steered with Doppler information derived from the carrier loop. The 
loss of lock in the carrier tracking will result in the loss of lock in code tracking and so 
the receiver is effectively jammed. 
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Tolerance to inband interference for typical CIA-code GPS receivers is specified at 
approximately 27 dB noise to signal, suggesting that interference above approximately 
-130 dBW prevents tracking or acquisition of the signals. With a received signal power 
of -157 dBW and a processing gain of 50, and allowing an SNR of 16 to maintain 
phase tracking, the theoretical noise power required to jam the satellite reception is -
123 dBW. The reduction in performance ( -123 dBW to -130 dBW) is caused primarily 
by the false locks that can occur in the CIA-code correlator. Flight test results (Owen, 
1993) showed that the receivers lost both code and carrier lock on the satellite signal at 
noise power levels between -125 and -130 dBW. 
The jamming source may be radar, very high frequency (VHF) communication 
transmitters or television broadcast transmissions. There are several techniques 
available for deliberate jamming, including pulsed transmission, wide band noise and 
continuous wave (CW), of which single frequency CW requires least power and 
sophistication to be effective (Johannessen and Asbury, 1992). 
A GPS receiver on an aircraft's final approach can therefore be jammed with an 
interfering source having a power of a few milli watts. This requires components 
costing only hundreds of dollars. It was reported that aircraft at 8000 feet height and 
within a range of 30 km of an interference source transmitting a few watts were likely 
to have their receivers jammed (Owen 1993). This means that a very simple 
interference system will effectively jam the receivers or cause the positioning accuracy 
to be degraded for a receiver within the range of tens kilometres around an airport 
(ICAO SC FANS, 1992). 
In addition to the system's faults or failures causmg navigation performance 
requirement violation, the jamming to the GPS signal also results in performance 
degradation. Thus, civil aviation organisations are concemed with the possibility of 
jamming (ICAO SC FANS, 1992; ICAO GNSS WP, 1994). 
An event of GPS signal interference was detected by the A USN A V GPS base station 
on the roof of the QUT ITE building (Kubik et al, 1994).1t occurred on 24 May 1994 in 
Brisbane area. Figure 2.5 shows the residuals of the affected Cl A code pseudoranges. 
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As a comparison, the residuals of pseudoranges for the same satellites during the same 
period at the Hobart GPS base station are shown in Figure 2.6. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 
show the height errors at QUT and Hobart, respectively. Figure 2.9 shows an example 
of large height errors. In these figures the epoch interval is one second, and the first 
epoch is at ohomos UTC on 24 May 1994 unless otherwise specified. 
Figure 2.6 shows the normal CIA pseudorange errors of GPS PRN 23 without 
interference under SA effect. The data exhibits the well known SA characteristic, but is 
locally without noise. Figure 2.5 shows the C/ A pseudorange errors of the same 
satellite in the same period with the effect of interference, as detected at QUT. It 
appears that there is strong noise added to the normal SA errors. 
The effect of signal interference on the receiver height is shown in Figure 2.7. When 
compared with the GPS height errors at Hobart in Figure 2.8, it can be concluded that 
the height fluctuates both systematically and randomly due to the effect of interference. 
Figure 2.9 shows the large deviations of height in the time period 1 h48m565 to 2h13m55s 
UTC at QUT. It can be seen that the variations in height were as large as 180m over 6 
seconds. This fast change of position will cause the integrity monitoring system to find 
it difficult to meet the strict requirements of aircraft precision approach and landing. 
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over Period of 1800 Seconds and 50 Seconds, respectively 
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As can be seen from the example, as the possibility of intentional jamming with the 
GPS SPS exists, anti-jamming measures must be taken into consideration in the design 
of any GPS integrity monitoring system. Anti-jamming solutions include external 
monitoring, which checks whether there is any detectable source of interference in the 
airspace and passes a jamming warning to airspace users as required, and RAIM, which 
constantly checks the range measurements. These two methods will be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapters. 
2.4.2 SATELLITE FAILURE 
GPS satellite failure occurs when a satellite stops transmitting its signal, transmits a 
wrong message, or transmits an out-of-date message. In the case of transmission 
termination, it will not cause integrity failure because there is no ranging signal to that 
particular failed satellite, but it may degrade the service performance. In the case of 
transmitting a wrong message, a navigation accuracy threshold violation may take 
place. In the case of transmitting an out-of-date message, there may be accuracy 
degradation, causing integrity failure for one accuracy requirement level but not for 
others. 
An event of satellite failure causing accuracy degradation was detected on August 1, 
1995 by the GPS base station ASHTECH XII receiver on the roof of the QUT ITE 
building. The following figures show the failure affected position errors and the Cl A 
pseudorange residuals. It was later reported that satellite PRN 23 was in an unhealthy 
status. In these figures, the epoch interval is 1 second, and the first epoch is at 
20h40m11 s UTC. 
Figures 2.1 0, 2.11 and 2.12 show the latitude, longitude and height errors. Figure 2.13 
shows the CIA pseudorange residuals for the unhealthy satellite PRN 23. For 
comparison of how an unhealthy satellite can affect accuracy, Figures 2.14 and 2.15 
show the CIA pseudorange residuals of satellite PRN 21 with and without the effect of 
PRN 23 in the navigation solution, respectively. 
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A satellite failure will influence users over a large area and could be disastrous if there 
is no timely warning. It is concluded that an integrity monitoring network is necessary 
for GPS to be used as a safe and reliable navigation system. 
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Figure 2.15: CIA Pseudorange Residual of Satellite PRN 21 after Deleting PRN 23 
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2.5 VARIANCE COMPONENT ESTIMATE OF GPS PSEUDORANGE 
In the navigation application of GPS, the term Dilution of Precision (DOP) represents 
a simple geometrical construction that provides an a priori description and measure 
of how satellite geometry affects positioning accuracy. In the RAIM availability 
evaluation, Approximate Radial-error Protection (ARP) also describes the goodness 
of the geometry for RAIM. 
Currently, the GPS range measurements are treated with the same weight in 
computing DOP or ARP values. It is known that the error of GPS range of a satellite 
with lower elevation could be larger than that of a higher satellite due to the 
correlation between atmospheric delay and satellite elevation. This suggests that GPS 
range should be weighted according to the satellite elevation. Weighting GPS ranges 
will give different DOP or ARP values from the traditional values. The a priori 
variances of the pseudorange measurements can be estimated by statistical methods. 
The general model of variance component estimation is (Searle et al., 1992) 
y= Xf3+Zu (2.2) 
where 
y: an N x 1 vector of measurements, 
[3: a p x 1 vector of fixed effect parameters occurring in measurements, 
X: a known N x p coefficient matrix, 
u: a vector of random effects occurring in measurements, u can be 
ul 
partitioned into a series of r sub-vectors, u = 
u2 
Z: a coefficient matrix corresponding to u. 
With the assumptions below, 
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where 
E(y) = Xf3 
E(u) = 0 
2 D(ui)=ai lq
1
, i = 1,2,. · ·,r 
cov(ui,u j) = 0, , i, j = 1,2,- · ·, r 
E: expectation operator, 
D: variance operator, 
cov: covariance operator, 
a?: variance of random effect ui , 
(2.3) 
lq
1 
: an qi x qi identity matrix, where qi is the number of elements in ui. 
The variance component estimation is to estimate a? with measurements y and 
measurement equation (2.2) under the assumptions (2.3). Methods of estimating 
variance components have been well developed in statistics. They include the so-
called ANOV A method, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation (REML), Bayes estimation, etc. (Searle et al., 1992). 
In geodesy, there are three important methods widely used: Helmert's least squares 
method (Li, 1988), Kubik's maximum likelihood method (Kubik, 1970) and Rao's 
MINQUE (Minimum Norm Quadratic Unbiased Estimation) method (Rao, 1973). It 
is known that MINQUE method is equivalent to REML method based on nmmality 
assumption (Searle et al., 1992). The Helmert method is a special case of MINQUE 
method (Cui et al., 1992). 
The difficulty in applying these methods lies in the partition of random effects u in 
measurements and determination of the coefficient matrix Z. For the problem of 
analysing variances of GPS C/ A pseudorange measurements, it seems quite difficult 
to establish an equation like Equation (2.2). One solution is to divide the GPS 
pseudoranges into a few of independent groups according to satellite elevation, with 
each group of measurements having a variance component. In this way, the variance 
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components of GPS CIA pseudoranges can be easily estimated by the Helmert 
method. In the following, the Helmert method is presented followed by result 
analysis of the method's application to GPS pseudorange measurements. 
2.5.1 HELMERT VARIANCE COMPONENT ESTIMATE 
Assume the following linearised error equations: 
l + v = A x (2.4) 
nxl nxl nxmmxl 
with assumptions: 
E(l) =Ax 
D(l) aJ' p-l = K (2.5) 
where 
l: measurement vector of n elements, 
v: measurement residual vector of n elements, 
A: design matrix of order n x m, 
x: unknown vector of m elements; x is the estimate of x, for example, if 
the least-squares estimation used, xLS =(AT PAf1 AT Pl; x is the 
expectation of .X , 
P: weight matrix of l of order n x n , 
a o : standard deviation of l, 
K: variance matrix of l of order n x n . 
Assuming there are k groups of measurements, each group has ni (i = 1,2, · · ·, k) 
measurements with measurements of one group being uncorrelated to the 
measurements in other groups, the variance matrix of l can be expressed: 
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2 R-1 
cro1 11 0 0 0 
0 2 p-1 0 0 K= cro2 22 2p-1 (2.6) = cro 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 p-1 aok kk 
where 
a Oi : standard deviation of measurements of group i, 
P;,i : weight matrix of measurements of group i. 
There exist the following equations: 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
0 0 
A1 AI 0 0 
A2 0 A2 0 A= = + +···+ (2.9) 
0 0 
2 R-1 
(j 01 11 0 0 0 Ku 0 0 0 
0 2 p-1 0 0 0 K22 0 0 K= cro2 22 = 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 p-1 aok kk 0 0 0 Kkk 
(2.10) 
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0 0 
v= 
0 v2 0 
+ +···+ (2.11) 
0 0 
From the least-squares solution of unknowns, it is known that the residuals can be 
computed by (Yu et al., 1990): 
v = Ax LS -l = (AQA T P- I)l 
where I is an identity matrix, 
The residuals of measurements of group i are: 
v·=A·x-l· l l l A-QATPz-z. =(A·QATP-l·)l=D·l l l l l l 
ro 0 0 ol 
lo 0 0 ol I (1 0 o~ I 
1· =I o ol l 0 0 l~ I 0 1 j I 
lo 0 0 oJ 
k 
D; =A;QATP-1; = L.A;Q(ATP)j-Ii 
j=l 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
It is known that, if random vector Y has mean T] and variance 2:, B is a symmetric 
positive definite matrix, the expectation of yT BY can be determined by (Li, 1988): 
E(YT BY)= tr(Bl:) + T] T BT] (2.17) 
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where tr denotes trace operator. It is known from the least-squares theory (Yu et al., 
1990) that 
where 
T N·· =A- P.·A· ll l ll l 
Using Equation (2.17) with B Pii, 17 = vi, 
k 
E(vt ~ivi) = tr{ LPiiD(vi )} 
j=l 
After some operations, the above equation becomes: 
2 T T T 
+Oio·(I· -2A P·AQ+ A P·AQA· P·AQ)} ll llll llll llll 
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
Replacing the expectation with estimate, the rigorous Helmert formula is given as 
(Li, 1988): 
T 2 T -1 T T 
v· P·v· = So·tr{P· (AQ:A· P· I·)P. (A-Q:A· P·- I·) } l ll l l ll l l ll l ll l l ll l 
k 
+ ~ S02 ·tr{P··A ·Q:A·T P··A ·Q:A·T} "'-' 1 ]]] l ]]] l 
j=l,j:f.:.i 
(2.20) 
or 
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k 
vJ Pvi = S~i(ni- 2tr{P;iAiQAJ}) + LS~}r{PjjAjQA/ PjjAjQAir} 
j=l,j¢i 
(i=l, ... , k) (2.21) 
Where s6 J (j = 1,2, · · ·, k) is the estimated variance component of measurements in 
group j. So, s1;1 (j = 1,2, · · ·, k) can be solved from k equations by iteration. 
2.5.2 VARIANCE COMPONENT ESTIMATE OF GPS PSEUDORANGE 
In the navigational application of Helmert variance component estimate, the GPS 
pseudoranges are divided into two groups by setting up an elevation boundary Eleb. 
That is, the pseudorange of satellite i, the elevation of which is below Eleb, is 
classified as group 1 observation, otherwise group 2 observation. Thus, the following 
two equations hold: 
v[ Pjy 1= s1J1 (n1- 2tr{NuQ} + tr{NuQNuQ}) + s1J2tr{N 22QNuQ} 
(2.22) 
vi P2v 2= s1;1tr{NuQN22Q}+ s1J2Cn2- 2tr{N22Q} + tr{N22QN22Q}) 
(2.23) 
A variance component estimation was performed using the real GPS pseudorange 
measurements. The results are discussed below. 
CASE 1: 
Observation Source: AUSNA V GPS base station Hobart, 
Receiver Type: Rogue, 
Observation Date: 28/0811995, 
Observation Time: Oh 45m to 2h 45m (UTC), 
Sampling Rate: 30 seconds. 
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Table 2.3: GPS Pseudorange Variance Component Estimate CASE 1 
EB EM MODEL NUM1 NUM2 VC1 VC2 RATIO 
15 5.0 4 118 1533 818 668 1.22 
15 5.0 5 118 1533 839 663 1.27 
15 7.5 4 107 1533 877 668 1.31 
15 7.5 5 107 1533 901 663 1.36 
20 5.0 4 241 1410 943 634 1.49 
20 5.0 5 241 1410 966 627 1.54 
20 7.5 4 230 1410 977 634 1.54 
20 7.5 5 230 1410 1001 626 1.60 
25 5.0 4 452 1199 776 642 1.21 
25 5.0 5 452 1199 786 634 1.24 
25 7.5 4 441 1199 789 642 1.23 
25 7.5 5 441 1199 801 634 1.26 
30 5.0 4 656 995 694 669 1.04 
30 5.0 5 656 995 703 658 1.07 
30 7.5 4 645 995 702 669 1.05 
30 7.5 5 645 995 711 658 1.08 
CASE2: 
Observation Source: AUSNA V GPS base station Hobart, 
Receiver Type: Rogue, 
Observation Date: 24/05/94, 
Observation Time: 16h to 20h (UTC), 
Sampling Rate: 120 seconds. 
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Table 2.4: GPS Pseudoran~e Variance ComEonent Estimate CASE.2 
EB EM MODEL NUM1 NUM2 VC1 VC2 RATIO 
15 5.0 4 129 803 783 501 1.56 
15 5.0 5 129 803 775 502 1.54 
15 7.5 4 104 803 800 496 1.61 
15 7.5 5 104 803 790 498 1.59 
20 5.0 4 180 752 749 490 1.53 
20 5.0 5 180 752 743 492 1.51 
20 7.5 4 155 752 749 487 1.54 
20 7.5 5 155 752 742 488 1.52 
25 5.0 4 240 692 728 475 1.53 
25 5.0 5 240 692 723 477 1.52 
25 7.5 4 215 692 722 472 1.53 
25 7.5 5 215 692 716 475 1.51 
30 5.0 4 314 618 675 472 1.43 
30 5.0 5 314 618 671 474 1.42 
30 7.5 4 289 618 661 471 1.40 
30 7.5 5 289 618 656 473 1.39 
In Tables 2.3 and 2.4, 
EB: elevation boundary to group GPS pseudoranges, in 
degrees. The pseudoranges of satellites lower than EB 
are put into group 1, others group 2, 
EM: 
MODEL: 
NUM1: 
NUM2: 
VC1: 
VC2: 
RATIO: 
elevation mask angle, in degrees, 
navigation model used. 4 stands for position and clock 
bias used as unknowns in the solution. 5 stands for 
position, clock bias and clock drift used as unknowns 
in the solution, 
number of pseudoranges in group 1, 
number of pseudoranges in group 2, 
variance component of observations of group 1, in m 2 , 
variance component of observations of group 2, in m 2 , 
ratio ofVC1 to VC2. 
From observing these two tables, we find: 
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• obviously, the variance components for pseudoranges with different 
elevation are different regardless of the model used. The lower the satellite 
elevation is, the larger the variance component of its pseudorange 
observation is. 
• The variance component ratio reaches its highest value when EB is at 15 or 
20 degrees. Assuming the weight of pseudoranges in group 2 as 1, the 
weight of pseudoranges in group 1 is about 1/1.2 to 1/1.6. 
The effect of weighting GPS range measurements on GPS positioning accuracy (DOP 
values) can be seen from the following figures, where Weighting Scheme 1 indicates 
weighting satellite lower than 20 degrees with 1/1.2, Weighting Scheme 2 indicates 
weighting satellite lower than 20 degrees with 1/1.6. The computations were done for 
the following case: 
Location: 
Date: 
Time: 
37 degrees South Latitude, 137 degrees East Longitude, 
13/06/1995, 
14h oom to 20h 40m UTC, 
Constellation: the Optimal Constellation (Green et al., 1989). 
From these two figures, it is seen that the DOP values are strongly dependent on the 
pseudorange weighting. The largest PDOP difference between unweighted 
pseudorange and Weighted Scheme 1 is 0.57, and the largest PDOP difference 
between the unweighted scheme and Weighting Scheme 2 is 1.67; the largest HDOP 
difference between the unweighted scheme and Weighting Scheme 1 is 0.30, and the 
largest PDOP difference between the unweighted scheme and Weighting Scheme 2 is 
0.89. 
The weighting effect on ARP will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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2.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter the relevant background information on the GPS navigation service 
has been presented. Firstly, the GPS SPS navigation en·or sources were discussed. 
Then two examples of GPS service failures due to signal interference and satellite 
failure were presented. Finally, the accuracy of GPS CIA pseudoranges and its 
dependence on satellite elevation angle was analysed. 
The interference can cause the receiver wholly jammed, or large navigation error 
depending on the interferencing signal power. The satellite failure definitely degrades 
the navigation service performance over a large area. Both two examples showed the 
possible causes of the GPS integrity failure and the imp01iance of the GPS integrity 
monitoring. 
The variance component estimate of GPS Cl A pseudorange showed the relationship 
between the accuracy of the CIA pseudorange and the satellite elevation. It showed 
the variance component of the pseudoranges of lower satellites is larger than that of 
higher satellites, their ratio reaches maximum when the elevation boundary is at 15 or 
20 degrees. Consequently, the effect of weighting GPS measurement on DOP is 
significant. 
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CHAPTER3 
REQUIRED NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE 
Target level of safety (TLS) of the aircraft is the dominant element of concern to the 
community. With the increasing air traffic capacity requirement of the civil aviation 
and application of new technology, the safety level must be maintained or further 
enhanced. The navigation systems, which affect the TLS, must satisfy the required 
navigation performance (RNP). RNP has been developed and applied by ICAO in 
recent years (AWOP, 1993; AWOP RNP, 1993; DIAS MASPS, 1993). In the 
application of RNP to aircraft navigation, RNP is usually defined by four parameters: 
accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability. 
This chapter first gives an introduction to the aircraft tunnel concept. Then the RNP 
parameters for the aircraft precision approach are discussed. As an example, the RNP 
risk allocations for CAT I precision approach using DGNSS are presented. These risk 
allocation results will be used in Chapter 5 where the integrity and continuity risk 
analysis of the precision approach and landing using a differential GPS navigation 
system is carried out. 
Also, the integrity requirements for GPS application in the en route, terminal and 
non-precision phases of flight are introduced. A brief discussion of the GPS integrity 
monitoring methods then follows. 
3.1 TUNNEL CONCEPT AND RNP 
With the increasing air traffic capacity requirement of the civil aviation and the 
application of new technologies, such as satellite navigation and satellite 
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communication, the safety level must be maintained or further enhanced. All of this 
may be difficult to achieve using traditional methods. A distinctive solution to this 
airspace management problem is the tunnel concept with RNP parameters. 
Any phase of flight, such as takeoff, climb, cruise, approach and landing, can be 
assigned a path along which the aircraft will successfully traverse if the aircraft and 
its navigation system satisfy the RNP for that phase of flight. Around this flight path 
is specified an aircraft containment surface, which is called a tunnel. If an aircraft 
stays inside its designed tunnel except for intentional leave, then it will avoid 
collision with other aircraft, terrain, and obstacles, etc. In contrast, a tunnel incident 
occurs only if the aircraft leaves its tunnel unintentionally, which has the possibility 
of developing into an aircraft accident. 
An aircraft tunnel is defined by an outer tunnel and an inner tunnel. The dimension of 
the aircraft containment surface defines the outer tunnel, while the inner tunnel 
dimension specifies the allowable 95 percent aircraft deviation about the tunnel 
center (the assigned flight path). The total system error (TSE), which comprises of 
the flight technical error (FTE) and the navigation system error (NSE), must satisfy 
both the inner and outer tunnel dimensions. 
For precision approach and landing, the tunnel concept has been applied to create the 
simple airspace protection criterion: an aircraft is allowed to unintentionally leave the 
outer tunnel only once in 10 million approaches (tunnel incident risk), including 
aircraft or navigation failures (DIAS MASPS, 1993). 
The tunnel concept is actually expressed by RNP parameters. Risk allocation to RNP 
parameters should ensure that the aircraft tunnel incident risk is not exceeded. Thus, 
the key to meet the tunnel incident risk requirement is to properly define the RNP 
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parameters and allocate the tunnel incident risk to associated RNP parameters, such 
as accuracy, integrity and continuity. 
3.2 REQUIRED NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
3.2.1 RNP PARAMETER DEFINITION 
Principally, RNP is an airspace system function and not a navigation sensor function. 
That is, any combination of avionics sensors are permitted if they provide the 
required RNP. In other words, RNP addresses the total system performance which is 
dependent on' signal-in-space, hardware and software. For the precision approach 
phase of flight, the ICAO All-Weather Operations Panel (AWOP) 14, in January 
1993, specified RNP by four parameters -- accuracy, integrity, continuity and 
availability. The ICAO definitions of the RNP parameters for precision approach 
(AWOP, 1993) are: 
• Accuracy is the ability of the total system to maintain the aircraft position 
with a total system error with a 95 percent probability (called the inner 
tunnel) and to stay within the outer tunnel, which defines the obstacle 
clearance, ten·ain avoidance, or aircraft separation criteria for the intended 
operation. The TSE is based on the 95 percent probability combination of 
aircraft and non-aircraft sensor errors, display errors, and flight technical 
errors at each point along the specified procedure. For approach, the outer 
tunnel must satisfy 1-1 o-7 probability per approach. It is intended that the 
outer tunnel be used as the obstacle clearance surface 
• Integrity is the quality which relates to the trust that can be placed in the 
correctness of the information supplied by the total system. Integrity risk is 
the probability of undetected [latent] failure of the specified accuracy. 
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Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide timely warnings to the 
user when the system should not be used for the intended operation. 
• Continuity is the ability of the total system to perform its function without 
nonscheduled interruptions during the intended operation. The continuity 
risk is the probability that the system will be unintentionally interrupted 
and not provide guidance information for the intended operation. 
• Availability is the ability of the total system to provide the required 
guidance at the initiation of the intended operation. Availability risk is the 
probability that the required guidance will not be present at the initiation of 
the intended operation. 
3.2.2 RNP PARAMETER RATIONALE 
The rationale for selection of the tunnel concept RNP parameters proceeds as follows 
(AWOP, 1993). 
ACCURACY: National airspace requirement and obstacle environment dictate the 
dimension of the tunnel-in-space. The aircraft must not leave the tunnel because it 
may collide with another aircraft, the terrain, or an obstacle. A guidance system, 
therefore, is necessary whose accuracy is commensurate with the tunnel dimension so 
that the aircraft can be steered down the tunnel under all weather conditions. The 
measure of accuracy is the Total System Error (TSE), which is a combination of the 
navigation sensor error and the flight technical error; its specification is the inner and 
the outer tunnel dimensions. 
CONTINUITY: Clearly the aircraft flight control system and the navigation system 
must not suffer equipment failures which generate guidance which causes the aircraft 
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to inadvertently leave the tunnel. Monitoring system is necessary to remove the 
guidance when it is inaccurate due to failures. Loss of the guidance alerts the pilot to 
abort the approach and initiate a missed approach procedure. Flight safety is 
maintained because the pilot leaves the tunnel on purpose. Thus the navigation 
system must not only be accurate, it must also be reliable if the flight mission is to be 
successfully completed. Since the critical exposure time is less than 5 minutes, a 
shmt term reliability called continuity must be defined. 
INTEGRITY: Should the monitoring system fail without alerting the pilot, the 
guidance system could subsequently fail or degrade, leading to improper and 
inaccurate guidance. Under such conditions, the navigation system could lead the 
aircraft outside the tunnel because the failure is not detectable. Consequently, an 
integrity level must also be defined to minimize the effects of latent failures. 
AVAILABILITY: The three RNP parameters discussed above all contribute to keep 
the aircraft in the tunnel. Availability, the fourth RNP parameter, defines the 
probability that the total system guidance is provided at the initiation of the aircraft's 
descent down the final approach tunnel. Unlike the other RNP parameters, it does not 
directly contribute to the loss of the aircraft risk. All functions must be available at 
the initiation of the tunnel final approach. 
3.3 RNP APPLICATION TO PRECISION APPROACH AND LANDING 
In the application of RNP parameters, each significant risk of all the components, 
such as aircraft, ground and transmission component, in navigation system should 
be accounted. Usually four steps are employed (AWOP, 1993). Firstly, a TLS 
reflecting acceptable safety risk is defined by the aviation community. Secondly, this 
risk is allocated to each subsystem component to ensure that navigation system will 
satisfy the required TLS. Thirdly, a capability verification process must be in place to 
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ensure that the design can achieve the safety level specified by the allocated risks. 
The certification process and flight crew qualification verify that the aircraft has the 
capability to stay in the tunnel. The fourth step, surveillance and continued 
airworthiness, ensures that all aircraft continue to meet the RNP tunnel requirements 
while in operational service. Figure 3.1 illustrates the complete RNP application 
process. 
I ICAOTLS I 
1 I Accident to Incident Ratio I 
1 
I Tunnel Incident Risk I 
1 
I RNP Risk Allocation I 
I 
L L 
Aircraft RNP Non Aircraft RNP 
1 1 
Airborne System Non Airborne System 
Specification Specification 
1 1 
ICAO SARPs Required 
ICAO SARPs Not for Ground/ Air 
Required Interoperability 
Figure 3.1: Proposed RNP Process: TLS to System Specifications 
(SARPs is Standards and Recommended Practices) (From Kelly and Davis, 1994) 
In the following the RNP and tunnel architecture for CAT I approach operation is 
given as an example. The tunnel architecture is based on a single approach. That is, 
the tunnel dimension is the same for all approaches. 
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CAT I approach associated RNP is defined over the range from the final approach fix 
(F AF) down to the 200 feet decision height. The proposed RNP values for CAT I 
approach are shown in Figure 3.2. 
RNP Continuity 
Incident per 
Approach 3.3 X 1 o-8 
Pilot Missed 
Detection and Pilot 
Failure to 
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Missed Approach 
Before DH 
A 
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1x 10-4 
1 
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2x1o-5 
Non 
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8x1o-5 
TLS(Approach) =10-8 
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Containment Surface 
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Incident per Approach 
3.3x 10-8 
Excessive TSE Tunnel 
Incident Alarm Missed 
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Failure to Transition to 
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per Approach 
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Before DH 0.25 
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1.3x 10-7 
Non 
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4x10-8 
Data 
Base 
3x 10-8 
Figure 3.2: RNP Tunnel Incident Risk for CAT I Operations (from AWOP, 1993) 
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TLS= 1 o-8 for CAT I approach is connected with the 1 o-7 tunnel incident by 
assuming an accident to incident ratio =0.1. This ratio is based on historical accident 
data (Kelly and Davis, 1994) 
In Figure 3.2, the tunnel incident risk is spread equally over the three RNP 
parameters, each having a values of 3.3 x 1 o-8 because there is no historical data to 
indicate that the risks should be allocated differently. 
It is noted that the allowable integrity and continuity risks per approach of 150 
seconds related with the aircraft component are 6x 10-8 and 2x 10-5 , respectively. 
3.4 GPS INTEGRITY MONITORING METHODS 
3.4.1 GPS NAVIGATION INTEGRITY REQUIREMENT 
As mentioned above, integrity is defined as the ability of a system to provide timely 
warnings to users when the system should be not used for navigation. In the civil 
aviation application of GPS, the integrity requirement is specified based on strict safety 
requirement. 
As for the en route, terminal, and non-precision approach phases of flight, integrity is 
required to ensure that an aircraft remains inside its assigned tunnel. Any intolerable 
aircraft deviation from its assigned flight path could result in a collision, or in a large 
navigation bias which could make it difficult to reestablish the intended route. The 
probability of a collision with another aircraft or a fixed obstacle due to the loss of 
integrity of a navigation system should be extremely improbable, which translates into 
a probability of collision of less than 10-9 per hour (Farrell and van Grass, 1991). 
Based on this probability, the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) 
Special Committee 159 developed tentative GPS integrity performance requirements 
which specified the quantitative standards for alarm limit, maximum allowable alarm 
rate, time to alarm, and minimum detection probability for the en route, terminal and 
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non-precision approach phases of flight (RTCA D0-208, 1991). These standards have 
been recommended for use by GPS as a supplemental navigation system and are listed 
in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Integrity Specifications of GPS Supplemental Use 
Phase of Flight Alarm Minimum Maximum Time to 
En Route 
Terminal 
Non-precision 
AEEroach 
Limit Detection Prob. Alarm Rate Alarm 
2.0 nm 0.999 0.002 /hr 30 s 
1.0 nm 0.999 0.002 /hr 10 s 
0.3 nm 0.999 0.002 /hr 10 s 
The integrity requirements with GPS/W AAS for the en route, terminal and non-
precision approach phases of flight are summarised in Table 3.2 from MOPS 
GPSIW AAS (1995) 
Table 3.2: Integrity SEecifications of GPSI¥( AAS Airborne EguiEment 
Phase of Flight Alarm Minimum Maximum Time to 
En Route 
Terminal 
Non-precision 
AEEroach 
Limit Detection Prob. Alarm Rate Alarm 
1.0 nm 0.999 0.00001 /hr 8 s 
1.0 nm 0.999 0.00001 /hr 8 s 
0.3 nm 0.999 0.00001 /hr 8 s 
The integrity and continuity requirements for precision approach with Differential 
Global Navigation Satellite System (DGNSS) are 6 X 10-8 and 2 X 10-5 per approach 
of 150 seconds with regard to the aircraft components, respectively (DIAS MASPS, 
1993). 
Although the integrity requirements of a primary means navigation system have not 
been released, It is expected that a primary means navigation system should be 
supported by an integrity assurance system with very high reliability and availability, 
especially in failure identification. 
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To achieve the required integrity specifications, GPS integrity must be monitored. 
There are two kinds of integrity monitoring methods. One is the internal method, such 
as RAIM. The other is the external method, such as GIC (GPS/GNSS Integrity 
Channel). 
3.4.2 INTERNAL MONITORING 
The internal method of GPS integrity monitoring is based on the full use of the 
measurements accessible by the avionics. The measurements could be GPS ranges, 
altimeter altitude, INS output, etc. The method applies statistical theory to evaluate 
whether the navigation solution is within the alarm limit. The receiver autonomous 
integrity monitoring (RAIM) is the model for the internal method. 
RAIM is a vehicle self-contained GPS integrity monitoring technique. It uses redundant 
observations to detect whether there is any observation fault causing the required 
navigation accuracy violation. If this violation occurs, a warning is issued to stop 
navigation with GPS, or a fault isolation/exclusion procedure is applied to prevent the 
navigation from using faulty observations, see Figure 3.3. 
X 
1245 
X 
1234 
X 
Figure 3.3: illustration of RAIM Principle 
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In Figure 3.3, the circle centre is for the true position, the circle represents the required 
navigation accuracy. There are 5 pseudoranges (numbered as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) used in 
the solution. The solution integrity can be checked by 5 navigation solutions each with 
one pseudorange removed. These five solutions to the position are shown in Figure 3.3, 
where each position is indicated by x, and the numbers of used pseudoranges are shown 
above x. If all the solutions are within the circle, it is said that there is no navigation 
service failure. Otherwise, if there are one or more solutions being outside the circle, it 
is concluded that there exists a navigation service failure for the specific alarm limit. 
The efficiency of RAIM is closely dependent on the receiver-satellite geometry, and 
RAIM may not always be available. Many investigations on RAIM availability have 
been done (eg., Van Dyke, 1992, Lee, 1993, Misra et al., 1993; Sang et al, 1995a). The 
conclusion is that the stand alone GPS constellation does not provide the required 
RAIM availability and GPS must be augmented if it is to be used as a primary 
navigation means for en route to non-precision phases of flight. The non GPS 
measurements which are helpful to improve the RAIM availability include barometric 
altitude, receiver clock coasting, geostationary satellite range, etc. The improvement 
will be discussed in Chapter 7 in detail. 
From its principles, the properties of RAIM can be summarised as follows: 
• it is a real time integrity monitoring method and has no delay or very short 
delay in Time to Alarm, 
• it is mathematically simple and practically easy to implement, 
• it can detect any local signal interference, 
• the efficiency of RAIM is closely related to satellite geometry. 
RAIM is required to be implemented on the avionics (TSO C-129, 1992), and plays an 
important role in the integrity monitoring for the phases of flight en route, terminal and 
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non-precision approach. The integrity monitoring for the aircraft precision approach is 
intended to use a different internal algorithm based on the RNP tunnel concept. This 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
3.4.3 EXTERNAL MONITORING 
The external method of GPS integrity monitoring is a ground-based integrity 
monitoring strategy. The type of this method is GPS Integrity Channel (GIC). 
With GIC, a ground integrity monitoring network (independent of the GPS Control 
Segment) tracks GPS signals and monitors the GPS satellite integrity. Any excessive 
satellite signal errors are indicated on a GPS integrity message broadcast by a master 
control centre to GPS users. With the integrity monitoring network composed of widely 
distributed tracking stations, the GPS signal failure can be relatively easily detected and 
isolated within the required Time to Alarm. The problem is how to disseminate the 
integrity message to the users. The most favourite option is using the geostationary 
satellites to broadcast the integrity message. 
Based on this GIC concept, the Wide-Area Augmentation System (W AAS) is being 
developed in the US incorporating both GIC function and DGPS function together. In 
addition, the geostationary satellites also transmit the GPS-like ranging signals. Thus, 
the accuracy and integrity are improved. 
The properties of GIC/W AAS integrity monitoring can be summarised below: 
• it has wide integrity monitoring coverage, 
• the integrity decision can be made from multiple sources and previous 
information, 
• the integrity message has delay with respect to the integrity failure event, 
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• it may not be able to detect any local signal failure. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter the tunnel concept applied in the civil aviation navigation have been 
introduced. Based on the tunnel concept, RNP parameters -- accuracy, integrity, 
continuity and availability are discussed. An example of applying RNP to the 
precision approach is presented. In addition, the integrity requirements and general 
integrity monitoring methods are discussed. 
The integrity of GPS aviation navigation is particularly focused on in this thesis. To 
meet the stringent integrity requirements it is therefore necessary to develop integrity 
monitoring techniques. In the next chapters various approaches to coping with the 
GPS navigation integrity issue will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER4 
PROBABILITY THEORY OF GPS NAVIGATION SERVICE 
When using GPS as a navigation aid, it is crucial to know the safety and reliability 
level of GPS. Whenever there is any service failure which causes or may cause the 
violation of the required accuracy, the users should be warned or the service should 
be terminated. 
From reliability theory, system integrity failure is inevitable, but it can be minimised 
by detecting and isolating failure sources using an integrity monitoring system. A 
GPS integrity monitoring system may be composed of different components such as a 
space, a control and a user segment. The system should be designed to monitor, 
detect, isolate and report any service failure with the integrity requirements 
demanded by the user community. 
In this chapter, the relationship between the probability of the GPS navigation service 
and the service failure time are first studied according to probability theory. 
Examples are given to explain probability meanings of some navigation performance 
requirements. Then, the analysis of a system's response to failure is carried out, and 
the response ability of both the internal and external monitoring methods is analysed. 
4.1 PROBABILITY OF GPS NAVIGATION SERVICE 
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
GPS operates with two service levels: Precise Positioning Service (PPS) and Standard 
Positioning Service (SPS) on the full operational constellation of 21+3 satellites in six 
orbital planes. The GPS system has been widely used in many fields. In particular, 
GPS-based primary means navigation system for civil aviation, such as W AAS and 
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GNSS, expected to be realised for the flight phases from the en route through to the 
precision approach (W AAS Specification, 1995; DIAS MASPS, 1993). 
However, stand alone GPS has three major technical deficiencies: 
• Insufficient service availability constrained by the limited number of 
satellites. This limitation can cause poor satellite geometry (larger DOP 
values) for some locations over some time periods, and the poor satellite 
geometry significantly degrades the navigation service performance. 
• Intentional or unintentional degradation of the system performance caused 
by Selective Availability (SA), satellite failure or signal interference as 
discussed in Section 2.4. 
• Insufficient system integrity. For example, a GPS satellite may transmit 
erroneous information for a few hours before being repaired or terminated 
(Gower and Mathon, 1990). In these cases, many users of this satellite will 
experience false position determination and may remain unaware of the 
problem. 
The impact of these deficiencies on the navigation service will depend on a number of 
factors: the satellite constellation, the type of user, the location of user, the service level 
expected, and the applied instruments and algorithms available to overcome these 
deficiencies. Generally, GPS navigation services can be classified as follows: 
• Provide position; 
• Provide position and detect possible integrity failure, such as in the case of 
GPS when used as a supplemental navigation system for aircraft operation; 
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• Provide position and permit continuous navigation by isolating integrity 
failures, such as in the case of GPS when used as a primary means 
navigation system for aircraft operation. 
The availability of GPS SPS navigation services has been investigated extensively ( eg., 
Green et al., 1989; Durand et al., 1990; Kubik et al., 1995). However, it is still 
necessary to make a general study of the probability problem related to the GPS 
navigation service and give an explicit definition of the required probability for GPS as 
a supplemental or primary means navigation system. These probability definitions are 
proposed in section 4.1.2. Section 4.1.3 gives two examples to explain the probability 
meaning of the minimum detection probability and continuity requirements. 
4.1.2 PROBABILITIES OF SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL GPS NAVIGATION 
SERVICES 
The probability problem of a GPS navigation service is analysed over a specified time 
interval T. The GPS system provides the users with the navigation service at a nominal 
accuracy level for time Tservice ::;; T. According to probability theory (Barlow, 1989), 
the probability of the GPS navigation service available with a nominal accuracy is 
defined as: 
p _ Tservice 
available - T (4.1) 
Obviously Pavailable ::;; 1. It defines the probability that the navigation service is 
available for a specific application, and depends on the GPS system behaviour and 
user's accuracy requirement. A value for this parameter will vary between 0.99 and 1.0 
for PPS under the assumption that GPS will provide near-continuous coverage and at 
least a 16 m spherical error probable to PPS users with the full operational 
constellation. Pavailable for the SPS will vary between 0.95 and 1.0 for the horizontal 
accuracy level of 100 m 2 drms, depending on the configuration of SA (Conley and 
Wilfong, 1991). 
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The navigation service may be corrupted by some natural or human causes. Any 
condition which causes a user to experience a loss in navigation, or instantaneous 
performance loss beyond the nominal service accuracy is defined as a GPS navigation 
service failure (Conley and Wilfong, 1991). The probability of GPS experiencing 
service failures over time Tis defined as: 
p _ Tfailure 
failure- T (4.2) 
where Tfailure is the time of service failures during T. 
Some of the service failures can be mitigated before the user's accuracy threshold is 
violated. Others may result in an integrity failure where the users cannot use GPS for 
their navigation purpose for a certain time interval and with the required navigation 
accuracy. So the integrity failure events are subsets of service failure events. The 
probability of mitigating the GPS navigation service failure over time interval Tis: 
~ntegrity Tfailure - 1integrity failure T 
where 7integrity failure is the time of integrity failures. 
(4.3) 
The probability Psafe with which the user will be provided a safe navigation service is 
defined as: 
Psafe = Pavailable- Pfailure + ~ntegrity (4.4) 
Considering Equations ( 4.1) to ( 4.3), it follows 
p _ Tservice - 7integrity failure 
safe- T (4.5) 
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There is also the possibility of issuing a false warning or a wrong termination of the 
GPS service, so the probability of false warning or wrong termination is defined as: 
P wrong warning 
T wrong warning 
T 
(4.6) 
where Twrong warning is the time of normal GPS service termination caused by false 
warning or wrong termination. So the probability Psuccess with which the user is 
provided with the successful service can be defined as: 
p = Tservice -7integrity failure - Twrong warning 
success T (4.7) 
Considering Equations (4.5) and (4.6), it follows 
Psuccess = Psafe - P wrong warning (4.8) 
This means 
Psuccess ~ Psafe (4.9) 
Clearly, Psafe or Psuccess represents the primary design parameter of an integrity 
monitoring system. When the GPS navigation system is used as a supplemental 
navigation system, parameter Psafe can be used. A low limit of Psafe for an integrity 
monitoring system should not be exceeded for a safe navigation system. It is easy to see 
that Psafe is controlled by Pavailable and ~ntegrity . 
When GPS is used as a primary means navigation system, there is a great demand on 
the continuity performance. In addition to a true warning or correct termination of the 
navigation service, any service termination caused by false warning or wrong 
termination also contributes to the degradation of the continuity performance. Thus 
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Twrong warning must not exceed a certain limit to ensure that the GPS navigation 
service has the required continuity performance. From Equation (4.8), it is seen 
Psuccess reflects this continuity requirement, so it can be used as the primary design 
parameter of an integrity monitoring system when GPS is used as the primary means 
navigation system. 
A problem may arise from the relationship Psafe ~ Pavailable ~ 1.0 if a navigation 
system is required to have Psafe ~ 0.999 . This requirement is impossible to achieve 
because Pavailable for GPS SPS service requiring 100 metre accuracy is only 0.95, or 
for GPS SPS aircraft non-precision approach not-to-exceed threshold of 300-500 metre 
is only 0.99 (GPS SPS Signal Specification, 1993). This difficulty is caused by the 
relationship Tservice ~ T. But in practical applications, it is required indeed that Psafe 
be greater than a specific low limit over a time domain. This leads us to assume 
Pavailable = 1 which is equivalent to the assumption of T = Tservice. Thus, Equation 
( 4.5) becomes: 
p = l _ Tintegrity failure 
safe 
Tservice 
(4.10) 
It is seen that Psafe represents a conditional probability under the condition of 
T = Tservice. Assuming Tservice is one year, the relationship of Psafe to 
Tintegrity failure is illustrated in Figure 4.1. From this figure, it is known that the 
probability Psafe of 0.9999 requires a Tintegrity failure less than 0.876 hours. 
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between Psafe and Iintegrity failure Assuming Tservice = 1 year 
Similarly, Psuccess is also a conditional probability given Pavailable = 1, and Equation 
(4.7) becomes 
p = l _ Iintegrity failure + Twrong warning 
success T . 
servzce 
(4.11) 
4.1.3 EXAMPLES 
In this section, the above theory is applied to explain the probability meanings of some 
of the navigation performance requirements given in Section 3 .4.1. 
4.1.3.1 MINIMUM DETECTION PROBABILITY 
The minimum integrity failure detection probability for supplemental use of GPS in the 
en route, tenninal and non-precision approach phases of flight is 0.999. If RAIM is 
used to detect GPS integrity failure, then at least 5 visible satellites are required to be 
available. 
The evaluation of the GPS satellite visibility over an area with south latitudes ranging 
from 5 to 50 degrees and east longitudes 85 to 185 degrees under the Optimal 
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Constellation (Green et al.; 1989) showed that the availability of at least 5 satellites 
above mask angle of7°.5 is only 0.99742. 
The result shows that the availability of RAIM detection function may have the 
maximum value of 0.99742. This means Pavailable will not exceed 0.99742. Thus, a 
possible explanation of the minimum detection probability is the conditional 
probability under the condition of Pavailable =0.99742. That is to say, if there are at 
least 5 satellites visible, the minimum detection probability of 0.999 may be achieved. 
Further study of the RAIM technique has shown that the capability of the RAIM 
detection function is strongly dependent on the alarm limit of the specific phase of 
flight and the satellite geometry (eg., Chin et al., 1992). That is, even if there are 5 or 
more satellites available, RAIM may still not detect the integrity failure with the 
required minimum detection probability due to bad geometry; or it can detect the 
integrity failure with one alarm limit, but can not with another alarm limit. All of these 
resulted in the research of the availability of the satellite geometry for RAIM detection 
function. 
Overall, the above arguments state that the minimum detection probability is a 
conditional probability with the condition that RAIM detection function is available. 
4.1.3.2 CONTINUITY RISK PROBABILITY 
It is known from Chapter 3 that the continuity risk for the aircraft component for the 
precision approach should be less than 2 x 10-5 per approach of 150 seconds. It is 
obvious that there is an assumption that the aircraft navigation system operates with the 
required accuracy except during an intentional interruption within the entire approach 
of 150 seconds. The intentional interruption of the navigation system does not affect the 
continuity risk because the pilot can initiate a missed approach. Only the navigation 
system termination issued by the tunnel penetration warning contributes to the loss of 
continuity. Thus, the continuity risk probability is defined as the probability of the 
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tunnel penetration warning under the condition that the navigation service is available 
except for an intentional interruption. 
4.1.4 BRIEF SUMMARY 
In summary, it is concluded from the above discussion that: 
• Psafe and Psuccess are conditional probabilities based on the assumption of 
Pavailable = 1. 
• Psafe can be used as the primary design parameter of an integrity monitoring 
system for GPS when used as a supplemental navigation means. In fact, the 
meaning of Psafe is the availability of the navigation service. To realise the 
specified Psafe, the only way is to reduce the time of integrity failure 
• Psuccess can be used as the primary design parameter of an integrity 
monitoring system for GPS when used as a primary means navigation 
system. To achieve the specified Psuccess, it is necessary to reduce both the 
time of the integrity failure and the time of the wrong service termination. 
4.2 RESPONSE EFFICIENCY OF AN INTEGRITY MONITORING 
SYSTEM 
4.2.1 RESPONSE OF AN INTEGRITY SYSTEM TO SERVICE FAILURE 
Response of an integrity monitoring system to a service failure will be completed in 
four continuous functions: monitoring, detecting/isolating, reporting and acting. The 
response time is the sum of each function's run time, that is (Conley and Wilfong, 
1991): 
tresponse = tmonitor + tdetect + treport +tact (4.14) 
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where 
tresponse: time required for an integrity monitoring system to respond 
to the integrity failure, 
tmonitor: time required to receive monitoring data and transport to 
detecting function, 
tdetect: time required to detect/isolate failure given data condition, 
treport: time required to communicate failure to acting function, 
time required to terminate service or warn users. 
The response time tresponse can be determined under the condition of specified 
resource reliability, resource coverage and detection algorithm. This parameter is highly 
dependent on the system's components. 
Accuracy 
Position Accuracy Threshold 
I 
I 
Failure Begins 
tresponse 
Time 
~Integrity Failure Acted 
Integrity Failure 
Begins 
Figure 4.2: Time History of a Failure Mode 
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For a service failure mode shown in Figure 4.2, a parameter ~ called the transfer time 
is defined, which is the time needed for a service failure to develop into an integlity 
failure. The relationship between tresponse and ~ is depicted in Figure 4.2. 
~ is different for different service failure modes. It is dependent on the satellite 
geometry, user location, user's accuracy threshold and failure characteristics. Assuming 
the range error for a soft failed satellite SVj can be expressed by: 
Msv (Llt) = Mnominal + Mbias + Ll Vbias x Llt 
J 
(4.15) 
where 
Llt : time since service failure begins, 
MsY; (Llt): range error for satellite SVj, 
Mnominal : range error where failure occurs, 
Mbias : failure mode-specific range bias, and 
Ll vbias : failure mode-specific range rate bias. 
The GPS positioning equation is (Wells et al., 1986): 
R+ M A(X + LlX) (4.16) 
where 
R: measurement vector, 
X: position vector, 
A: design matrix. 
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So the effect of the range error !:lR on the position, M , is: 
L\X = Ux!:lR (4.17) 
where 
(4.18) 
If the first two components of the vector X are the east and north coordinates, then the 
horizontal position error !::..Hj caused by the range error of failed satellite SVj is 
obtained as: 
(4.19) 
Because the nominal range error is normally distributed with zero mean, it is not 
considered as a cause of the violation of position accuracy. The position accuracy 
threshold is violated when the term !:lR.bias + L1 Vbias x L1t exceeds a certain limit. The 
variation of this term will determine the transfer time 'Ti_ • Thus, there could have the 
following cases: 
1. If !:lR.bias is large enough to cause the position accuracy threshold to be 
violation, then 'Ti_ =0. From Figure 4.2 ~ntegrity failure i = tresponse holds; 
2. If !:lR.bias is sufficient small, then Ll vbias is the factor determining whether 
the position accuracy threshold will be violated or not. If after time L1t the 
value of !:lR.bias + L1 Vbias x Llt is large enough to result in the violation of 
the position accuracy threshold, then 
~ = Llt, ~ntegrity failure i = tresponse - ~ ~ 0; 
61 
3. If the value of Mbias + ~ vbias X ~t is always sufficient small during the 
period of service failure, then Iintegrity failure i = 0 . 
4.2.2 RESPONSE ABILITY OF RAIM AND EXTERNAL MONITORING 
SYSTEM 
The response of RAllv1 and external GPS integrity monitoring system to GPS integrity 
failure is studied now. 
4.2.2.1 RESPONSE OF RAIM 
From its principle, when RAllv1 is implemented in receiver's software and the RAIM 
function is available, the integrity monitoring of the GPS navigation solution can be 
carried out in real time. The actual running times of the four functions of the RAIM-
based integrity monitoring system will be: 
tmonitor: 
tdetect: 
treport: 
tact: 
no delay in receiving data and transmitting data to detecting 
function, 
time required to detect/isolate failure, 
no delay in reporting the integrity message to the pilot, 
instantaneous action by the pilot on the occurrence of integrity 
failure. 
Thus, the efficiency of RAil\11 is completely dependent on the RAil\11 ability for 
detecting/isolating the integrity failure. While current RAIM is of snapshot, as it uses 
only the available measurements at the moment, so the detection time of RAIM is 
independent of the signal failure mode, but is dependent on the measurement sampling 
rate. Because the sampling rate demanded by civil aircraft navigation is 1 second or less 
(MOPS GPS/W AAS, 1995), the time to alann requirement listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
can easily be satisfied. The only problems left are the ability and availability of RAIM 
detection and identification. They will be studied in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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4.2.2.2 RESPONSE OF EXTERNAL MONITORING SYSTEM 
An external integrity monitoring system, such as GIC and W AAS, will be composed of 
a ground monitoring network, a processing station and broadcasting satellite(s). A 
ground monitoring network measures the GPS signals and transmits them to the 
processing station, where the processing station processes the received data from the 
monitoring network to make a decision on the integrity status of GPS satellites. The 
broadcasting satellite receives the integrity message from the processing component 
and broadcasts the integrity message to users. The response of such a system to the 
integrity failure is dependent on reliability, availability, and coverage of all the 
components. Here, as an example, the response efficiency of a local DGPS ground 
station monitoring system is analysed. This system will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
Basically, the system is composed of the following components: a GPS receiver to 
measure GPS signals, a personal computer to monitor the signal integrity and generate 
DGPS corrections, and a DGPS data link to transmit the DGPS corrections and 
integrity message. Thus, the running times of the four functions of the system are: 
tmonitor: 
tdetect: 
treport: 
very little delay as the receiver is directly connected to the 
processing computer, this is usually less than 1 second; 
processing time required to detect/isolate failure and generate 
DGPS corrections, and to fmmat the message to be transmitted, 
this is usually less than 0.1 seconds; 
the transmission time from the ground station to the users, this is 
dependent on message transmission rate; and 
it is assumed that the users and user facilities instantaneously act 
on any integrity warning issued by the ground station. 
It can be seen that the response time of the system is mainly dependent on the message 
transmission rate which is determined by the GPS receiver's measurement sampling 
rate, the communication capability of the data link system and the user requirement for 
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accuracy and integrity. If the transmission rate is assumed 5 seconds, then the response 
time of the system to an integrity failure will be less than 6 seconds. 
Thus, assuming the reliability and availability of all the system components are 
guaranteed and that the users are within the coverage of the transmission data link, the 
efficiency of the system in detecting and identifying the signal failure is determined by 
the efficiency and ability of the algorithms used in the processing component. 
4.3 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the relationship between the probability of the GPS navigation service 
and the service failure time have been studied. Two parameters Psafe and Psuccess 
have been proposed which can be used as the primary optimisation parameters for 
designing a GPS integrity monitoring system. Based on the developed theory, the 
meanings of the minimum detection probability and the continuity risk requirement 
given in Section 3.4.1 are explained. 
Furthermore, the response procedure of a GPS integrity monitoring system to 
navigation service failure and the factors affecting the efficiency of the internal and 
external integrity monitoring systems are analysed. It is seen that the efficiency and 
ability of the algorithms used to detect and identify the integrity failure are the most 
important factors affecting the system efficiency under some conditions. This suggests 
that attention should be paid to the aspects of algorithm development and performance 
evaluation. Thus, we concentrate on these issues in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTERS 
INTEGRITY AND CONTINUITY RISK ANALYSIS 
OF PRECISION APPROACH AND LANDING 
Following the tunnel concept in Chapter 3, the RNP parameters--integrity, continuity 
and accuracy of a navigation system must meet the requirement that the probability of 
any part of an aircraft leaving the tunnel without warning shall be less than 1 in 107 
approaches in the precision approach and landing. This requires an integrity risk of 
6x10-8 and continuity risk of 2x10-5 per approach in the aircraft component. 
The parameters influencing the airborne subsystem risk probability are the tunnel 
dimension, the flight technical error (FTE) and the navigation system error (NSE). 
There is a tradeoff method to realise the required integrity level in DIAS MASPS 
(1993). This chapter is directed in particular toward a critical examination of the 
treatment of the above parameters. A rigorous approach based on the joint probability 
distribution of NSE and FTE is developed to evaluate the airborne subsystem risk 
probabilities of integrity and continuity. 
Following the discussion of the alarm algorithm for precision approach and landing in 
Section 5.1, rigorous models for computing integrity and continuity risk probabilities 
are derived in Section 5.2. Then computational results are presented and compared with 
those given in DIAS MASPS in Section 5.3. Thus, a reasonable combination of NSE 
and FTE accuracy which guarantees the required integrity and continuity performance 
is obtained. Furthermore, the tunnel penetration alarm problem is discussed with the 
conclusion that the probability of an aircraft leaving the tunnel is different from the 
probability of the aircraft being outside the tunnel, that means the definition of the 
tunnel penetration in DIAS MASPS should be reviewed. 
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5.1 INTEGRITY ALARM ALGORITHM FOR PRECISION APPROACH 
AND LANDING 
Shown in Figure 5.1 is the algorithm warning the tunnel penetration of the total system 
error (TSE) given in (DIAS MASPS, 1993): 
TSE= IFTEI+kanav > TL-M 
I I 
' 
Tunnel 
M 
Centre 
(5.1) 
M 
NSE= 
kanav 
I I I 
Edge of Tunnel 
where 
FTE 
Figure 5.1: Tunnel Penetration W aming Algorithm 
IFTEI: the measured cross-track (or vertical) deviation of aircraft from the 
tunnel centre, 
anav: standard deviation of the navigation solution error, 
k: a constant multiple of the standard deviation of the navigation solution 
error chosen to preserve a very high level of system integrity, 
TL: the half-width (or height) of the tunnel, 
M: the margin required to protect aircraft extremities from penetrating the 
containment tunnel. 
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Let 
S = TL - M- ka nav (5.2) 
Then Equation (5.1) becomes 
IFTEI>S (5.3) 
Equation (5.3) can be used as the practical tunnel penetration warning equation, where 
Sis called the tunnel alarm limit and determined by Equation (5.2). 
The philosophy behind this algorithm is to define an uncertainty region around the 
aircraft which is known to contain the aircraft with a high probability. This probability 
minimises the number of undetected penetrations of the containment surface. From 
Equation (5.1), TSE is defined as the sum of IFTEI and kanav, called the flight technical 
error and navigation system error, respectively. TSE is compared with the tunnel 
dimension, TL-M, to determine if the tunnel penetration warning is activated. 
To achieve the required integrity risk of 6 x 10-8 allocated to the airborne subsystem in 
Section 3.3, DIAS MASPS (1993) used the following equation 
Pr(undetected penetration)= Pr(tunnel penetration) x Pr(missed warning) 
(5.4) 
Pr(tunnel penetration) is set to be 1 x 10-7 (DIAS MASPS, 1993), if Pr(missed 
warning) is 0.005, it follows 
Pr(undetected penetration)= Jx 10-7 x 0.005 = 5x 10-10 (5.5) 
Assuming there are ten independent events over the duration of an approach, then the 
integrity risk per approach is the probability that an undetected penetration occurs 
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during any of the ten independent events. Thus the integrity risk of one approach is 
simply 5 x 10-9 . This is within the requirement of 6 x 10-8 , leaving the remaining 
integrity risk probability of 5.5 x 1 o-8 to aircraft hardware and software components. 
The TSE containment warning also contributes to the continuity risk, in that a missed 
approach must be executed in the event of a TSE true or false warning. Thus the 
probability that the warning occurs must be within the airborne continuity allocation of 
2.0 X 10-5 per approach. 
The probability that a warning occurs, given the warning algorithm above, is the 
probability that TSE is large enough to activate the warning. This probability is 
dependent on the standard deviation of the navigation error O"nav and the standard 
deviation of FTE aFTE. In DIAS MASPS, anav is fixed as 7 m , k is assumed 3, and 
the lateral tunnel dimension at 200 feet of decision altitude is 33.54 m, thus 
Pr(tunnel penetration warning)= Pr(IFTEI + 3snav > TL- M) 
= Pr(IFTEI + 3 X 7 > 33.54 m) 
= Pr(IFTEI > 12.54 m) 
(5.6) 
Approximating FTE as a normal distribution variable with mean of zero and standard 
deviation aFTE of 2.59 m (DIAS MASPS, 1993), so 
Pr(tunnel penetration warning) Pr(IFTEI > 12.54 m) 
= Pr(iFTEi > 4.84a FTE) = 1.25x 10-6 
(5.7) 
Assuming that there are ten independent events over one approach, the continuity per 
approach is 1.25 x 10-5 . This falls within the airborne subsystem continuity allocation 
of 2.0 X 10-5 , leaving the remaining risk of 0.75 X 10-5 to hardware failures. 
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In the above treatment of the integrity and continuity probability computation, it can be 
seen that: 
• it was not specified how to achieve Pr(tunnel penetration) of 1 x 10-7 , 
• anav was fixed which is not in accordance with the actual situation because 
anav should be estimated in real time from the measurements used in the 
navigation solution. 
In order to address these criticism , it is therefore desirable to develop a rigorous way to 
take the aircraft tunnel dimension, FTE and NSE into consideration in dealing with the 
integrity and continuity risk probabilities. 
5.2 GPS NAVIGATION RISK ANALYSIS THEORY 
In this section, the dependence of the integrity and continuity risks on the tunnel 
dimension, FTE and NSE is developed based on the consideration that FTE and NSE 
are independent random variables. For this purpose, the joint probability density 
function of FTE and NSE is derived first. Then, the risk computation formulas are 
derived for the tunnel penetration warning equation (5.3). 
5.2.1 JOINT PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF FTE AND NSE 
From above it is known that integrity and continuity risks are functions of the tunnel 
dimension, the flight technical error and the navigation system error. NSE was fixed 
and FTE was assumed to be normally distributed in computing the risks in Section 5.1. 
This, in fact, does not conform to the actual situation of the airborne navigation system, 
because NSE is also a random variable. A rigorous method must be developed to 
account for the randomness of NSE. 
NSE was assumed to be kanav, k = 1,2,3. In the practical application of DGPS 
(DGNSS) system, anav can be estimated from the navigation solution, that is 
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O"nav = DOPx<J0 (5.8) 
where 
DOP: the dilution of precision, being either horizontal DOP or vertical DOP, 
a0: estimated standard deviation of the measurements used in the solution. 
For the least-squares solution, 
A ~WSSE ao = 
n-4 
(5.9) 
where 
WSSE: weighted sum of squares of residuals of measurements, 
n: number of measurements used in the solution. 
It is known that WS~E is a chi-square variable with the degrees of freedom n- 4 (Yu 
ao 
et al, 1990). Let 
X 
where 
WSSE 
a5 
2 
Xn-4 
a0 : nominal standard deviation of measurements. 
Then, the probability density function of X is 
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(5.10) 
1 m_l X 
km(X)= m x2 e 2 (5.11) 
2 2 r(m) 
2 
where m stands for the degrees of freedom, r denotes the gamma function. 
According to the probability density function transformation theory (Blake, 1979), the 
probability density function of a;r can be derived as 
(5.12) 
Using the transformation theory again, the probability density function of 
jNSEj = k DOP 80 is obtained, noting that the probability that NSE being positive or 
negative is the same: 
,NSEc..O 
(5.13) 
For simplicity of expression, let 
COE (kDOPa0 ) 2 (5.14) 
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So Equation (5.13) becomes 
fNsE(NSE) = 
m_l 
m ( ___!!!__) 2 NSEm-l e 
m COE 
mNSE2 
2COE , NS£?.0 
COE·22 r(m) 
2 
(5.15) 
Assuming that FTE is normally distributed with the probability function (DIAS 
MASPS, 1993) 
FTE 2 
1 -;;:z 
fFTE(FTE) = ~ e FTE 
v21CCJFTE 
(5.16) 
and that FTE and NSE are independent, the joint probability density function of FTE 
and NSE is obtained: 
f(FTE, NSE) = fFrE(FTE) fNsE(NSE) 
FTE2 
---
= 1 e 2CY~E 
J2iiaFTE 
,NS£?.0 
mNSE2 
2COE 
(5.17) 
5.2.2 PROBABILITY EXPRESSION OF INTEGRITY AND CONTINUITY 
OF AIRBORNE NAVIGATION SYSTEM 
For the airborne subsystem, according to the tunnel penetration warning Equation (5.3), 
different tunnel events by a two dimensional graph can be expressed, as in Figure 5.2. 
From this figure, there exist four possible tunnel events: 
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El: aircraft within tunnel and IFTEI+NSE<TL-M, normal operation, that is 
FTE: -S to S, NSE: -(TL-M-FTE) to (TL-M-FTE); 
E2: aircraft outside tunnel but IFTEI+NSE<TL-M, integrity risk, that is 
FTE: -S to S, NSE: -oo to (TL-M-FTE) and (TL-M-FTE) to oo; 
E3: aircraft within tunnel but IFTEI+NSE>TL-M, false alarm, that is 
FTE: -oo to-SandS to oo, NSE: -(TL-M-FTE) to (TL-M-FTE); 
E4: aircraft outside tunnel and IFTEI+NSE> TL-M, true alarm, that is 
FTE: -oo to-SandS to oo, NSE: -oo to (TL-M-FTE) and 
(TL-M-FTE) to oo; 
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Figure 5.2: Tunnel Events 
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So the probabilities of these four tunnel events are obtained as follows: 
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150 
S TL-M-FTE 
Ji = 2 f fFrE(FTE) dFTE f fNsE(NSE) dNSE 
-s o 
FTE2 s 1 ---
= 2 f e 2o-~E dFTE 
.fliia FTE 
-s 
TL-M-FTE mNSE2 
X f 2COE dNSE 
0 
(5.18) 
s = 
P2 = 2 f fFrE(FTE) dFTE f fNsE(NSE) dNSE 
-S TL-M-FTE 
FTE2 s 1 ---
= 2 f e 2o-~E dFTE 
.fliia FTE 
-s 
mNSE2 
X 2COE dNSE 
(5.19) 
= FTE-(TL-M) 
P3 = 4 f fFrE(FTE) dFTE f fNsE(NSE) dNSE 
s 0 
FTE2 
= 1 ---
4 J e 2o-~E 
S .J2ii a FTE 
dFTE 
FTE-(TL-M) mNSE2 
X f 2COE dNSE 
0 
(5.20) 
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00 00 
P4 = 4 f fFrE(FTE) dFTE f fNsE(NSE) dNSE 
S FTE-(TL-M) 
FTE2 
00 ---
4 f 1 2cr!.m dFTE 
= s .J2iiCJ FTE e 
oo m -1 
x f m (~)2 NSEm-le 
m COE 
FTE-(TL-M) COE. 2 2 r(m) 
2 
mNSE2 
2COE dNSE 
(5.21) 
It can be seen that these risk probabilities can be computed if the tunnel dimension TL-
M, standard deviation of FTE CJFTE, k, DOP and CJo are specified. 
5.3 NUMERICAL RESULTS OF INTEGRITY AND CONTINUITY RISKS 
OF PRECISION APPROACH AND LANDING USING DGPS 
According to the integrity and continuity risk definition given in Section 3.2, the 
integrity risk ~ntegrity risk and continuity risk Pcontinuity risk are obtained, by noting 
that the probabilities in Equations (5.18) to (5.21) are valid for each independent event 
and that the entire approach consists of 10 independent events: 
~ntegrity risk = I 0 X P2 
Pcontinuity risk = 10 X ( P3 + P4) 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
P2, P3 , and P4 can be computed using Equations (5.19), (5.20) and (5.21). fu these 
equations, S was determined from Equation (5.2), where the tunnel dimensions TL-M 
of 30, 60 and 90 m were used, k was fixed as 1, and CJ =DOPxCJ
0 
with DOP =1. It 
nav 
is assumed that DGPS is used. For the tunnel dimension of 30 m, DGPS accuracy of 
CJ 0 was assumed to begin at 0.5 m with an increment of 0.5 m, and FTE accuracy 
CJFTE at 0.5 m with an increment of 0.5 m. For the tunnel dimension of 60 m, DGPS 
accuracy of CJ 0 was assumed to begin at 1.0 m with an increment of 1.0 m, and FTE 
accuracy CJFTE at 1.0 m with an increment of 1.0 m. For the tunnel dimension of 90 m, 
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DGPS accuracy of a 0 was assumed to begin at 1.5 m with an increment of 1.5 m, and 
FTE accuracy aFTE at 1.5 m with an increment of 1.5 m. The computation terminated 
when P2 was greater than 6.0 x 10-9 . 
The computational results for the tunnel dimensions of 30, 60 and 90 m are listed in 
Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A, respectively. In these Tables, the first column 
indicates the degrees of freedom m, the second and third give aFTE and ao, 
respectively. The fourth, fifth and sixth list the integrity risk P2 , the false alarm risk P3 
and the true alarm risk P4 , respectively. The seventh column gives the continuity risk. 
They are valid for one single event with duration of 15 seconds. They must be 
multiplied by a factor of 10 in order to cover the total approach duration of 150 
seconds. In the computation, k was fixed as 1, and DOP was assumed as 1.0. 
From inspection of Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
• The integrity risk probability is usually larger than the continuity risk 
probability, so if the integrity risk is less than the requirement of 6.0 x 10-8 , 
the continuity risk will be below the requirement of 2.0 x 10-5 . For this 
reason, the computation was terminated when P2 was greater than 
6.0x 10-9 ; 
• For a fixed tunnel dimension and degrees of freedom, the integrity risk 
requirement can be satisfied with a combination of a 0 and a FTE. These 
combinations are summarised in Tables 5.1 to 5.3. The combinations are 
also displayed in Figures 5.3 to 5.5. In these figures, the curves bound the 
allowable a 0 and a FTE values to make the integrity risk less than 
6.0 x 10-8 for the full approach duration. 
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Table 5.1: Allowable Combinations of a 0 and aFTE for TL-M=30 m, k=1, DOP=1 
The degrees of freedom = 1 The degrees of freedom =2 The degrees of freedom ~ 3 
a FTE:::; (m) ao :::; (m) aFTE:::; (m) a 0 :::; (m) a FTE:::; (m) ao :::; (m) 
0.5 5.0 0.5 6.5 0.5 7.5 
1.0 4.5 1.0 6.0 1.0 7.5 
1.5 4.5 1.5 6.0 1.5 7.5 
2.0 4.5 2.0 6.0 2.0 7.0 
2.5 4.0 2.5 5.5 2.5 6.5 
3.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 6.0 
3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 5.0 
4.0 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 
4.5 2.0 4.5 2.5 4.5 3.0 
5.0 1.0 5.0 1.5 5.0 1.5 
5.5 0.5 
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Figure 5.3: Graphic Display of the Allowable a o and a FTE 
for TL-M=30 m, k=1, DOP= 1 
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6 
Table 5.2: Allowable Combinations of cr0 and crFTE for TL-M=60 m, k=1, DOP=1 
The degrees of freedom = 1 The degrees of freedom =2 The degrees of freedom ?:. 3 
crFTE:::; (m) cr0 :::; (m) cr FTE:::; (m) cr0 :::; (m) cr FTE:::; (m) cr0 :::; (m) 
1.0 10.0 1.0 13.0 1.0 
2.0 9.0 2.0 13.0 2.0 
3.0 9.0 3.0 12.0 3.0 
4.0 9.0 4.0 12.0 4.0 
5.0 8.0 5.0 11.0 5.0 
6.0 8.0 6.0 10.0 6.0 
7.0 7.0 7.0 9.0 7.0 
8.0 6.0 8.0 7.0 8.0 
9.0 4.0 9.0 5.0 9.0 
10.0 2.0 10.0 3.0 10.0 
11.0 
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Figure 5.4: Graphic Display of the Allowable cr0 and crFTE 
for TL-M=60 m, k=1, DOP=1 
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Table 5.3: Allowable Combinations of a 0 and O'FTE for TL-M=90 m, k=1, DOP=1 
The degrees of freedom = 1 The degrees of freedom =2 The degrees of freedom 2::: 3 
O'FTE:::; (m) ao:::; (m) O'FTE:::; (m) ao:::; (m) 0' FTE:::; (m) ao:::; (m) 
1.5 15.0 1.5 19.5 1.5 
3.0 13.5 3.0 19.5 3.0 
4.5 13.5 4.5 18.0 4.5 
6.0 13.5 6.0 18.0 6.0 
7.5 12.0 7.5 16.5 7.5 
9.0 12.0 9.0 15.0 9.0 
10.5 10.5 10.5 13.5 10.5 
12.0 9.0 12.0 10.5 12.0 
13.5 6.0 13.5 7.5 13.5 
15.0 3.0 15.0 4.5 15.0 
16.5 
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Figure 5.5: Graphic Display of the Allowable a 0 and O'FTE 
for TL-M=90 m, k=1, DOP=1 
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• Comparing these three figures, it is seen that the curves for the same degrees 
of freedom have the similar shape. This suggests that there exists a general 
formula relating the tunnel dimension and the allowable a 0 and aFTE. 
Using the allowable a 0 and aFTE for TL-M=30 m as bases, the allowable 
a 0 and aFTE for the tunnel dimension TM=TL-M can be determined as: 
TM 
a -a O,TM - 0,30 30 
(5.24) 
TM 
a -a FTE,TM - FTE,30 30 
(5.25) 
For example, the allowable a 0 and aFTE for the tunnel dimension of 15m can 
be obtained by multiplying the numbers in Table 5.1 with 0.5. 
• The computation was only made for the case of k=l and DOP=l.O. 
However, from the probability density function of NSE, it is easy to extend 
the above computation results to the cases of k> 1 and DOP:t:l. That is, if the 
allowable a 0 for k=1 and DOP=l.O is known (denote it as 
ao,TM,k=l,DOP=l.O), then the allowable a 0 for any k and DOP is 
determined as: 
a _ ao,TM,m,k=l,DOP=l.O 
O,TM ,m,k,DOP - k. DOP (5.26) 
For example, for TM=90 m, m=2, the allowable a FTE:::;; 12.0 m, k=2, 
DOP=3.0, then, 
a = ao,TM,m,k=l,DOP=l.O = 10.5 = 1 75 m O,TM=90,m=2,k=2,DOP=3.0 k·DOP 2·3 . 
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• In summary, the joint probability density function of the navigation system 
error and flight technical error has been derived. Based on this function, 
rigorous integrity and continuity risk probabilities were computed. The 
results show that there are reasonable combinations of NSE and FTE errors 
which can guarantee the integrity and continuity requirements for aircraft 
landing and precision approach. The results are different from those obtained 
in DIAS MASPS (1993) in the sense of the theoretical strictness and 
application flexibility. The results can also be easily extended by Equations 
(5.24) to (5.26). 
5.4 AIRCRAFT TUNNEL PENETRATION ALARM: AN ANALYSIS 
USING CROSSING THEORY OF STOCHASTIC PROCESS 
This section further discusses the tunnel penetration alarm problem and gives more 
rigorous definition of the tunnel penetration. 
From Equation (5.7), the probability of the tunnel penetration alarm is explained as the 
probability of IFTEI larger than the alarm limit. In practical application, the tunnel 
penetration alarm will be issued when IFTEI just becomes larger than and passes 
through the alarm limit. Thus, the probability of the tunnel penetration should be 
explained as the frequency of IFTEI crossing the alarm limit from inside the tunnel to 
outside the tunnel. The difference between these two explanations is stated below. 
It is assumed that the flight technical error is simulated by two sine functions of equal 
amplitude but with different frequencies, for example, see Figure 5.6. In this Figure, the 
left sine function stands for the FTE with lower frequency, and the right one with 
higher frequency. The tunnel penetration alarm will be issued once the IFTEI becomes 
larger than the alarm limit. Over a sufficiently long interval, the proportional area above 
the nominal alarm limit (the probability of a value exceeding the nominal value) will be 
equal for both curves. However, the alarm condition (approach and penetration of the 
nominal limit) will occur much more frequently for the high frequency curve. 
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Once the alarm limit is passed, the pilot will initiate a missed approach procedure. 
Therefore, only the probability of an occurrence when FTE passes the alarm limit S is 
relevant, while the probability given in Equation (5.7) has no meaning here since it has 
little predictive significance. The quantity that must be determined is the probability of 
the first occurrence of FTE exceeding the alarm limit and the spectral composition of 
FTE bears directly on this probability. 
fu the following, the theory underlying more rigorous tunnel penetration probability 
computation is developed using stochastic process theory. 
As noted above, it is the mean number of crossings of the ala.J.m limit by FTE(t) 
concerned. Suppose FTE(t) (O::; t ::;[) is a real-valued, normal and stationary process 
with zero mean and unit variance, and such that its covariance function r(t) satisfies the 
following equation, 
(5.27) 
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with finite ~ and 1\.q. as t -7 0, where ~i, i = 1,2 is the 2i-th moment of the spectral 
function (Cramer and Leadbetter, 1967). Hence, the mean number of crossings of the 
level u in the time interval [0, 1] is (Cramer and Leadbetter, 1967): 
(5.28) 
Noting that the number of upward and downward crossings of u is the same, and only 
the upward crossings of u (u>O) and downward crossing of -u (u<O) are concerned in 
the aircraft tunnel penetration problem, the mean number of crossings of the alarm limit 
S by IFTE(t)l from inside the tunnel to outside the tunnel is 
(5.29) 
if the variance of FTE(t) is afrTE, then the above equation becomes 
(5.30) 
where ~ is determined as (Cramer and Leadbetter, 1967) 
~ = -r"(O) (5.31) 
From Equation (5.27), it is known that r(t) is symmetric about t=O and r'(O) = 0. 
However, it is quite difficult to determine r(t) for the aircraft penetration problem. For 
the research purpose, Equation (5.30) can be used to study the difference of the tunnel 
penetration probability from Equation (5.7). Suppose S=12.54 m and aFTE =2.59 m, 
the mean numbers of crossings of S by IFTE(t)l from inside the tunnel to outside the 
tunnel are listed in Table 5.4 for T=1 and~ I aFTE =0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10. 
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Table 5.4: Mean Numbers of Crossings of Alarm LimitS= 12.54 m by IFTE(t)l 
from inside the tunnel to outside the tunnel in unit time, a FTE =2.59 m 
~ I a FTE mean number of crossings 
0.01 2.59e-07 
0.1 8.17e-07 
0.5 1.83e-06 
1 2.59e-06 
2 3.66e-06 
5 5.78e-06 
10 8.17e-06 
The mean numbers in Table 5.4 have to be multiplied by 150 to cover the entire 
duration of CAT I precision approach. This will give the mean numbers of crossings 
-5 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 d 3.88 X 10 , 1.23 X 10 , 2.74 X 10 , 3.88 X 10 , 5.48 X 10 , 5.78 X 10 an 
1.20 X 1 o-3 , respectively. Any one of them is significantly larger than 1.25 X 10-5 given 
by Equation (5.7). 
The above discussion gives a reasonable explanation about the tunnel penetration 
probability. But the determination of ~ is involved and it is difficult to do. In the 
following, another explanation is given with some rough assumptions on FTE(t). 
Consider the random process FTE(t) and its time derivative DFTE(t). Let the joint 
probability density function of FTE(t) and DFTE(t) be p(FTE, DFTE). The probability 
that FTE(t) at time t lies between S and S+dS and at the same time, DFTE(t) lies 
between V and V+dV, is given by p(FTE, DFTE)dSdV. On the other hand, this 
expression also represents the time interval which, during unit time, is being spent by 
FTE within the strip dS while moving with speed V. Now, the duration of a single 
crossing of the strip is given by dS!IVI. Dividing the total time being spent within the 
strip by the duration of one crossing, the mean number of crossings of the line FTE=S 
in unit time for the speed Vis obtained as below (Grandall, 1963; Leadbetter, 1982): 
nFTE=S = f~oolDFTElp(FTE,DFTE)dDFTE (5.32) 
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In the mean, the number of upward and downward crossings of the line FTE=S will be 
equal, as well the number of upward and downward crossings of the line FTE=-S . It is 
concluded that, in the mean, the frequency with which IFTE(t)l exceeds a givenS will 
be nFTE=S · 
Suppose FTE(t) 1s a Wiener process, thus FTE(t)- N(O,a 2t), 
RFTE(t
1
),FTE(t
2
) = a 2 min(t1,t2), where a>O, R represents autocovariance (Gardner, 
1990). It is known that Wiener process is an independent-increment process, that is, 
FTE(t) is independent of FTE(t+h)-FTE(t) (h>O). But DFTE(t) does not actually exist, 
because the autocorrelation of FfE(t) is not twice differentiable (Gardner, 1990). 
However, with the broadened definition of differentiability, FTE(t) can be interpreted 
as being mean-square differentiable, therefore DFTE(t) exists in the broader sense 
(Gardner, 1990), and DFTE(t)- N(O,a2). Thus, p(FTE, DFTE) is 
p(FTE, DFTE)=p(FTE) p(DFTE) 
Then, Equation (5.32) becomes 
nFTE=S 
1 
2ap(FTE = S) ~ 
-v2n 
Finally, considering FTE(t)- N(O,a 2t), the above equation follows 
(5.33) 
(5.34) 
Equation (5.34) gives the mean number of crossings of the almm limit S by FTE(t) 
from inside the tunnel to outside tunnel per unit time at t. The maximum of t for CAT I 
precision approach is 150 seconds. Taking a2t = CJfrrE = 2.592(m2 ) and S=12.54 m, 
the minimum mean number of crossings per unit time during the entire approach 
ns=1254 is 2.11 x 10-
7
, and the minimum mean number of crossings of the alarm 
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limit S=12.54 m during the entire approach of 150 seconds is 3.17 x 10-5 . This number 
is significantly larger than 1.25 x 10-5 obtained with Equation (5.7). 
5.5 SUMMARY 
From above discussions and results, it can be concluded: 
• Parameters affecting the integrity and continuity risks are tunnel dimension, 
NSE and FTE. The joint probability density function of NSE and FTE was 
derived strictly. 
• Based on the derived joint probability density function of NSE and FTE and 
the definition of RNP integrity and continuity, the formulas for computing 
the integrity and continuity risks were derived. Extensive sample 
computations were made, showing that there exist significant differences 
both in theoretical methods and computation results between this chapter 
and DIAS MASPS (1993). It is concluded that the method applied here is 
theoretically rigorous, and the results are flexible, compared to those in 
(DIAS MASPS, 1993). The obtained allowable combinations of a 0 and 
aFTE could be used in GPS aircraft navigation application. 
• The alarm problem is also discussed. It has shown that the probability of 
exceeding an alarm limit is significantly different from the probability of 
being outside the alarm limit. Thus, the definition of the tunnel penetration 
given in DIAS MASPS (1993) should be reviewed. 
• Overall, the results show that the risk allocation method and risk 
computation in DIAS MASPS (1993) should be reviewed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GPS RAIM POWER: A THEORETICAL STUDY 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is a self-contained method for 
GPS integrity monitoring. It has been widely investigated for the past decade, and 
mainly focused on the algorithm development ( eg., Lee, 1986; Parkinson and Axelrad, 
1988; Sturza, 1988), GPS RAIM availability evaluation (eg., Van Dyke, 1992; Sang et 
al., 1995) and enhancement (eg., Lee, 1993; Misra et al., 1993). As RAIM is a 
statistical testing method, it is theoretically valuable and practically necessary to have a 
RAIM test power analysis. However, a RAIM test power analysis based on strict 
probability theory has so far not been reported because of the complexity of the 
problem. 
This chapter is therefore devoted to a theoretical analysis of the RAIM test power. First, 
the least-squares based RAIM algorithm is introduced. Then, the Approximate Radial-
Error Protected (ARP) concept is presented. Finally, an analytic study on the RAIM 
power is performed based on probability theory, and its expansion into DGPS RAIM 
integrity monitoring is also discussed. 
6.1 RAIM ALGORITHM 
Three RAIM methods received special attention: (1) a least-squares-residuals method 
(Parkinson and Axelrad, 1988), (2) a range-comparison method (Lee, 1986), (3) a 
parity method (Sturza, 1988). All three methods are snapshot schemes in that they 
assume that noisy redundant range-type measurements are available at a given sample 
point in time. Also, in all cases the navigation equations are linearised about some 
approximate value of vehicle position and clock bias. Brown (1992) has proven the 
equivalence of these three methods. So here only the least-squares method is 
introduced. 
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For a GPS-based navigation system, the following basic measurement equations hold: 
L+c:=AX 
nxl nxl nx44xl 
p 
nxn 
(6.1) 
and the error equations: 
where 
A 
l+v=AX 
nxl nxl nx4 4xl 
n: the number of measurements, 
L: true measurement vector, 
e : measurement error vector, 
p (6.2) 
nxn 
X: true position correction (ill, /::,.y ,/::,.h) to its approximation and clock 
bias c/::,.t of the receiver, where x, y, h represent north, east and height 
components of the position. 
l : measurement vector, 
v : residual vector, 
X : estimated solution of the position correction and clock bias, 
A: design matrix, 
P: weight matrix. 
They have the forms: 
I Lll 
I~ I 
E(l) = L =I : I 
lLnJ 
(6.3) 
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where 
I ru l 
I A A I 
A =I Ll~ I 
X I ~hI' 
lc~t J 
I alx I I a2x 
A=l : 
l anx 
aly 
a2t 
any 
I P11 o 
I o P22 P=l 
1 o o 
l 0 0 
lc1l 
I c; I 
E (c) = E 1 :2 I) = 0 
lc,J 
I illl 
I~- I 
A - I y I E(X) =X= -I ~h I 
lc~t J 
alh alt l I 
a2h a~t I 
I 
anh ant J 
0 0 l 
o o 1 
o I 
0 Pnnj 
/1i : weight of measurement li , 
(6.4) 
(6.5) 
(6.6) 
(6.7) 
li : range-type measurement, such as GPS pseudorange, barometric altitude. 
The least-squares solution of (6.2) is given by (Yu et al., 1990): 
A T 
XLs =Qxh A Pl 
LS 
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(6.8) 
where 
iQxx Qxy Qxh Qxt l 
IQ Qyy Qyh Qyt I Q A =(AT PA)-1 =I yx (6.9) 
XLs I Qhx Qhy Qhh Qht I 
lQtx Qty Qth Qtt J 
The residuals are: 
A T 
v=AXLs-l=(AQXA A P-l)l 
LS 
where I is an identity matrix. 
Defining WSSE as the weighted sum of squares of the residuals, that is: 
WSSE=vTPv, 
the estimate of the unit variance is: 
A2 WSSE 
ao = (n-4) 
(6.10) 
(6.11) 
(6.12) 
80 is used as the test statistic in the RA1M method. It has two special properties: 
1. It is a non-negative scalar quantity. This makes for a simple decision rule. 
All have to do is partition the positive semi-infinite real line into two parts--
one for "no failure" and one for "failure". The dividing point is called the 
threshold. 
2. With the assumption of t: - N (0, a{; P-1), ws;E is a X ;_4 variable (Yu 
ao 
et al., 1990), where n- 4 is the degrees of freedom. So, the threshold of 80 
can be determined if an a priori alarm rate is to be satisfied. Let a be the 
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alarm rate, X & ,n-4 denotes the threshold of X ,;_4 for satisfying a , it 
follows: 
(6.13) 
In the GPS integrity requirement specification given in Table 3.1, a= 0.002 I hour for 
the non-precision approach, terminal and en route phases of flight. Assuming the 
correlation time of the GPS SA error is 2 minutes (RTCA D0-208, 1991), a is 
computed as a= 0.002 I hour= 0.002 I 30 = 6.667 ·10-5 . This gives do,threshold as 
listed in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: do,threshold Assuming a= 6.667 ·10-5 and a 0 =33m 
Degrees of Freedom 2 Xa,m do,threshold (m) 
m 
1 15.92 132 
2 19.20 102 
3 22.00 90 
4 24.40 82 
5 26.65 76 
6 28.75 72 
Thus, the least-squares based RAIM could be implemented as in the following figure. 
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Least-squares Solution of Unknowns 
A 
ATPz Xrs =Qg 
LS 
Residuals and Test Statistic 
Computation 
A T 
v=AXrs-l=(AQgLSA P-I)l 
80 = .JwssE 1 (n-4) 
NO 
cJo > 8o,threshold ? 
YES 
No Integrity lint 
Failure 
egrity Action 
Figure 6.1: Simple RAIM Algorithm 
6.2 ARP CONCEPT 
6.2.1 HYPOTHESIS TESTING POWER 
From the hypothesis testing theory, it is known that there exist risks in making a 
decision based on limited data. Suppose that a sequence 11, Z2 , · · ·, ln of n random 
variables is observed and each has been obtained independently from a mechanism that 
has either a probability density function fo(x) or fi (x). It is our problem to decide 
which probability density function is appropriate. To simplify matters it is assumed that 
fo(x) and fi (x) both have the same form and differ only in their means, see Figure 
6.2. Assume that fo (x) has mean f.Lo and fi (x), p 1. The hypothesis that the mean is 
f.Lo is called the null hypothesis, H0 , and the hypothesis that the mean is p 1 the 
alternative hypothesis, H 1. To write this more explicitly: 
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Ho: f.L = f.Lo (null hypothesis) 
Hl: f.L = f.Ll (alternative hypothesis) 
f.Lo 
Type II 
error 
Figure 6.2: Type I Error and Type II Error of Hypothesis Testing 
Upon observing Z1, Z2 , · · ·, ln it must be decided which of the two hypotheses is valid. 
There is always the possibility that, even though the null hypothesis is true, the sample 
lies in rejection region in which case H 1 will be accepted. This is referred to as Type I 
error and it occurs with a probability PrJ, which is usually denoted by a. Similarly, if 
H 1 is true, there is a chance that the sample lies in acceptance region, in which case Ho 
will be accepted as true. This is called Type II error and it occurs with a probability 
Pru also denoted as f3 . PrJ is commonly called the level of significance and 1 f3 
the power of test. If both f 0 ( x) and fi ( x) are known and a is specified, f3 can be 
computed. 
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6.2.2 SCREENING OUT BAD GEOMETRY: ARP CRITERIA 
For GPS RAIM testing, the null and alternative hypotheses are: 
Ho:8o ~ 8o,threshold 
Hl: 8o > 8o,threshold 
(No Integrity Failure): 
(Integrity Failure) 
The RTCA integrity specifications for GPS as a supplemental navigation system in the 
non-precision approach, terminal and en route phases of flight stated that the alarm rate 
a = 0.002 I h and minimum detection probability 1- f3 = 0.999 must be met. For 
RAIM, the alarm rate is satisfied with the determination of the threshold for 80 . The 
minimum detection probability is in fact the RAIM test power. So the missed detection 
probability, which is the probability of accepting H 0 but actually H1 is true, must be 
less than or equal to 0.001. 
As is shown in Section 6.1, the thresholds meeting the alarm rate are dependent on the 
degrees of freedom, but independent of satellite geometry. However, the minimum 
detection probability is related with the satellite geometry (Brown et al., 1991). That is, 
for some satellite geometry, this specification can not be met. Thus, satellite geometry 
at any moment needs to be evaluated to judge whether this geometry is admissible for 
required RAIM function operation. This is called "screening out bad geometry" (Chin 
et al, 1992). 
It is understandable that small measurement bias causes small position error and does 
not need to be detected. At the other extreme, very large biases cause catastrophic 
position errors, but they are easy to detect. Biases in the middle range are the most 
troublesome. They are sufficiently large to move the position error out beyond the 
alarm limit, yet are not so large as to be detected easily. In brief, in testing any RAIM 
algorithm against RTCA specifications, one must consider the combined situation of 
poor satellite geometry coupled with the worst-case satellite bias situation. Then, if the 
detection requirement can not be met, the geometry at hand must be declared 
inadmissible. 
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Chin et al (1992) made extensive Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the goodness of 
satellite geometry based on the approximate radial-error protection (ARP) concept 
dealing with the worst-case bias. The simultaneous results are so-called ARP ceilings, 
which serve as the criteria of evaluating a satellite geometry and whether it is 
admissible or not for RAIM method to detect integrity failure with the required power 
of 0.999. If the ARP value of the satellite geometry is less than the corresponding ARP 
ceiling, the geometry is declared as admissible, otherwise inadmissible. The ARP 
ceiling values of Chin et al are listed in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: ARPceiling Values for the Non-precision Approach, Terminal and En Route 
Ph fFr h b M C 1 s· 1 f (Ch. t 1 1992) ases o Igl t )y onte aro Ifill a lOTI me a., 
Phases of Flight 
Non-precision Approach 
Terminal 
En Route 
Navigation Radial Error 
Alarm 
Limit 
Number of SV s Number of SV s 
in View= 5 in View= 6 
328 339 
1077 1135 
2159 2262 
Normal Navigation ..... ...-
.· 
.· 
.· 
Threshold 
Figure 6.3: Integrity Monitoring Event 
95 
Number of SV s 
in View ~7 
352 
1135 
2262 
Test Statistic 
The ARP value of a satellite geometry, as defined in Figure 6.3, is computed by the 
following equations, assuming weight matrix P as an identity matrix (Chin et al., 
1992): 
ARP = SLOPEmax X fio,threshold (6.14) 
where 
SLOPEmax = max{SLOPEi} (6.15) 
(ell: +C22·)(n-4) 
SLOPE-- 1 1 
z - (1- Bii) (6.16) 
C= QgLS A T (6.17) 
B= AQA AT 
XLs 
(6.18) 
6.3 THEORETICAL STUDY OF GPS RAIM POWER 
From Figure 6.2, it is known that the theoretical analysis of hypothesis testing power 
requires the exact knowledge of both the probability density functions of the null and 
alternative hypotheses. Obviously, this requirement can not be met for the RAIM power 
study, because the probability density function of the events of signal failure is 
unknown. An alternative way is performing Monte Carlo simulation as in Chin et al 
(1992). 
In order to make the problem suitable for theoretical studies, suppose there is only one 
satellite signal failure because it is extremely rare to have two simultaneously failed 
satellites. 
Based on this limitations, the following assumptions are made: 
1. Although there is measurement noise, it is the bias on one measurement that 
causes the navigation radial error to exceed the alarm limit. V4 is denoted as 
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the bias on measurement li and VHORi the radial error caused by V4. It is 
assumed that VHORi is the dominant component in the total radial error. 
That is, if the radial error exceeds the alarm limit, V HORi also exceeds or 
nearly exceeds the alarm limit. 
2. Although there is measurement noise, it is the bias that is the dominant part 
causing the test statistic ao larger than its threshold. 
3. When missed detection occurs, the test statistic 8'0 is usually close to its 
threshold. So, 8o,threshold is used instead of 8o in the analysis of RAlM 
power. 
Based on these assumptions, the following method is used to analyse the RAlM test 
power: deriving a test statistic which relates the satellite geometry with the affected 
radial error; deriving the probability density function of the test statistic; determining 
satellite geometry criteria which provide the required minimum detection probability. 
In the following, starting from the study of the relationship between the bias and the 
radial error, a test statistic is derived and this test statistic is used to study the RAlM test 
power. It will be shown that the RAlM test power is a function of the satellite geometry 
and can be estimated. Thus new geometry criteria are obtained which meet the 
specified test power requirement of 0.999 for the non-precision approach, terminal and 
en route phases of flight using GPS as supplemental navigation system. 
6.3.1 MEASUREMENT BIAS ESTIMATION AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE 
POSITION SOLUTION 
The derivation below follows the outlier detection procedure developed by Baarda 
(1968). It is also known as "mean shift" outlier detection in statistical literature (eg., 
Cook and Weisberg, 1982). The following mathematical models are assumed for a data 
A 
processing system with a bias Vli on measurement li: 
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where 
l + v = A X + ei V~ 
nxl nxl nx44xl nxl 
p (6.19) 
nxn 
X is the receiver position and clock bias to be estimated free of bias V ~, 
0 
e· l = 1 
.th 
l element (6.20) 
nxl 
0 
To solve Equation (6.19) in the least-squares way, let 
(6.21) 
(6.22) 
So Equation (6.19) becomes: 
p (6.23) 
Its least-squares solution is: 
(6.24) 
Define Q as: 
(6.25) 
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Thus (Yu et al., 1990), 
(6.26) 
Q- Q A + Q A N Q AN Q A X XLS XLs Aei V'li eiA XLs (6.27) 
(6.28) 
where 
(6.29) 
Finally, the least-squares solution of Equation (6.19) is: 
Thus, 
(6.30) 
(6.31) 
where 
(6.32) 
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For individual outlier detection/isolation, the following statistic is a student variable 
A 
with degrees of freedom (n-5) when Vli = 0 (Cook and Weisberg, 1982), 
-v·IP.· ~ f· = l ll'\j~V;; 
l ~ 2 2 (WSSE - v · I P. · Q ) I ( n - 5) t u Vu 
- t(n-5) (6.33) 
This suggests that the minimum number of measurements for outlier isolation is 6. 
However, the detection of GPS navigation system failure with RAIM is carried out in 
the way described in Section 6.1, and only horizontal position is concerned. Thus the 
following derivation focuses on the bias effects on horizontal position and WSSE which 
result in the construction of a test statistic required to perform RAIM power analysis. 
Equation (6.30) is the estimate of the bias V~. It can be detetmined from the least-
squares solution X LS. From Equation (6.31), the bias free solution X is composed of 
two terms. The first is the bias affected solution X LS, the second is the bias effect on 
the solution. the horizontal position biases (\!xi, Vyi) caused by V~ are obtained: 
A 
Vii= (Qxxaix +Qxyaiy +Qxhaih +Qxtait)f1iVli 
A 
Vyi = (Qyxaix +Qyyaiy +Qyhaih +Qytait)J1iVli 
Using the definition of matrix C in Equation (6.17), 
So, 
eli = (Qxxaix + Qxyaiy + Qxhaih + Qxtait) 
c2i = (Qyxaix + Qyyaiy + Qyhaih + Qytait) 
v.x. = c1.p .. vf. l l ll l 
VyA· = C2 ·P .. vf. l l ll l 
100 
(6.34) 
(6.35) 
(6.36) 
(6.37) 
(6.38) 
(6.39) 
and the radial error caused by V~ is: 
VHOR· =~C1~ +C22·R·IVfl l l l ll l (6.40) 
In addition, the residuals Vv and the weighted sum of squares of residuals VWSSE 
A 
caused by \I li can be determined as: 
A A T A 
Vv = AVXLs - e· VI· = (AQ ~ A P- I)e· VI· 
z z XLs z z 
T AT T T T A VWSSE=Vv PVv=Vliei (AQx~ A P-I) P(AQx~ A P-I)ei\lli 
LS LS 
Using the definition of B in Equation (6.18), 
Vv = (BP- I)ei \I~ (6.41) 
(6.42) 
Because of 
it follows 
(BP- Il P(BP- I)= (PBT P- P)(BP I) 
= PBTPBP- PBP-PBTP+P= P- PBTP= PQvP 
The definition of Qv in Equation (6.32) has been used. Finally, Equation (6.42) 
becomes: 
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(6.43) 
6.3.2 RAIM POWER ANALYSIS 
A statistic test is required to be constructed to relate the alarm limit to satellite 
geometry in order to perform the RAIM test power analysis. Define R1 and R2 as: 
(6.44) 
(6.45) 
where cr0 is the a priori standard deviation of the measurements, and is adopted as 
33.0 metres for the GPS CIA pseudoranges. R2 is used as a test statistic, It is known 
that R2 is a non-central chi-square variable with the degree of freedom 1 (Yu et al., 
1990). It is denoted as X '2 ( oJ ,1), where oJ is the non centrality parameter 
determined by (Yu et al., 1990): 
(6.46) 
From Equation (6.40), R2 is expressed as the function of VHORi: 
(6.47) 
According to the test power definition (Li, 1988), the RAIM test power is required to 
meet: 
(6.48) 
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X 6~999 ( oJ ,1) must be determined, where X 6~999 ( oJ ,1) is the quartile of X '2 ( oJ ,1) to 
give probability 0.999. From the definition of X '2 ( oJ ,1) (Abramowitz and Stegun, 
1972 ), it follows 
(6.49) 
where Prj is the probability of chi-square variable with degrees of freedom 1 + 2 j, 
that is, 
12 (82 1) 
P _ r x 0.999 o, k c )d rj - J 0 1 + 2 j X X (6.50) 
and k1+2j (x) is the probability density function of chi-square variable with degrees 
of freedom 1 + 2 j as defined by: 
m x 1 --1 -
km(x) =-m--x2 e 2 (6.51) 
- m 
22 rc2) 
where m stands for the degrees of freedom. 
In order to use Equation (6.49) for determining xc?.-999 (oJ ,1), oJ must be determined 
first. According to Equation (6.43) and Assumptions 2 and 3, it follows 
A 2 2 
A 2 VWSSE (Vli) Pii Qv (j - - II O,threshold - 4 - 4 n- n- (6.52) 
So an estimate of oJ is obtained: 
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8 2 _ (n- 4)6-J,threshold 0 -
a6 
According to Equation (6.13), the above equation becomes 
8 2 2 0 = Xa,n-4 
(6.53) 
(6.54) 
In this way the values of the non-centrality parameter 8r} are obtained. They are given 
in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: The Non-centrality Parameters 8r} in x'2 (8rS ,1) 
n-4 8r} 
1 15.9 
2 19.2 
3 22.0 
Thus, X6~999 (8r} ,1) can be computed from Equation (6.49) and the results are listed in 
Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: X 02999 ( 8r} ,1) Guaranteeing the Minimum Detection Probability 0.999 
n-4 x6~999co5 ,I) 
1 50.5 
2 57.0 
3 64.0 
In order to achieve the RAIM test power of 0.999, the following equation should hold: 
(6.55) 
According to Assumption 1, let IVHORi I =Alarm Limit, so 
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it follows 
(Alarm Limit) 2 
x6~999Co6 ,1)aJ 
(6.56) 
(6.57) 
Considering the weight matrix and ARP definition by Equation (6.14), the weighted 
ARP variable WARP is defined as 
( Cfl + cii )(n- 4) A 
WARP= Qv.. ao,threshold 
ll 
(6.58) 
Thus, ceilings for WARP are obtained: 
(Alarm Limit) X CJO,threshold X~ 
WARPceiting = 1 
ao -v x 6~999 C oJ ,1) 
(6.59) 
Using the alarm limits of 555 m, 1852 m and 3704 m for the non-precision approach, 
terminal and en route phases of flight, the WARP ceilings are computed and listed in 
Tables 6.5. 
Table 6.5: WARPceiling Values for the Non-precision Approach, 
T . 1 d E R Ph f Fl" h U . GPS SPS ermma an n oute ases o Igl t smg 
Phases of Flight Number of SV s Number of SV s Number of SV s 
in View= 5 in View= 6 in View ~7 
Non-precision Approach 312 324 334 
Terminal 1042 1082 1116 
En Route 2085 2164 2231 
These WARP ceilings are very close to those in Table 6.2. 
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From the procedure of deriving these new ARP ceiling values, the following 
observations can be made: 
• The derivation is mathematically rigorous. It follows the strict statistical 
definition of test power. The main assumption is that there is only one bias 
in all measurements. 
• The derivation is independent of the measurement type and satellite 
constellation. This is different from the ARP criteria derivation by the Monte 
Carlo simulation of Chin et al (1992) where the Optimal Constellation was 
used. In the derivation, the measurement can be GPS pseudorange, 
barometric altitude, clock bias estimate, etc., if the observable can be added 
into Equation (6.2). 
• The derived WARP ceilings are independent of a0. Actually, from Equation 
(6.13) it follows 
~ 2 cJO,threshold X~ 
Xa,n-4 = 
ao 
So Equation (6.59) becomes 
(Alarm Limit) X~ X~,n-4 
WARPceiling = 1 
-v x 6~999 coJ ,I) 
(6.60) 
• The derivation is based on the weighted least-squares method. Thus the 
weighted ARP criteria have been obtained. When using these criteria, a 
weight for each measurement need to be specified. The weight of 
measurement li can be determined by: 
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(6.61) 
where ai is the standard deviation of li , a0 is the standard deviation of GPS 
C/ A pseudorange assumed as 33 m. 
• The derived weighted ARP criteria are for RAIM detection function to have 
the maximum alarm rate of 0.002/h and the minimum detection probability 
of0.999. 
• In summary, the weighted ARP computation f01mulae are written below: 
2 2 
Cli +C2i ~A 
WARP= max{ Qv.. }"\ln-4ao,threshold 
ll 
6.4 DGPS RAIMANALYSIS 
i = 1,2,··· ,n 
(6.62) 
(6.63) 
(6.64) 
DGPS provides a more accurate positioning service than GPS. As most of the spatial 
conelated systematic biases in the GPS pseudoranges can be eliminated through 
differential operation, the standard deviation of GPS pseudorange after using the 
differential conection generated at fixed base station is reduced significantly from 33m 
to a few metres (eg., Kremer et al., 1990). 
Of course, there is still the possibility of having integrity failures in real operation. This 
generates the need to monitor DGPS integrity failure. RAIM is one option to carry out 
this monitoring. 
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Similar to the GPS RAIM power analysis, DGPS RAIM power analysis can be based 
on the same assumptions as used above. Assuming that the same maximum alarm rate 
and minimum detection probability as in GPS RAIM is met, that is, a =0.002/h and 1-
/3 =0.999. Assuming a differential correction is broadcast every 5 seconds, so 
a=0.002/720=2.778x 10-7 . Thus x&,m can be computed, see Table 6.6. From 
Equation (6.54) it is known x&,m =55. 
Table 6.6: x& m =55 for a=2.778x 10-7 
, 
Degrees of Freedom m=n-4 2 52 Xa,m = 0 
1 26.7 
2 30.2 
3 33.2 
4 36.1 
5 38.2 
6 40.1 
According to Equation (6.13), the following thresholds of 80 are given in Table 6.7 for 
ao=2, 3, 4 and 5 m. 
Table 6.7: &o,threshold for a =2.778x 10-7 and a0=2, 3, 4 and 5 m 
n-4 ao=2 ao=3 ao=4 ao=5 
1 10.3 15.5 20.7 25.8 
2 7.8 11.7 15.5 19.4 
3 6.6 10.0 13.3 16.6 
4 6.0 9.0 12.0 15.0 
5 5.5 8.3 11.0 13.8 
6 5.2 7.8 10.3 12.9 
X 6~999 (55 ,1) for DGPS RAIM can be determined using Equation (6.52) as following: 
Table 6.8: X 62999 (55 ,1) for DGPS RAIM Power Analysis 
n-4 x6~999c55 ,1) 
1 68.5 
2 73.7 
3 78.5 
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Finally, WARP ceilings for DGPS RAIM to meet the alarm rate 0.002/h and minimum 
detection probability 0.999 can be computed using Equation (6.60). For example, if the 
alarm limit equals to 10m, WARP ceilings are given in Table 6.9. 
Tabl 69 WARP C T e e1 mgs ~ DGPS RAIM ~ Al or or arm L . flOm lffilt 0 
n-4 WARP ceilings 
1 6.2 
2 6.4 
;?:3 6.5 
6.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter a rigorous probabilistic approach to GPS RAIM has been presented, 
based on the concept of statistical hypothesis testing power. The test power actually 
represents the minimum detection probability required by the user community. From 
the assumption that there is only one failed satellite, the relationship between GPS 
RAIM test power and the satellite geometry has been derived. Using this relationship a 
new set of geometry criteria have been obtained, which will be used to evaluate the 
GPS RAIM function availability in Chapter 7. It can be seen that the developed method 
can be easily expanded to derive the RAIM geometrical criteria for different alarm 
limits and test power. 
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CHAPTER7 
GPS RAIM AVAILABILITY EVALUATION 
AND ENHANCEMENT 
This chapter presents the RAIM availability results for the GPS and its augmented 
systems. Extensive RAIM availability evaluation has been performed based on the new 
criteria derived in Chapter 6. It is aimed to provide the necessary integrity monitoring 
performance with RAIM, and examine the possibility of using GPS based 
augmentation system as the primary means navigation system for the en route, terminal 
and non-precision approach phases of flight. Part of the results have been presented to 
the Australian Civil Aviation Authority (Kubik et al., 1995; McLucas et al., 1995), and 
at some conferences (Sang et al., 1995a; Feng et al., 1995a; Feng et al., 1995b). 
Section 7.1 discusses the definition of the RAIM availability along with a brief 
discussion of factors affecting the availability. Section 7.2 presents the availability 
results for stand alone GPS, where two distinct ARP criteria are compared and the 
weighting of GPS measurements is considered, resulting in the decision on which 
criteria and weighting scheme to be applied in further discussion. Then, the barometric 
altimeter aided GPS RAIM availability is presented and discussed in Section 7.3. The 
receiver clock modelling and aiding for the RAIM integrity monitoring is discussed in 
Section 7.4. Finally, WAAS RAIM availability results are presented. 
7.1 RAIM AVAILABILITY DEFINITION AND AFFECTING FACTORS 
7.1.1 RAIM AVAILABILITY DEFINITION 
RAIM should have two meanings. The first is its integrity failure detection ability, ie., 
to find whether there exists any integrity failure. The second is its integrity failure 
identification or isolation ability, ie., to find which measurement causes the integrity 
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failure and remove it from the navigation solution to keep the navigation system 
functioning normally. 
A navigation data processing system is assumed to have the form: 
l + v = A X 
nxl nxl nx4 4xl 
p 
nxn 
where each variable has the same meaning as in Equations (6.3) to (6.7). 
(7.1) 
From this equation, a quantity called ARP can be computed using the following 
equations, see Equations (6.62) to (6.64) and (6.9): 
2 2 
ARP { eli+ C2i} '4A = max Q -../ n - "f(j O,threshold 
vu 
i=1,2, .. ·,n 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
(7.4) 
(7.5) 
The ARP value at a specific location, specific time and for a specific satellite 
constellation is compared with its ceiling value to determine whether the RAIM 
function is available. 
7.1.1.1 RAIM DETECTION AVAILABILITY 
The quantity ARP of the geometry of n (n~S) measurements is compared with its 
criterion ARPceiling. It has been shown in Chapter 6 that ARPceiling is only for the 
integrity failure detection. So, if ARP is less than its ARPceiling, the geometry at hand is 
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declared as admissible for integrity failure detection, and the RATh1 detection function 
is available. 
7.1.1.2 RAIM IDENTIFICATION AVAILABILITY 
To evaluate the RAIM identification availability, ARPceiling is used as the criteria. 
Parameter ARP max is defined: 
ARPmax = maximise{ARPd i=l, 2, ···, ,n; n?.6 (7.6) 
where ARE>; is the ARP value of the geometry deleting the i 111 measurement from the 
current n measurements. 
So, if ARP max is less than ARPceiling for the geometry of n-1 measurements--that means 
that any subset of n-1 measurements in the geometry of n measurements is available for 
integrity failure detection--the geometry at hand is declared as admissible for integrity 
failure identification, and the RAIM identification function is available (Ananda et al., 
1994). 
7.1.1.3 RAIM AVAILABILITY AT A FIXED LOCATION 
As the GPS satellite geometry changes over time at a fixed location, RAIM will be 
available or unavailable at different times. The availability A VA!i at a fixed location 
i is defined as the percentage of the available time out of 24 hours, noting that the GPS 
constellation repeats itself in about 24 hours: 
A VAl. _ Available Time in 24 hours x 1 OO% 1
- 24 hours (7.7) 
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7.1.1.4 RAIM AVAILABILITY FOR A FLIGHT ROUTE 
As an aircraft flies along a specified route, the instant geometry at hand is the function 
of aircraft location and time, so RAIM will be available or unavailable depending on 
this changing geometry. The availability for a flight route AVA! Flight route is defined as 
the percentage of the available time out of the flight period: 
Available Time during Flight Route X JOOmo A VAl flight route = ------------=---=----- -;( 
Flight Time 
(7.8) 
7.1.1.5 RAIM AVAILABILITY OVER AN AREA OF INTEREST 
For two locations at the same time RAIM may be available at one location but 
unavailable at the other location. Thus, RAIM availability A VAl area of an area is 
defined as the average of the availabilities at sample locations in the area. That is 
m 
L,AVA!i 
A T T Af -""i=~l~--Y.t"l area =- (7.9) 
m 
where m is the number of sample locations in the area. 
7.1.2 FACTORS AFFECTING RAIM AVAILABILITY 
RAIM function availability is affected by many factors. The following sub-sections 
briefly discuss some of the significant factors. 
7.1.2.1 GPS SATELLITE CONSTELLATION 
Obviously, adding some satellites into or removing some satellites from the existing 
GPS satellite constellation will dramatically change the satellite geometry. Currently, 
the operational GPS constellation is the Primary Constellation which is composed of 24 
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satellites allocated on six planes. From the reliability study of GPS constellation, the 
availability of having at least 21 satellites operational in the Primary Constellation is 
0.997 (Durand and Caseau, 1990). Thus, the Primary Constellation and the Optimal 
Constellation (Green et al., 1989) were chosen in the GPS RAIM availability 
evaluation. 
7.1.2.2 SATELLITE ELEVATION MASK ANGLE 
The satellite elevation mask angle is also an important factor affecting the geometry. 
The mask angles of 5° and 7°.5 were used in the computation as either of these two 
mask angles is the most likely adopted angle for the navigation solution. 
7.1.2.3 WEIGHTING SCHEME 
From the variance component estimate of GPS pseudorange measurements in Chapter 
2, it is known that the weight of pseudorange could be the function of satellite 
elevation. This, of course, may not have a significant influence on the navigation 
solution, but it can be seen from the following results that this factor can not be ignored 
in RAIM availability evaluation. The effects of the following two weighting schemes 
on RAIM availability are studied: 
Weight Scheme A: weight =111.2 for satellites below than 20 elevation. 
Weight Scheme B: weight =1/1.5 for satellites below than 20 elevation. 
· 7.1.2.4 AUGMENTATION 
In order for GPS to meet the required navigation performance for aircraft operation, 
GPS must be augmented. The augmentation could be one, or combination, of the 
following schemes: 
barometer altimeter aiding, 
receiver clock aiding, 
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wide area augmentation system CW' AAS). 
The RAIJVI availability of GPS augmented with these options are studied. 
7.1.2.5 USER LOCATION 
An area of 5° to 50° latitude South and 85° to 185° longitude East was chosen for the 
RAIJVI performance evaluation as it nearly covers the Australian Area of Interest 
(Larden, 1992). 5°x5° grids were used to select the sample locations in this computed 
area. In addition to the area availability, the flight route availability was also studied 
choosing flight routes of Perth-Melbourne and Sydney-Darwin as representations of 
Australian air flight routes. For each location, the availability was evaluated for a 
period of 24 hours with time sampling rate of 5 minutes. So, there are 60480 sampling 
points in the area for each case. 
Software was developed to perform the RAIJVI availability evaluation. Figure 7.1 
outlines the structure of this software. 
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Parameters Input: 
Constellation Definition 
Mask Angle 
User Location 
Augmentation Scheme 
Weighting Scheme 
Standard Deviations of Measurements 
ARP Criteria 
Navigation Function, 
L Yes RAIM Detection and 
n (number of measurements)~ Identification Functions 
-
No All Unavailable 
Navigation Function Available? No 
Yes 
Yes Both RAIM Detection 
n<5? and Identification 
Functions Unavailable 
No 
ARP > ARPceiling ? Yes 
No 
RAIM Detection Function 
Available 
Yes 
n<6? • 
RAIM Identification 
No Function Unavailable 
ARP max > ARPceiling ? Yes T 
No 
RAIM Identification Function 
Available 
Figure 7.1: Structure of Navigation and RAIM Availability Evaluation Software 
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7.2 STAND ALONE GPS RAIM AVAILABILITY 
7.2.1 CONVENTIONAL AVAILABILITY RESULTS 
By "conventional" it means RAIM as evaluated using the ARP ceiling values of Chin et 
al (1992) and considering all the satellite measurements having equal weight. For the 
convenience of description, ARP Criteria I is denoted for the ARP ceilings of Chin et al 
(1992), and ARP Criteria II for the ARP ceilings obtained in Chapter 6, and use the 
following notations in the tables of this chapter: 
MOT: Maximum Single Outage Time, in minutes 
AV AI: Average Availability,% 
Non: Non-precision Approach Phase of Flight 
Ter: Terminal Phase of Flight 
Enr: En Route Phase of Flight 
7.2.1.1 DETECTION AVAILABILITY 
The averaged RAIM detection availability results are listed in Table 7.1. To see the 
variation of RAIM detection availability with the user location, as an example, the 
availabilities of the sampled locations for the non-precision approach phase of flight are 
shown in Figure 7 .2. The variations are similar for the en route and tetminal phases of 
flight. From Table 7.1 and Figure 7 .2, it is found: 
• For the computed area, the averaged RAIM detection availability varies 
from 83.813% to 99.992%, depending on the satellite constellation, the 
mask angle and the phase of flight. The availability with higher mask 
angle, fewer satellites and smaller alarm limit is worse than that with 
lower mask angle, more satellites and larger alarm limit. 
• For the computed area, the RAIM detection availability is high in the 
lower latitude area, and low in the higher latitude area. Australia is located 
in an area with low availability. 
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T bl 7 1 GPS RAIM D a e 0 : etect10n A 01 bT ARP C 0 0 I va1 a 11ty, ntena 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°oS so 7°oS 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 8S 920068 130 830813 3S 980747 60 960314 
Ter 3S 980776 60 960022 10 99o98S 1S 990744 
Enr 3S 99.479 4S 970996 10 990992 1S 990871 
Longitude (degree) 
-5 84 80 82 80 82 80 84 88 86 88 88 88 88 88 100 88 87 87 87 80 90 
-10 85 82 81 81 90 90 84 83 84 85 88 85 87 96 85 84 85 95 81 90 
-15 88 80 91 88 80 82 5 88 82 84 80 87 82 88 80 ..... OJ 
OJ 
-20 86 88 88 86 88 87 88 88 88 86 87 88 88 88 86 80 85 88 lo. C'l 
OJ 
-25 76 81 84 84 83 86 86 88 88 88 8 88 85 84 88 82 87 84 "0 \1 
-30 OJ 74 73 77 76 72 80 86 84 78 85 78 78 84 84 81 78 "0 
:J 
""' -35 67 70 71 73 74 76 7 78 77 77 75 78 77 73 75 74 •1'4 
""' IU
-40 68 71 71 72 76 68 70 73 77 78 76 72 \773 72 78 80 77 72 68 73 .J 
-45 74 70 70 70 68 68 72 75 78 81 80 77 70 68 78 80 81 76 73 68 71 
Figure 702: GPS RAIM Detection Availability for Non-precision Approach Phase of 
Flight, ARP Criteria I, The Optimal Constellation, Mask Angle 7°.5. 
7.2.1.2 IDENTIFICATION AVAILABILITY 
The averaged RAIM identification availability results are listed in Table 7 020 The 
variation of RAIM identification availability for non-precision approach with the user 
location is shown in Figure 7030 The variations are similar for the en route and terminal 
phases of flight. From Table 7 02 and Figure 7 03, it can be seen: 
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-5 52 
-10 51 
-15 24 
-20 15 
-25 13 
-30 13 
-35 12 
-409 
-457 
• For the computed area, the averaged RAIM identification availability is in 
the range from 20.785% to 97.235%, depending on the satellite 
constellation, the mask angle and the phase of flight. Particularly, the 
availability for the non-precision approach is very low. Similar to the 
RAIM detection availability, the identification availability with higher 
mask angle, fewer satellites and smaller alarm limit is worse than that 
with lower mask angle, more satellites and larger alarm limit. 
• For the computed area, the RAIM identification availability is high in the 
lower latitude area, and low in the higher latitude area. Australia is located 
in an area with very low availability. The availability for the non-precision 
approach is less than 20% for most of the area of Australia. 
Longitude (degree) 
45 39 42 45 40 47 44 45 46 63 55 55 57 61 56 46 44 50 43 43 
38 37 42 39 39 38 39 47 49 46 46 51 47 39 33 42 
20 26 29 28 29 30 37 38 32 34 30 32 27 31 '"' ill 
ill 
16 15 18 22 19 21 19 24 25 29 27 24 30 24 18 18 21 22 20 I. ~ 
ill 
14 17 14 14 14 12 12 17 17 19 18 18 17 17 14 12 15 12 "0 '.1 
ill 
13 13 12 13 10 12 12 12 9 7 9 11 "0 
::J 
+' 
12 9 8 7 6 13 10 8 6 9 7 6 •1'1 
+' 
11) 
9 8 10 7 6 6 8 7 8 13 11 ~10 12 11 7 8 8 5 7 J 
6 7 9 8 7 6 6 7 8 9 6 6 5 7 9 8 7 6 7 6 
Figure 7.3: GPS RAIM Identification Availability for Non-precision Approach Phase 
of Flight, ARP Criteria I, the Optimal Constellation, Mask Angle 7°.5 
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a e .. entl 1cat10n T bl 7 2 GPS RAIM ld 'f Val a 11ty, ntena A ·1 bT ARP C . . I 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation· 
of so 7°.5 so 7°.5 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 395 33.765 780 20.785 170 66.997 275 49.137 
Ter 160 68.684 250 52.359 60 94.463 125 87.068 
Enr 95 80.068 155 67.184 50 97.235 90 92.561 
7.2.2 AVAILABILITY WITH NEW ARP CRITERIA 
In Chapter 6, a new set of ARP ceilings was obtained through the strict statistical 
analysis of RAIM test power. Each new ARP ceiling is smaller than its corresponding 
value quoted in Chin et al (1992) which has been widely used before. That means the 
new ARP ceilings are more strict. It is valuable to see the difference of availabilities for 
the two distinct ARP criteria. In Tables 7.3 and 7 .4, the RAIM detection and 
identification availabilities with ARP Criteria IT are given, respectively. Figure 7.4 
shows the difference of the RAIM identification availabilities for the non-precision 
approach phase of flight. 
a e .. etec 10n Val a 11ty, ntena T bl 73 GPSRAIMD t A '1 bT ARPC .. II 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.5 so 7°.5 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 85 90.941 135 82.234 45 98.461 65 95.608 
Ter 35 98.715 60 95.901 10 99.985 15 99.736 
Enr 35 99.479 45 97.994 10 99.992 15 99.871 
a e . : en IICa lOll Val a IHy, ntena T bl 74 GPSRAIMid ff f A '1 bTt ARPC .. II 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.5 so 7°.5 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 480 31.095 850 18.783 220 63.479 390 45.180 
Ter 160 68.069 310 51.537 60 94.208 125 86.310 
Enr 95 79.517 155 66.427 50 97.116 90 92.105 
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Longitude (degree) 
-52 2 0 3 2 2 1 1 2 4 2 1 2 0 0 2 2 
-102 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 
-152 4 2 3 2 2 3 2 4 4 
,.., 
OJ 
OJ 
-204 0 3 3 4 3 4 2 3 4 4 4 3 2 2 3 5 
I. 
1)'1 
OJ 
-253 3 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 5 3 2 4 3 3 6 4 3 '1.3 \1 
-304 OJ 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 2 '1.3 
;:1 
.... 
-352 4 5 3 3 5 2 3 3 3 3 2 •1'1 
.... 
l'tl 
-405 2 2 3 3 3 6 4 6 3 2 3 \76 4 3 3 4 2 2 4 
.J 
-457 4 3 4 6 6 5 2 2 3 4 7 6 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 
Figure 7.4: Difference of GPS RAIM Identification Availabilities with Two Distinct ARP 
Criteria, the Non-precision Approach Phase of Flight, the Primary Constellation, 
Mask Angle 7°.5 
From an inspection of Tables 7.3 and 7.4 and Figure 7 .4, and the comparison with the 
results in Section 7 .2.1, the following findings can be drawn: 
• The GPS RAIM detection availability is in the range from 82.234% to 
99.992%, the identification availability is in the range of 18.783% to 
97.116%. The availability with ARP Criteria II is worse than that with ARP 
Criteria I. 
• The difference of the RAIM detection availabilities for the two distinct ARP 
criteria is smaller than the difference of the identification availabilities, this 
means the identification function is more sensitive to the ARP ceiling change 
than the detection function. 
• The availability for the non-precision approach phase of flight suffers larger 
changes from the ARP ceiling change than other two phases of flight. There 
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is no difference between the detection availabilities using the two ARP 
criteria for the en route phase of flight, and a small difference for the 
identification availabilities. This means that the availability for small alarm 
limits is more sensitive to the ARP ceiling change than the availability for 
larger alarm limits. 
• The availability differences for the non-precision approach phase of flight 
are significant, especially for the identification function. The average 
difference in the RAIM identification availabilities in the case of the Primary 
Constellation and mask angle 7°.S is 3.429%, with the maximum of 6.944% 
and minimum of 0.347%. 
7.2.3 WEIGHTING EFFECTS ON RAIM AVAILABILITY 
The variance component estimate in Chapter 2 showed that the variance components of 
GPS pseudoranges could be a function of satellite elevation. Consequently, weighting 
some satellite measurements will change the values of the satellite geometry indexes, 
such as DOP and ARP, and thus the availability will be affected. Considering the 
weighting schemes A and B, the effect of the weighting factor on the RAIM availability 
is evaluated. The evaluation results are given in Tables 7.5 to 7.8. The differences of 
the weighted RAIM identification availabilities for the non-precision approach phase of 
flight with those in section 7 .2.1 for the case of the Primary Constellation and mask 
angle 7°.S are shown in Figures 7.S and 7.6. 
T bl 7 S GPS RAIMD a e etect10n A ·1 bT ARP C. . I W. h. S h Val a 11ty, ntena 
' 
eigl tmg c erne A 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.S so 7°.S 
Flig_ht MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 80 92.976 130 84.927 30 99.010 60 96.772 
Ter 3S 98.813 60 96.093 10 99.98S 1S 99.744 
Enr 3S 99.486 4S 98.024 10 99.992 1S 99.871 
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T bl 7 6 GPS RAIMD a e etectwn A ·1 bT ARP C . . I W . h . S h vm a 11ty, ntena , e1g1 tmg c erne B 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.5 so 70.5 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 85 88.198 170 79.048 40 97.884 70 94.688 
Ter 35 98.681 60 95.815 10 99.985 15 99.729 
Enr 35 99.443 45 97.852 10 99.990 15 99.869 
T b1 7 7 GPS RAIM Id T a e . ent1 1catwn A ·1 bT ARP C . . I W . h . S h A val a 11t , ntena , e1g1 tmg c erne 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.5 so 7°.5 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 485 30.597 900 18.595 295 63.576 365 46.010 
Ter 160 68.024 310 51.612 65 94.190 125 86.620 
Enr 95 79.S90 155 66.S05 50 97.135 90 92.389 
T b1 7 8 GPS RAIM Id T a e . entl 1catwn A ·1 bT ARP C . . I W . h . S h B Val a 1 1ty, ntena , e1g1 tmg c erne 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.5 so 7°.S 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non S35 26.402 1040 15.977 30S 58.667 420 41.465 
Ter 16S 66.949 310 50.407 65 93.679 12S 85.847 
Enr 9S 78.763 155 65.342 50 96.639 90 92.052 
Longitude <degree> 
-5o 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
-1.01 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 
-1.5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ""' II) 
II) 
-202 0 2 3 3 2 0 0 2 4 2 2 2 2 
I. 
0'1 
II) 
-251 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 5 3 0 1 'tl ..., 
-302 
II) 
3 2 2 4 4 2 4 3 2 5 5 2 2 'tl 
:I 
+' 
-353 2 4 5 3 3 3 2 4 3 .... 
+' 
I'll 
-401 0 5 3 3 3 4 4 3 
v3 4 4 3 3 2 5 
.J 
-45c; 2 2 3 5 2 4 2 3 4 5 4 6 5 5 3 4 2 
Figure 7.5: Differences between the GPS RAIM Identification Availabilities with 
Weight Scheme A and Those without Weighting, ARP Criteria I, the Non-precision 
Approach Phase of Flight, the Primary Constellation, Mask Angle 7°.5 
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Longitude (degree) 
-56 4 3 5 8 6 4 6 5 3 3 4 8 7 5 4 2 4 2 3 5 
-106 3 2 5 5 6 4 5 7 3 2 5 5 3 3 3 3 4 3 5 5 
-156 8 2 6 6 6 6 3 4 2 5 5 3 11 6 t'o ~ 
~ 
-207 4 3 4 5 7 4 5 4 3 5 7 7 8 8 10 8 5 8 
I.. 
Ill 
~ 
-253 5 8 8 4 7 5 7 8 5 3 11 5 10 12 4 7 6 'tS 'V 
-30 ~ 10 8 12 8 10 10 7 8 6 11 6 10 8 6 3 7 10 11 8 'tS 
:1 
... 
-357 6 8 10 8 8 7 6 8 4 5 5 5 7 •1"1 
... 
IU 
-408 5 3 7 11 6 4 6 11 7 4 6 \711 7 8 8 4 3 8 10 .J 
-45 11 10 8 10 10 7 8 6 8 8 10 12 11 7 8 11 11 8 7 6 6 
Figure 7.6: Differences between the GPS RAIM Identification Availabilities with 
Weight Scheme Band Those without Weighting, ARP Criteria I, the Non-precision 
Approach Phase of Flight, the Primary Constellation, Mask Angle 7°.5 
On the weighting effects on the RAIM availability, the following observations can be 
made: 
• The RAIM detection and identification availabilities are sensitive to the 
weighting of satellite measurements. Weight changes have a larger effect on 
the identification function than the detection function. The effect varies with 
the satellite constellation, the mask angle, the alarm limit, and the weighting 
scheme. Generally, the difference is larger for the constellation with fewer 
satellites, the higher mask angle, and the smaller alarm limits. Weighting 
Scheme B causes more degradation in the availability than Weighting 
Scheme A. 
• Comparing with the results in Section 7 .2.1, the identification availability 
of the non-precision approach varies with the Weight Scheme A and 
Weight Scheme B as follows: for the Primary Constellation and mask 
angle 7°.5, the mean difference is 2.6% for Weighting Scheme A, with a 
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maximum of 6.9% in the computed area; the mean difference is 7.1% for 
Weighting Scheme B, with a maximum of 14.9%. For the Primary 
Constellation and mask angle so, the mean difference is 3.4% for 
Weighting Scheme A, with a maximum of 8.7% in the computed area; the 
mean difference is 8.3% for Weighting Scheme B, with a maximum of 
17.0%. For the Optimal Constellation and mask angle 7°.S, the mean 
difference is 2.2% for Weighting Scheme A, with a maximum of 6.3% in 
the computed area; the mean difference is 4.8% for Weighting Scheme B, 
with a maximum of 12.2%. For the Optimal Constellation and mask angle 
S0 , the mean difference is 3.2% for Weighting Scheme A, with a 
maximum of 6.9% in the computed area; the mean difference is 7.4% for 
Weighting Scheme B, with a maximum of 14.2%. 
• From Figures 7.S and 7.6, it is seen that for the Australian area the 
availabilities can be very sensitive to variations in assumptions made for 
pseudorange weights and ARP criteria. 
7.2.4 SUMMARY 
An evaluation of the RA1M availability for the stand alone GPS system was performed. 
It can be seen from the above results that: 
• The dominant factor affecting the RA1M availability is the satellite 
constellation. With the same mask angle and same alarm limit, the 
availabilities change dramatically with the constellations. Also the mask 
angle significantly affects the availabilities. Obviously this is due to the 
limited number of the measurements available for the navigation solution. 
Adding extra measurements to the GPS measurements will definitely 
improve the availability. 
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• The availability is a function of the user location as the satellite visibility 
changes with the location. Australia is located in an area with poor RAIM 
availability. 
• The availability degrades when more strict criteria are used, especially the 
availability for the non-precision approach phase of flight and the RAIM 
identification function. For the non-precision approach phase of flight, when 
the ARP ceilings are reduced about 5% , the detection availability declines 
more than 1% for the Optimal Constellation; and the identification 
availabilities decline by more than 2% and 25% for the Optimal and Primary 
Constellations, respectively. 
• The availability degrades when the lower satellites are weighted by a number 
less than 1, especially for the non-precision approach phase of flight and the 
RAIM identification function. For the non-precision approach phase of 
flight, when Weighting Scheme A was adopted in the computation, the 
detection availabilities decline by more than 0.9% for the Optimal 
Constellation; the identification availabilities reduce by more than 2% and 
3% for the Optimal and Primary Constellations, respectively; when 
Weighting Scheme B was applied, the detection availabilities decline by 
more than 3.8% for the Optimal Constellation; the identification 
availabilities reduce by more than 4.8% and 7.5% for the Optimal and 
Primary Constellations, respectively. 
Overall, the sensitivities of the RAIM availabilities to the ARP ceiling changes and 
weighting of satellite measurements can not be ignored. A prudent way to evaluate the 
stand alone GPS RAIM availability should take both these two factors into account. In 
the following sections, only the case using ARP Criteria II and Weighting Scheme A is 
considered. Tables 7.9 and 7.10 summarise the GPS RAIM availabilities with ARP 
Criteria II and Weighting Scheme A. 
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T bl 7 9 GPS RAIMD a e . etectiOn A '1 bT ARP C. . II W . h. S h vm a 11ty, ntena 
' 
e1g1 tmg c erne A 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.S so 7°.5 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 85 89.279 135 80.260 4S 98.069 70 94.936 
Ter 35 98.679 60 95.835 10 99.985 15 99.732 
Enr 35 99.464 60 97.946 10 99.992 15 99.871 
T bl 7 10 GPS RAIM Id 'f a e . entl 1catwn A '1 bT ARP C. . II W . h. S h vm a 11t , ntena 
' 
e1gl tmg c erne A 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.5 so 7°.5 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non S40 28.031 850 16.827 305 60.035 390 42.488 
Ter 160 67.409 310 50.883 65 93.897 125 86.141 
Enr 95 79.0S9 155 65.761 50 96.997 90 92.130 
7.3 BAROMETRIC ALTIMETER AIDED GPS RAIM AVAILABILITY 
7.3.1 THEORY 
As specified by TSO C-129 (1992), the aircraft navigation equipment shall include a 
provision for automatic input of pressure altitude (or barometric pressure corrected 
altitude) data. In such a case, barometric altimeter data provides an additional piece of 
information for the navigation, RAIM detection and identification functions. This data 
shall be utilised in navigation and RAIM functions when and only when these functions 
can not be provided by the GPS alone. 
Incorporating this altitude data into the GPS navigation equation is quite simple. A 
linear equation of the following form is augmented to Equation (7 .1 ), making use of the 
baro-altitude measurement: 
(7.9) 
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where flB is the difference between the measured barometric altitude converted to 
WGS-84 altitude, and the predicted altitude based on the nominal GPS position; £ baro 
is the error in measured barometric altitude. 
As the standard deviation of £ baro is different from a sv , the barometric altitude must 
be weighted before it is added to the basic GPS navigation equations. From the least-
squares theory, its weight can be determined by: 
2 
_ asv 
Pharo --2-
(Jbaro 
where a baro is the standard deviation of £ baro . 
(7.10) 
Thus, in computing ARP using Equations (7.2) to (7.5), the baro-altitude is processed 
as the measurement of an additional satellite with the measurement equation (7.9) and 
weight determined by (7 .1 0). 
There are two ways of aiding GPS with barometric altimeter. One is to use pressure 
altitude data with no correction for local temperature or pressure, but calibrated with 
GPS. The other is to use calibrated altitude data with a local barometric setting (TSO 
C-129, 1992). 
In the first case of the altitude calibrated by GPS, the standard deviation abaro is 
determined by (TSO C-129, 1992): 
where, 
(7.11) 
e c = VDO P max X a sv ; e c is calculated at the time of the most recent 
calibration; 
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VDOPmax = max{VDOfi} for each satellite in use; VDOJi is the VDOP with 
ith satellite removed; 
bez =0.5 m/nm when in level flight; 
ben =13 m/1000 feet altitude change above 18,000 feet; 23 m/1000 feet altitude 
change from 6000 to 18,000 feet; 32.5 m/1 000 feet altitude change 
below 6000 feet; 
v = aircraft velocity in knots; 
t = flight time in hours since the last GPS calibration of the altitude. 
In the second case of the altitude corrected with local barometric pressure setting at 
18,000 feet and below, the standard deviation a baro is determined according to Table 
7.11 (TSO C-129, 1992). 
Table 7.11: a baro of the Bare-altitude Corrected with Local Barometric Pressure 
Setting at 18,000 feet and Below 
18,000 477 
10,000 290 
5,000 165 
1,000 34 
500 19 
200 12 
7.3.2 RAIM AVAILABILITY RESULTS 
The RAIM availability of GPS augmented by baro-altitude was evaluated for the area 
defined in section 7.1.2.5. In addition, the RAIM detection availability for the en route 
phase of flight for the flight routes from Perth to Melbourne and from Sydney to 
Darwin was computed. In the area RAIM availability evaluation, a baro was fixed as 
300 m. In the flight route RAIM availability computation, a baro was determined by 
the following procedure: If the aircraft altitude is below 18,000 feet, altitude aiding 
with local pressure input was used. Otherwise, altitude aiding with GPS calibrated was 
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used in which a S for VDOP max was adopted. The level flight altitude was assumed to 
be at 30,000 feet (TSO C-129, 1992). 
The availability for the computed area are summarised in Tables 7.12 and 7.13. The 
following findings are drawn: 
• The RAIM detection availability changes between 82.923% and 100%, and 
the identification availability between 20.40S% and 99.603%. They are 
higher than the availability values given in Tables 7.9 and 7.10. Thus, the 
barometric altimeter aiding improves GPS RAIM availability. 
• For the detection function in the en route phase of flight, the availability 
reaches 100% when the mask angle is so for both constellations. 
• For the detection function availability, the baro-aiding has most benefits in 
the case of the Optimal Constellation and a mask angle 7° .S, increasing the 
availability by more than 1.9%. 
• The identification availability is significantly improved by the baro-aiding, 
especially for the en route and terminal phases of flight. The baro-aiding 
increases the availability of the RAIM identification function to 99.603%, 
and reduces the maximum single outage time to 1S minutes for the en route 
phase of flight under the Primary Constellation with mask angle 7°.S. 
Table 7.12: Baro-aided GPS RAIM Detection Availability, 
ARPc·. nw·h· Sh A ntena 
' 
e1g1 tmg c erne 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.S so 7°.S 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 8S 90.807 130 82.923 40 98.479 70 9S.810 
Ter 20 99.712 2S 98.907 10 99.992 1S 99.898 
Enr 0 100 1S 99.84S 0 100 10 99.98S 
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Table 7.13: Baro-aided GPS RAIM Identification Availability, 
ARPc·. nw·h· Sh A ntena 
' 
etgJ tmg c erne 
Phases The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
of so 7°.5 so 7°.5 
Flight MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
Non 540 31.920 850 20.405 305 62.591 390 46.076 
Ter 110 85.822 185 75.724 55 98.014 110 94.311 
Enr 55 94.630 90 87.355 15 99.603 55 98.249 
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 show the improvement of the RAIM detection availability by bare-
aiding for the en route phase of flight in the flight routes Melbourne--Perth and Sydney-
-Darwin under the Optimal Constellation with mask angle 7°.5, where the black point 
indicates the unavailable area. From these two figures, it is seen that, for the typical 
flight routes in Australia, the RAIM availability can be enhanced notably from the 
adoption of barometric altimeter altitude in the navigation solution. For example, the 
RAIM detection availability for the en route phase of flight on Perth-Melbourne route 
is 94.024% if the baro-aiding is adopted against 86.240% if the baro-aiding is not 
adopted, for the Optimal Constellation and mask angle of 10° (Sang et al., 1995a). 
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Figure 7.7: Baro-Aided GPS RAIM Detection Availability for the En Route Phase of 
Flight, Perth-Melbourne, the Optimal Constellation, Mask Angle 7°.5. 
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Figure 7.8: Baro-Aided GPS RAIM Detection Availability for the En Route Phase of 
Flight, Sydney-Darwin, the Optimal Constellation, Mask Angle 7°.5. 
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7.4 RECEIVER CLOCK AIDED GPS RAIM AVAILABILITY 
The RAJl\.1 availability discussed above is obtained by using instantaneous 
measurements only. This is called the snapshot type of RAIM. However, the 
information generated by the GPS navigation system previous to the current epoch 
would be helpful for enhancing the RAIM capability. The stability of the GPS receiver 
clock can benefit the RAIM function if the prediction of the clock bias is used as an 
extra measurement. This, of course, is absolutely dependent on the stability of the clock 
and the accuracy of predicting the clock bias. 
7.4.1 RECEIVER CLOCK BIAS MODELLING 
The GPS receiver clock bias estimate has RMS error a clock from the least squares 
solution of GPS measurements as: 
a clock = a SV x TDO p (7.12) 
where TDOP is the time dilution of precision reflecting the effect of satellite geometry 
on the clock bias estimate. TDOP typically ranges between 0.75 and 1.5 for the Primary 
Constellation (Misra et al., 1995). Taking a typical value of 1 for TDOP, we get 
0' clock = 0' SV = 33.0 m. 
If there are GPS measurements over a time period ( t0 , t1) during which the receiver 
clock frequency drift rate is stable, the clock bias at time t could be modelled simply by 
a quadratic function or a Chebychev series, or by Kalman filter built into the receiver 
(NAVSIM, 1987). Chebychev series (Fox and Parker, 1968) is used to demonstrate the 
characteristics of modelling and predicting the receiver clock bias . 
Two examples of approximating and predicting the receiver clock biases are presented 
below. In the first example, the clock bias estimates of 1 hour GPS data from a Rogue 
receiver were used. The clock biases were approximated by a Chebychev polynomial of 
order 2. The RMS error of the approximation was 21.3m. The obtained Chebychev 
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series was then used to predict the clock biases 15 minutes ahead. The RMS error of 
prediction is 16.3 m. The approximation and prediction accuracy can be observed from 
Figure 7.9. In the second example, the clock bias estimates of 2 hour GPS data from a 
Rogue receiver were used. These clock biases were also approximated by a Chebychev 
polynomial of order 2. The RMS error of this approximation was 24.3 m. Then the 
obtained Chebychev series was used to predict the clock biases 30 minutes ahead. The 
RMS en·or of prediction is 21.6 m. The approximation and prediction accuracy can be 
observed from Figure 7.10. 
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~ -680 \; ____ - \ 1\ 
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Figure 7.9: 
Receiver Clock Bias Approximation of 1 Hour Data and Prediction of 15 Minutes 
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Figure 7.10: 
Receiver Clock Bias Approximation of 2 Hour Data and Prediction of 30 Minutes 
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These two examples show that a receiver clock with a stable frequency drift can be 
modelled by a simple polynomial with RMS error not greater than a sv . With the 
accurate prediction of the clock bias, it can be treated as an additional measurement in 
the navigation solution, or fix the prediction as known in the solution. This will 
definitely benefit the RAIM function in the case of only limited satellites visible. 
It should be noted that the stable time may be needed long enough to allow accurate 
estimation of polynomial coefficients. Thus, in order for clock aiding to be practical for 
general aircraft navigation operation, robust clocks have to be available. 
7.4.2 RECEIVER CLOCK AIDED RAIM AVAILABILITY 
In this evaluation of the GPS RAIM availability with the aid of the receiver clock, the 
clock bias prediction is considered as an extra measurement. To reflect the 
improvement of the RAIM availability with the clock aiding, the flight route Perth-
Melbourne was chosen to study the identification availability for the en route phase of 
flight, and the area of Melbourne to study the detection availability for the non-
precision approach. This choice is made because the Perth-Melbourne route represents 
one of the worst routes in term of GPS availability, and Melbourne represents one of 
the locations with poor availability. 
The clock aiding to the RAIM function is applied as follows: 
Step 1. When the RAIM detection and identification functions are available using the 
GPS ranging (or aided by baro-altitude ), the clock bias predictions are not used for 
these functions. During these periods, the satellite geometry is good and the clock bias 
estimates are used to solve the coefficients of the polynomial modelling the clock 
biases. The geometric criterion for a good geometry for clock bias estimate was defined 
as 1.0 (Misra et al., 1995). 
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Step 2. If the RAIM functions are not available with GPS ranging alone (or aided by 
baro-altitude ), the clock bias predictions are augmented into the navigation system. The 
augmentation time is dependent on the time period during which the polynomial is 
modelled. From the results in section 7 .4.1, it is seen that if GPS clock biases are 
available for polynomial approximation for the last 2 hours, then sufficient prediction 
accuracy is guaranteed for at least 30 minutes ahead. If 1 hour data is available, 
sufficient prediction accuracy is guaranteed for at least 15 minutes. These results were 
used to determine the terminating epoch of clock aiding. 
Step 3. Similar to the baro-aiding theory, a measurement equation for clock bias 
prediction is formed as: 
~clock bias [ 0 0 0 1)x +£clock (7.13) 
where ~clock bias is the difference between the clock bias prediction and the 
nominal clock bias, and £clock is the error of clock bias prediction. 
The weight of Equation (7.13) is determined by 
2 
asv Pclock = _2.:::...:__ 
a clock 
(7.14) 
where a clock is the standard deviation of £clock . From the result in section 7 .4.1, 
Pclock may be larger than 1. The conservative value of Pclock = 1 was used in the 
following computations. 
The en route identification availabilities without and with the clock aiding for Perth-
Melbourne route are given in Table 7 .14. Figure 7.11 shows the GPS RAIM 
identification function enhancement through the augmentation of baro-altitude and 
clock bias prediction for the Primary Constellation and mask angle 7° .5. 
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Table 7.14: Receiver Clock Aided GPS RAIM Identification Availability, En Route 
Ph f Fl" h P h M lb ARP C . . II W . h . S h A ase o Ig t, ert - e oume, ntena 
' 
e1g1 tmg c erne 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
GPS Alone 68 71.384 95 58.592 25 94.693 60 88.028 
Baro-Aided GPS 51 89.504 77 81.755 17 98.406 43 95.618 
Baro- & Clock- 29 97.056 61 93.453 11 99.213 21 97.931 
Aided GPS 
From Table 7 .14, it is concluded that GPS RAIM identification availability for the en 
route phase of flight along Melbourne-Perth route improves very significantly through 
clock- and baro-aiding. It is seen: 
• For the Optimal Constellation and mask angle S0 , the availability increases 
from 71.384% to 97.056%, the maximum single outage time reduces from 
68 minutes to 29 minutes; 
• For the Optimal Constellation and mask angle 7°S, the availability increases 
from 58.592% to 93.453%, the maximum single outage time reduces from 
9S minutes to 61 minutes; 
• For the Primary Constellation and mask angle so, the availability increases 
from 94.693% to 99.213%, the maximum single outage time reduces from 
25 minutes to 11 minutes; 
• For the Primary Constellation and mask angle 7°5, the availability increases 
from 88.028% to 97.931%, the maximum single outage time reduces from 
60 minutes to 21 minutes; 
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Figure 7.11: Enhancement of GPS RAIM Identification through the Augmentation of 
Baro-altitude and Clock Bias Prediction, En Route Phase of Flight, Perth-Melbourne, 
the Primary Constellation, Mask Angle 7°.5, ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A 
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From Figure 7.11, the enhancement of the GPS RAIM identification function is found 
significant. Through the baro-altitude and clock bias prediction aiding, GPS has the 
potential of being used as the primary means navigation system for the en route phase 
of flight in Australia. 
For the non-precision approach phase of flight at Melbourne, the GPS RAIM detection 
availability improvement by the receiver clock aiding is seen from Table 7.1S, which 
gives the RAIM detection availability. 
Table 7.1S: Receiver Clock Aided RAIM Detection Availability, 
N A h M lb ARP C . . II W . hf S h A on-precision .pproac , e ourne, ntena 
' 
eigJ mg c erne 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 70.5 so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
GPS Alone 31 83.576 46 73.368 16 95.903 26 91.181 
Baro-Aided 30 84.688 46 75.486 15 96.319 26 91.840 
GPS 
Baro- & Clock- 22 94.132 31 87.049 5 99.653 20 97.396 
Aided GPS 
From Table 7.1S, it is seen the RAIM detection function for the non-precision approach 
phase of flight at Melbourne: 
• For the Optimal Constellation and mask angle so, the availability increases 
from 83.S76% to 94.131%, the maximum single outage time reduces from 
31 minutes to 22 minutes; 
• For the Optimal Constellation and mask angle 7°S, the availability increases 
from 73.368% to 87.049%, the maximum single outage time reduces from 
46 minutes to 31 minutes; 
• For the Primary Constellation and mask angle so, the availability increases 
from 9S.903% to 99.6S3%, the maximum single outage time reduces from 
16 minutes to S minutes; 
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• For the Primary Constellation and mask angle 7°5, the availability increases 
from 91.181% to 97.396%, the maximum single outage time reduces from 
26 minutes to 20 minutes; 
7.5 WAAS RAIM AVAILABILITY 
A satellite navigation system providing a primary means navigation aid for the en 
route to non-precision approach phases of flight will have to meet the stringent 
accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements. Although GPS demonstrates the 
ability for being used as the supplemental navigation system for aviation, it is not 
suitable for being used as a primary means navigation system, even for the en route 
phase of flight, as seen from the results obtained in the above sections. The Wide 
Area Augmentation System (W AAS) is the most important augmentation scheme for 
GPS to have a primary means navigation performance (Walter et al., 1995). 
7.5.1 WAAS DESCRIPTION 
Figure 7.12 shows the US FAA WAAS concept (WAAS Specification, 1994). GPS 
satellite signals are received and processed at widely located Wide-area Reference 
Stations (WRSs). These data are forwarded to data processing sites, refen·ed to as 
Wide-area Master Stations (WMSs), which process the data to determine the integrity, 
differential corrections, residual errors and ionospheric information parameters. This 
information is sent to a Ground Earth Station (GES) and uplinked along with GEO 
navigation message to GEO satellites. These GEO satellites downlink this data on the 
GPS L1 frequency with a modulation similar to that used by GPS. 
Recognising the potential of WAAS, similar W AAS programs have been proposed 
independently for Australia, Japan and China (CAA Australia, 1994; CAB Japan, 1994; 
CAAC, 1995). Currently, the main objective of these systems is to provide a primary 
means navigation system for all the flight phases down to the non-precision approach. 
The ultimate objective would be to provide a primary means navigation system for all 
the phases of flight down to CAT I precision approach. 
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Wide Area Augmentation System 
Concept 
* Wide Area Master Station+ Wide Area Reference Station 
• Wide Area Reference Station 
.i Ground Earth Station 
Figure 7.12: W AAS Concept (W AAS Specification, 1995) 
GEO 
Proposals to incorporate these three systems into an enhanced W AAS system for 
Asian-Australian region were made (Wei, 1995; Feng et al., 1995a; Feng et al., 1995b). 
This combined system (named as AAAS) would provide superior integrity, accuracy 
and availability for most countries in the Asia-Australian region for all the phases of 
flight. 
A GPS/W AAS receiver receives the ranging signals and navigation messages from all 
visible GPS satellites and GEO satellites, and the integrity message, differential 
corrections, residual errors and ionospheric information parameters from the GEO 
satellites. All information is used in the navigation solution and RAIM integrity 
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monitoring. With additional ranging signals provided by the GEO satellites, the 
navigation performance is enhanced. 
A ranging signal from a GEO satellite has the same measurement equation as the GPS 
ranging signal, but may have a different weight. The weight of a GEO ranging 
measurement is determined by 
2 
asv p GEO = --==-2 '-'--
aGEO 
where a GEO is the standard deviation of the GEO ranging measurements. 
7.5.2 W AAS RAIM AVAILABILITY 
(7.1S) 
The RAIM availability of W AAS was evaluated only for the non-precision approach 
phase of flight. In the evaluation, two W AAS schemes were considered. One is an 
Australian W AAS (A W AAS), which is assumed having three GEO satellites located at 
longitudes 10S0 , 13S0 and 16S0 East, respectively. The other is AAAS, which is 
assumed having six GEO satellites located at longitudes 60°, 8S0 , 110°, 130°, 1S0°, 
170° East, respectively. As W AAS provides the differential corrections, two cases of 
a GEo= a sv=33.0 m and 10.0 m were considered. 
Tables 7.16 to 7.19 give the RAIM detection availability. The main findings from these 
Tables are summarised below: 
• When aided by baro-altitude and clock bias prediction, A W AAS provides 
100% availability only for the Primary Constellation and mask angle so if 
a GEO =a SV =33 m. 
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• Even AAAS can not provide 100% availability for the Optimal Constellation 
if a CEO= a SV =33 m. 
• A W AAS provides 100% availability for the Primary Constellation if the 
differential corrections are used and a GEO =a sv = 10 m, and 100% 
availability for the Optimal Constellation when it is aided by the baro-
altitude and the clock bias prediction and a GEO =a sv =33 m. 
• AAAS provides 100% availability for both the constellations if the 
differential corrections are used and a GEO =a sv = 10 m. 
Table 7.16: A W AAS RAIM Detection Availability, Non-precision Approach, 
ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A, a GEO =a sv =33 m 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
AWAAS Alone 40 99.679 60 98.876 10 99.983 25 99.838 
Baro-Aided 40 99.702 60 98.967 10 99.985 25 99.856 
AWAAS 
Baro- & Clock- 15 99.997 40 99.960 0 100 5 99.998 
AidedAWAAS 
Table 7.17: AAAS RAIM Detection Availability, Non-precision Approach, 
ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A, a GEO =a sv =33 m 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
s_ystem MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
AAASAlone 35 99.841 45 99.478 10 99.984 25 99.894 
Baro-Aided 35 99.843 45 99.486 10 99.985 25 99.904 
AAAS 
Baro- & Clock- 10 99.998 25 99.988 0 100 5 99.999 
AidedAAAS 
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Table 7.18: AWAAS RAIM Detection Availability, Non-precision Approach, 
ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A, a GEO =a sv = 10 m 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
AWAAS Alone 0 100 5 99.998 0 100 0 100 
Baro-Aided 0 100 5 99.998 0 100 0 100 
AWAAS 
Baro- & Clock- 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 
AidedAWAAS 
Table 7.19: AAAS RAIM Detection Availability, Non-precision Approach, 
ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A, a GEO = a sv = 10 m 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
AAAS Alone 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 
Baro-Aided 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 
AAAS 
Baro- & Clock- 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 
AidedAAAS 
Tables 7.20 to 7.23 list the RAIM identification availability results of WAAS. From 
these Tables, the following findings are obtained: 
• W AAS provides much higher RAIM identification availability than GPS. 
• When the differential corrections are not used in the navigation solution 
and RAIM integrity monitoring, both A W AAS and AAAS can not provide 
100% RAIM identification availability. 
• When differential corrections are used and a GEO =a sv = 10 m, the RAIM 
identification function is 100% available for A W AAS based on the 
Primary Constellation and aided by the baro-altitude and the clock bias 
prediction. 
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• The baro-altitude and clock bias prediction aided AAAS with 
a GEO =a sv = 10 m provides 100% RAIM identification availability 
except for the Optimal Constellation and mask angle 7° .5. 
Table 7.20: AWAAS RAIM Identification Availability, Non-precision Approach, 
ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A, a GEO =a sv =33 m 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
AWAASAlone 140 86.247 170 75.737 85 95.719 135 90.782 
Baro-Aided 140 87.154 170 77.300 85 96.004 135 91.395 
AWAAS 
Baro- & Clock- 115 97.824 155 94.694 55 99.497 115 98.527 
AidedAWAAS 
Table 7.21: AAAS RAIM Identification Availability, Non-precision Approach, 
ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A, a GEO =a sv =33 m 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
AAAS Alone 165 94.213 195 89.559 70 98.247 110 95.971 
Baro-Aided 165 94.276 195 89.730 70 98.269 110 96.048 
AAAS 
Baro- & Clock- 140 98.889 180 97.090 45 99.701 90 99.157 
AidedAAAS 
Table 7.22: AWAAS RAIM Identification Availability, Non-precision Approach, 
ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A, a GEO =a sv = 10 m 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
AWAAS Alone 35 99.726 50 98.975 10 99.990 30 99.902 
Baro-Aided 35 99.740 45 99.041 10 99.995 30 99.912 
AWAAS 
Baro- & Clock- s 99.998 15 99.965 0 100 0 100 
AidedAWAAS 
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Table 7.23: AAAS RAIM Identification A vail ability, Non-precision Approach, 
ARP Criteria II, Weighting Scheme A, a GEO = a sv = 10 m 
Navigation The Optimal Constellation The Primary Constellation 
so 7°.S so 7°.S 
System MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI MOT AVAI 
AAAS Alone 10 99.993 20 99.897 0 100 10 99.988 
Baro-Aided 10 99.995 20 99.911 0 100 10 99.990 
AAAS 
Baro- & Clock- 0 100 5 99.997 0 100 0 100 
AidedAAAS 
7.6 SUMMARY 
Extensive RAIM availability results have been presented in this chapter. From the 
above results, the following conclusions are drawn: 
• For GPS being used as a supplemental navigation system, RAIM is the most 
important integrity monitoring method. A real time RAIM availability 
evaluation and prediction system would be essential for the safe use of GPS. 
• Both the barometer altitude aiding and receiver clock aiding significantly 
enhance the RAIM capability. In particular, with the aiding of baro-altitude 
and receiver clock, GPS demonstrates the ability of providing the primary 
means navigation service for the en route phase of flight when the Primary 
Constellation is in operation. 
• AAAS with the aiding of the baro-altitude and receiver clock and 
a GEO =a sv = 10 m provides 100% RAIM identification availability for 
the en route to non-precision approach phases of flight in the computed 
area except for the Optimal Constellation and mask angle 7° .5. Thus, 
AAAS is suitable to be used as the primary means navigation system even 
100% availability for the RAIM identification function is required. 
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CHAPTERS 
GROUND STATION INTEGRITY MONITORING OF GPS 
In Chapter 5, the risk analysis of the aircraft precision approach and landing was 
based on the application of DGPS (DGNSS). It is concluded that DGPS corrections 
must have appropriate accuracy to realise the integrity and continuity requirements. 
In Chapter 7, for W AAS to be used as a primary means navigation system with 100% 
RAIM failure identification availability for the non-precision approach phase of 
flight, DGPS was also necessary. These facts show that purely onboard integrity 
monitoring without the support of ground facilities is not sufficient to satisfy high 
integrity and continuity requirements. 
DGPS has been widely used in many applications. However, a simple DGPS system 
may conceal the danger of interruption, inaccuracy, non-integrity of the corrections, 
thus causing the aircraft navigation to lack sufficient continuity and integrity 
performance. 
In this chapter, an on-line ground station integrity monitoring system is developed. 
This system is designed to have the functions of monitoring GPS signals and 
predicting the DGPS corrections. Monitoring the GPS signals is aimed to ensure that 
no failed signal is used in navigation application. Predicting the DGPS corrections is 
necessary for ensuring the continuity of the navigation service. 
In the following, the GPS Integrity Channel (GIC) concept based on the ground 
monitoring of the GPS system is introduced briefly. Then, the algorithm for 
monitoring the GPS signals from a DGPS reference station is developed. This is 
followed by the presentation of the DGPS correction prediction based on neutral 
network modelling. Finally, a prototype on-line ground station monitoring system is 
developed. 
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Part of this chapter is based on the work performed for the ARC project "Neutral 
Networks Modelling for Time Series Prediction with Application to Differential 
GPS" (Kubik et al., 1996). 
8.1 GPS INTEGRITY CHANNEL CONCEPT 
The GPS Integrity Channel (GIC) concept was first proposed by Braff and Shively 
(1985). It is an external GPS integrity monitoring system with a ground network that 
continuously monitors the GPS signals and a space segment that broadcasts the GPS 
signal integrity message to the users via geostationary satellites. Based on this initial 
GIC concept, Wide Area Augmentation System (W AAS), which provides GPS 
satellite integrity message, DGPS corrections and extra ranging signals from 
geostationary satellites, is being developed in the US. The basic GIC concept is 
described below. 
8.1.1 GIC OPERATIONS CONCEPT 
It is known that one of the most important functions of GIC is to provide GPS 
integrity message to users. On the question of what information the GIC should 
provide to users and how the avionics employs this information to determine the 
integrity status of the position solution, there are several alternatives (Kalafus, 1989). 
One of these alternatives is called Satellite Error Indication (SEI). In SEI, the GIC 
broadcasts for each visible satellite the interval containing the ranging error of its 
signal-in-space and a sign bit, unless the magnitude of the error exceeds a 
prespecified limit. If the error exceeds the limit for a satellite, GIC issues a "Don't 
Use" message to users for that satellite. In application of the GIC integrity message, 
two modes are possible. In one mode, the user would use the integrity message only. 
In the other mode, the user would apply the range error information as differential 
corrections. 
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8.1.2 GROUND INTEGRITY MONITORING 
Both the integrity message and DGPS corrections are generated by a ground 
monitoring segment. A ground monitoring segment would consist of two types of 
stations: Ground Monitoring Stations (GMSs) and Integrity Processing Stations 
(IPSs) (Lee, 1990). 
The major functions of a GMS are to make measurements of the GPS signals, format 
the data and send them to the IPSs. The transmitted data include the code and carrier 
ranging measurements of all visible satellites, navigation message, ionospheric and 
tropospheric delays, etc .. 
The primary functions of an IPS are to process GMS data in order to construct an 
integrity message, generate the differential corrections, and send these messages to 
earth station for broadcast to the users via GIC satellites. The IPS is required to carry 
out the following functions (Lee, 1990): 
• Check consistency of the navigation message data from multiple GMSs. 
After consistency check, a single sequence of navigation data will result. 
• Calculate range error: Taking the difference between the measured range 
and estimated range obtains the range error. In this differencing, the 
pseudorange measurement would be smoothed by the carrier phase, and 
corrected with ionospheric delay, tropospheric delay, satellite clock offset, 
monitor station clock offset, relativistic effects; the estimated range is 
computed using GMS position and satellite position. 
• Determine a representative range error: If a satellite is in view of more 
than one GMS, multiple range error values will be obtained. On the basis 
of these values, a single range error value most representative for the 
coverage area is estimated, and could be used as the DGPS correction. If 
there exists a large discrepancy in these multiple values, an alarm may be 
set. 
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• Calculate error in ionospheric delay model: The error in the ionospheric 
delay model from a GPS satellite is estimated by comparing the modelled 
ionospheric delay with the ionospheric correction generated by dual 
frequency carrier phases from GMS. Based on the error estimates for 
multiple GMSs, an estimate of the delay model error is determined for that 
GPS satellite. 
• Calculate the range error interval: The satellite range error and the 
ionospheric delay model error are algebraically combined. Then the 
corresponding range error interval is identified. 
• Check health and accuracy bits: Depending on the check of the health and 
accuracy bits from satellite navigation message, an alarm may be set. 
• Set an alarm bit: An alarm is set if examination of the range errors shows 
signal malfunction developing. The alarm may also be set depending on 
the check of health and accuracy bits in the navigation message. 
• Construct and transmit GIC integrity message: The GIC integrity message 
is constructed according to a format, and transmitted to the earth station. 
• Estimate GMS clock offset: A Kalman filter should be used to estimate the 
clock offsets to GPS time over a few days. 
Observing these functions, they could be classified as range error dete1mination, 
integrity message construction, and GMS clock offset estimation. For a local area 
DGPS service system, there is probably only one ground station. This demands that 
GPS signal integrity monitoring is reliable and robust. In addition, interruption of 
DGPS correction generation may occur in real time application environment. This 
problem would be serious for a local area ground system which supports high 
dynamic users. For example, the aircraft precision approach and landing requires 
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reliable and continuous DGPS service provided by a ground station located around an 
airport. For this purpose, the integrity and continuity guarantee of the DGPS service 
are essential. 
In the following, robust GPS signal integrity monitoring and DGPS correction 
prediction at a single DGPS ground station are addressed. 
8.2 GPS INTEGRITY MONITORING AT A DGPS GROUND STATION 
For a usual DGPS base station, because its position is known, the only unknown to 
be estimated is the receiver clock bias. Thus, if there are at least two visible satellites, 
GPS signal failure can be detected; if there are at least three visible satellites, the 
GPS signal failure can be identified. 
Assume there are n satellites visible to the ground station receiver. The sum of the 
squares of the pseudorange residuals with the least-squares method (arithmetic mean) 
is denoted as WSSE, see Equation (6.11). It is known from Chapter 6, WSSE I a~v is 
a X~-1 variable. Similar to the derivation of the RAIM thresholds, a set of thresholds 
for detecting the signal failure at the ground station can be obtained, if the maximum 
alarm rate is specified. For this detection purpose, at least two visible satellites are 
needed. 
However, this simple estimate of the receiver clock bias has a poor performance in the 
presence of contamination. The robustness of an estimator can be measured with 
"breakdown point". The definition of the breakdown point is described briefly below 
(Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987). 
Take any sample of n data points Z, and R is a regression estimator. This means that 
A 
applying R to such a sample Z yields a vector of regression coefficients 8 : 
A 
R(Z) = 8 (8.1) 
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Now consider all possible corrupted samples Z' that are obtained by replacing any m of 
the original n data points by arbitrary values. Denote the maximum bias that can be 
caused by such a contamination by bias(m, R, Z): 
bias(m, R, Z) = supi!R(Z')- R(Z)II (8.2) 
Z' 
where the supreme is over all possible Z', 11•11 is the Euclidean norm. If bias(m, R, Z) is 
infinite, then it is said that the estimator breaks down. Therefore, the breakdown point 
of the estimator R at the sample Z is defined as 
breakdown point(R,Z) = min{m ;bias(m,R,Z) is infinite} (8.3) 
n 
The breakdown point of the least squares estimate is _!_ (Rousseeuw and Leory, 1987), 
n 
where n is number of measurements used in the estimate. This means that one signal 
failure may be sufficient to distort the least squares solution. Thus, a robust estimate for 
the receiver clock bias is necessary. Andrews et al. (1972) studied 68 estimators with 
Monte Carlo simulation. From that study it is known that the worst estimator is the 
arithmetic mean. Rousseeuw (1984) proposed a robust estimator called least median of 
squares (LMS) which has the highest possible breakdown point of 50%. In addition, the 
Danish method (Jorgensen and Kubik, 1983) has been widely applied in surveying data 
processing. 
In the following, a robust algorithm to detect and identify the GPS signal failure at 
one ground reference station is discussed based on the LMS principle. 
8.2.1 LMS BASED ESTIMATE OF RECEIVER CLOCK BIAS 
For the receiver clock bias, the LMS estimate is given by the following equation 
(Rousseeuw, 1984): 
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where 
Minimize median v~ l 
edt INS 
LMS estimate of the receiver clock bias 
V( residual of GPS pseudorange PRi,i = 1,2,···,n 
(8.4) 
The computation of the LMS estimate of the receiver clock bias is as follows 
(Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987): Let cdti be the estimate of the receiver clock bias 
using only P Ri, i = 1,2, · · ·, n , and are ordered from small to large as 
(8.5) 
where, cdtl:n and cdtn:n are the smallest and largest among all cdti, i = 1,2, · · ·, n, 
respectively. Then, the following h differences are computed: 
cdth:n - cdtl:n, cdth+ l:n cdt2:n, · · ·, cdtn:n - cdtn-h+ l:n (8.6) 
where h = [~] + 1, [ ] stands for taking integer part of the value inside the bracket. 
The LMS estimate is then the midpoint of two edt values which give the smallest 
difference. If there are several smallest differences, then the LMS estimate is the 
average of their midpoints. For example, if we have cdti, i = 1,2,3,4,5 , and they are 
ordered as below: 
271.147, 393.466, 417.538, 422.680, 475.321 
so h=3, and three differences: 
417.538-271.147= 146.391 
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422.680-393.466= 29.214 
475.321-417.538= 57.783 
The smallest difference is 29.214. Thus, the LMS estimate 1s obtained as 
(422.680+393.466)/2 = 408.073. 
Then, weighted least-squares estimate (weighted arithmetic mean) of the receiver 
clock bias is performed, where the weight of PRi is determined as (Rousseeuw and 
Leroy, 1987) 
_hj_~2.5 
asv (8.7) 
otherwise 
here, vi is the residual of PRi with the LMS estimate of the receiver clock bias, 
a sv =33.0 m for the CIA pseudorange. The weighted arithmetic mean of the receiver 
clock bias is then used in the failure detection and identification. 
8.2.2 SIGNAL FAILURE DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION 
With the robust estimate of the receiver clock bias at hand, the conventional 
statistical testing is applied to detect and identify the signal failure using the residuals 
computed with the robust estimate of the receiver clock bias. 
For the least squares solution, the following variable 
-~ w.-
' a. 
l 
is of N(50 ,1) (Yu et al., 1990), where 
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(8.8) 
(j i = (j sv fQ;" -v~v,, 
and I is an identity matrix, V P Ri is the outlier of the pseudorange P Ri , 
P= 
A= 
pl 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 0 
p2 0 
0 0 
0 Pn 
and P;, is weight of the ith measurement. 
The following two hypotheses are formulated 
H0 : vi =0 
H( vi :;t:O 
(8.9) 
(8.10) 
(8.11) 
(8.12) 
(8.13) 
(8.14) 
and H0 is tested against H1 on a significance level a. Under the null hypothesis, wi is 
a variable of N(O,l). Selecting a significance level a, and if lw;l >Nan, then it is said, 
with the confidence 1-a, that pseudorange PRi has an outlier, where Na; 2 is the a 2 
quartile for a variable of N(0,1). 
156 
8.2.3 EXAMPLE 
In this example, there are 5 visible satellites, so that there are 5 receiver clock biases 
each obtained by using only one satellite. They are listed in the first column of Table 
8.1. Thus, the arithmetic mean of the receiver clock bias is 396.030 m. If the alarm 
rate is set as 0.002/h, then the statistic testing to WSSE suggests no signal failure, 
because ~WSSE =75.93, and this value is smaller than its threshold 82.0 as given in 
n-1 
Table 6.1. 
However, the robust estimate of the receiver clock bias is 427.251 m. Following the 
procedures stated in the above sub-section, the variable lwi I is obtained for each 
measurement, see Table 8.1. If the significance level a is chosen as 0.001, then 
Nan is 3.291 (Li, 1988). So it can be said, with confidence of 0.999, that the first 
measurement is affected by outlier, because w1 =4.73 > N a/2 =3.291. Finally, the first 
measurement in this example is identified as a failed signal with confidence 0.999. 
T bl 8 1 E a e xampJe o f R b s· 1 F '1 Id 'f o ust 1gna m ure entl 1cat10n 
cdt(i) (m) vi(m) ai(m) lwil 
271.147 156.104 33.0 4.73 
393.466 33.785 28.579 1.18 
417.538 9.713 28.579 0.34 
422.680 -4.571 28.579 0.16 
475.321 -48.070 28.579 1.68 
This example demonstrates the advantage of the proposed algorithm over the 
conventional method of detecting signal failure. Because the breakdown point of 
LMS estimator can reach 50%, which is the highest possible breakdown point for an 
estimator, it is concluded that the proposed algorithm for detecting and identifying 
GPS signal failure is robust. 
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8.3 DGPS CORRECTION PREDICTION WITH NEURAL NETWORKS 
MODELLING 
The continuity requirement of the aircraft precision approach and landing requires 
continuity of the DGPS service. In the case of an unscheduled intenuption of the 
DGPS correction generation or significant quality deterioration, avionics could rely 
on the delta pseudorange correction (PRC) contained in DGPS message. During this 
period, the temporal decorrelation of the DGPS corrections is the dominant error 
degrading DGPS service. 
The temporal decorrelation error is dominated by SA error (Kremer et al., 1990). If 
nominal age of PRC is 5 seconds, then unmodelled SA acceleration error should be 
less than 0.16 m I s2 in order to maintain 2 m PRC accuracy. This same acceleration 
error would cause a ranging error of 8 m if age of PRC is 10 seconds, hence it is 
necessary to attempt SA prediction. 
The accuracy of predicting SA with a second order Gauss-Markov process is in the 
same order as the accuracy of modelling SA with a polynomial (Chao and Parkinson, 
1993). By modelling SA with neural networks, the prediction accuracy of SA error 
could be as good as 2m in the 30 second period (Wang, 1994). A more precise DGPS 
correction prediction with neural networks is developed and discussed below. 
8.3.1 INTRODUCTION TO NEURAL NETWORK MODELLING 
8.3.1.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF NEURAL NETWORK MODELS 
When talking about neural network (NN) models, they are usually referred as either 
biological models or application-driven models. NN models are biological models 
because they often mimic biological neural systems such as audio (cochlea) functions 
or early vision (retina) functions. NN models are application-driven models because 
most of NN models are largely dictated by application needs. Many such neural 
network models are represented by the Connectionist Models (various computational 
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models proposed by people who believe that massively parallel (usually simple, 
adaptive) information processing elements with (hierarchically) interconnected 
networks can present intelligence). 
The most important characteristics of the application-driven NN models that make 
the NN models different from most traditional modelling techniques are (Hecht-
Nielsen, 1991 ): 
• Adaptiveness and self-organisation: This offers robust and adaptive 
processing capabilities by adopting adaptive learning and self-
organisation rules. Few other systems have ever offered this level of 
adaptive and self-organisational ability. 
• Nonlinear network processing: This enhances the network's 
approximation, classification and noise-immunity capabilities, while most 
traditional techniques only deal with linearity and cause themselves not 
capable of solving modem complex (nonlinear) modelling problems. 
• Parallel processing: NN models usually employ a large number of 
processing cells enhanced by extensive interconnectivity. This makes it 
possible to apply NN neural network theory to solve large scale problems. 
• Hierarchical structure: Every NN model embodies some degree of 
structure. This makes it possible to understand or organise NN models. 
These characteristics make NN models suitable for highly non-linear, high 
dimensional and complex problem. 
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8.3.1.2 NEURAL NETWORK INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEM 
NN information processing systems are totally different from any traditional 
modelling systems. They not only include the classification or regression kernel 
components (neural networks), but also include other important components. fu most 
situations, the NN information processing systems include the following 
components: instantiation process, feature extraction, neural net, and post-processing 
(Hecht-Nielsen, 1991), as shown in Figure 8.1. 
Neural 
Network 
Figure 8.1: Neural Network Information Processing System 
INSTANTIATION PROCESS 
The instantiation process samples the signal from the problem domain. It is also 
called sampling process. It is obvious that every real world modelling system must 
have a process to collect the information it needs. 
FEATURE EXTRACTION 
Before the data are put into the network, they must be refined to better represent the 
information contained in the sampled signals. By such a process, a training data set 
and a test data set are obtained. Without such a process, the information for problem 
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solving is often hidden by the non-relevant information and noise. It is the experience 
of many researchers that success of NN modelling hinges upon a proper feature 
extraction process (representation of the signals). Various signal representation 
techniques have been adopted to solve different problems. Several possible methods 
are: 
• Direct method. One example is using waveform to represent time series, 
as done in representing the GPS pseudorange error signals. Another 
example is using bitmap to represent picture. This is the most natural way 
of representing signal. 
• Frequency-domain representations. Different transformations are used to 
acquire the representation that may better suit the problem. Some of these 
transformations include Fast Fourier Transformation/Discrete Fourier 
Transformation (FFT/DFT), Principle Component Analysis (PCA), and 
Wavelet representation. 
• Parametric representation. A very famous model of this type of signal 
representation method include Autoregression Model (AR) and 
Autoregression and Moving Average Model (ARMA). 
• Geometric representation. Contours, boundaries, areas and moments are 
usual geometric representations often adopted in image processing. 
NEURAL NETWORK STRUCTURE AND LEARNING METHOD 
A neural network needs to learn or to be trained before it is used. In this phase, what 
really happens is that the training data, usually input data (denoted as Iinput) are input 
to the network. A training algorithm is then used to adjusts the parameters (denoted 
as 1¥) in the network. This will repeat until an optimal or correct solution is found. 
This process can be represented as: 
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(!input)~ W (8.15) 
After training, the network is ready to enter retrieving phase (recognition phase). At 
this stage, new inputs are put into the network and predictions Ooutput are obtained 
from the network. This process can be represented as: 
(/input + VV) ~ 0 output (8.16) 
The learning algorithms for a NN can be supervised or unsupervised. In the 
supervised learning, the output corresponding to each input in the training data set is 
known and used to adjust the network parameters. In the unsupervised learning, the 
output corresponding to each input in the training data set is either unknown or not 
used for the adjustment of the network parameters. 
POST PROCESSING 
A post processing component may be needed for various reasons for a particular 
application. For example, a post processing component may be important to prevent 
the neural network from making unreasonable mistakes. 
8.3.2 TEMPORAL SYSTEMS MODELLING 
Since the resurgence of artificial neural networks research in the late 1980's, there 
have been enormous interests on NN. While the majority of this research is directed 
towards a better architecture for pattern classification, there has been considerable 
work in applying such networks to the identification, prediction and control of 
dynamic systems (eg., Moody and Darken, 1989; Narendra and Parthasarthy, 1990). 
There are basically two categories of neural network architectures used in dynamic 
system modelling. One is the feed forward neural networks (FNN), including 
multilayer perceptron, cascaded network architecture and radial basis function 
network (RBF). A classical example of applying the classic multilayer perceptron 
architecture was given by Lapedes and Farber (1987). Another classic example of 
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usmg unsupervised clustering algorithms was presented by Moody and Darken 
(1989). The characteristic of the FNN is that they implement a static mapping, or a 
mapping from finite past to the desired prediction, no matter what learning algorithm 
is used, what architecture is adopted and so on. 
The other category of neural networks in dynamic system modelling consists of 
recurrent network architectures. The Williams-Zipser architecture (Williams and 
Zipser, 1989; Zipser, 1989) and the Jordan-Elman architecture (Elman, 1990; Jordan 
and Jacobs, 1990) are two examples of the recurrent networks. The characteristic of 
the recurrent networks is that they implement the dynamic mapping, or a mapping 
from all past input to the desired prediction, so that they are able to deal with time-
varying input or output. The recurrent network is commonly regarded as better suited 
for dynamic system modelling than the simpler feedforward network. 
O(k) 
w/ l 
Figure 8.2: Dynamic Recurrent Networks 
Recently, a number of researchers have experimented with various architectures that 
are somewhere in between a feedforward multilayer perceptron type architecture, and 
a full recurrent network architecture (eg., the Williams-Zipser model). Diagonal 
recurrent neural networks (DRNN), as shown in Figure 8.2, is a dynamic mapping 
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similar to the fully recurrent neural network (FRNN). Since there is no interlinks 
among neurones in the hidden layer, the DRNN has considerably fewer weights than 
the FRNN and the network is simplified considerably. 
It is commonly accepted that too many parameters in a nonlinear model often result 
in the model learning from the noise in the training data, with poor generalisation 
performance. In addition, a complex model, such as the Williams-Zipser model, 
usually also needs more training time. These considerations lead us to choose the 
DRNN to model the DGPS corrections in the SA environment. 
In the next section, the DRNN model is developed, and it is compared with the FNN, 
FRNN in terms of their total weights and input/output mapping characteristics. Then, 
a dynamic backpropagation training algorithm is presented to train a DRNN. At the 
end of next section, the convergence property of the DRNN based system is 
discussed, and an analytic method is proposed to find the adaptive learning rates for 
the DRNN. The results of the application of the DRNN on the GPS pseudorange 
error in the SA environment are presented in section 8.3.4. 
8.3.3 DIAGONAL RECURRENT NETWORKS 
Consider Figure 8.2, where for each discrete time k, Ii(k) is the ith input, Sj(k) is the 
sum of inputs to the /h recurrent neuron, Xj(k) is the output of the /h recurrent 
neuron, and O(k) is the output of the network. Depending on the network, W, VlP, 
wD and wH represents input, output, diagonal, and hidden weight vectors, 
respectively. 
The mathematical models for the DRNN in Figure 8.2 are: 
O(k) = L wpxj(k), X/k) = f(S/k)) 
j 
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(8.23) 
wherefO is the usual sigmoid function, f(x) = 1 _ 
l+e-x 
(8.24) 
Let y(k) be the desired output of the network. then the error function for training the 
DRNN can be defined as 
Er = _!_(O(k) y(k)) 2 
2 
(8.25) 
The gradient of the above error with respect to weight vector W, wD or W is 
represented by 
JEr = -er(k) ()Q(k) 
aw aw 
(8.26) 
where er(k)=O(k)-y(k) is the error between the desired and actual output of the 
network. 
The output gradients with respect to output, recurrent and input weights, respectively 
are given by 
()Q(k) 
awo = Xj(k) 
J 
(8.27) 
(8.28) 
()Q(k) 0 
aw~ = WJ Qij(k) 
!] 
(8.29) 
where 
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Qij(k) =()X j(k) I JW;j 
and they satisfy 
(8.30) 
(8.31) 
Equations (8.30) and (8.31) are nonlinear dynamic recursive equations for the state 
gradients ()X j (k) I aw and can be solved recursively with given initial conditions. 
For the usual FNN, the recurrent weight wD is zero and the equation reduces to the 
equation of the traditional back propagation. 
According to the analysis above, the negative gradient of the error with respect to a 
weight vector is 
_ JEr = er(k) ()O(k) 
aw aw 
(8.32) 
where the output gradients are given by Equations (8.27) to (8.31), and W represents 
W, wD and~, respectively. 
The weights can now be adjusted according to a gradient method, ie. the weight 
update rule becomes 
JEr W(k + 1) = W(k) + TJ( --) 
aw 
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(8.33) 
where 17 is a learning rate. Equations (8.27) to (8.33) define the dynamic 
backpropagation algorithm (DBP) for the DRNN. 
The update rule of (8.33) calls for a proper choice of the learning rate 11· For a small 
value of 17 the convergence is guaranteed but the speed is slow; on the other hand, if 
17 is too large, the algorithm becomes unstable. 
Let 17 be the learning rate for the weights of the DRNN, and g1, max be defined as g1, 
max= maxkll gi(k)ll, where gi(k) = a O(k) I aw I' and 11•11 is Euclidean norm. Then it can 
be proven that the convergence is guaranteed if 17 is chosen as 
2 
0 < 17 < --:::-2--
gl,max 
and the maximum learning rate which guarantees the most rapid or optimal 
convergence can be reached for 
1 
77*= 2 
gl,max 
the proof of these properties is found in (Ku and Lee, 1995). 
8.3.4 DRNN APPLICATION TO PREDICTING DGPS CORRECTIONS 
8.3.4.1 NEURAL NETWORK SELECTION 
Wang (1994) investigated GPS SA error modelling with FNN. He adopted the multi-
layer perceptron and radial basis function networks. Here the DRNN is adopted to 
model the DGPS corrections. 
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One reason for adopting the DRNN is because it is a dynamic model, while multi-
layer perceptron and radial basis function network are static models. It is hoped that 
the DRNN network may have a better generalisation ability than the static models. 
Also, as pointed out by Moody and Darken (1989), with the same training data set, 
the radial basis function network is usually less capable of reaching a high accuracy 
level than a usual multilayer perceptron. This "stems from the fact that a 
backpropagation network is fully supervised, learns a global fit to the function, and is 
thus a more powerful generaliser, while the network of locally-turned units learns 
only local representations" (Moody and Darken, 1989). Though usually a radial basis 
function network learns much faster than other methods, we aim mainly at reaching a 
higher accuracy level. Therefore the radial basis function networks will not be used. 
8.3.4.2 MODELLING METHOD 
For the prediction of the DGPS corrections from time t, a series of the DGPS 
corrections x(t), x(t-d), ...... , x(t-md) are used to predict x(t+ T). Where d is the 
sample interval between two consecutive sample data, m is the number of data points 
used as the input to the network, Tis a prediction time step. Thus, a neural network is 
to be used to construct a function f( •) such that 
Y(t+T) =f(x(t), x(t-d), ...... , x(t-md)) 
is a good prediction of x(t+ T). 
Various values of m have been tested. From m=4 to m=lO, the prediction error levels 
were all close to each other. When m was larger than 10, the error would not decrease 
and the training of the network became difficult. Thus, with too many data put into 
the network at a time, the training algorithm may be unable to find the optimal 
solution. 
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Also, various values of d were tested. Too small a d will cause too much calculation, 
while too large a d will make it difficult to reach the optimal solution. It was found 
that d=5 was an acceptable value and was adopted throughout the computation. 
The network was trained with the adaptive backpropagation algorithm giVen in 
section 8.3.3. Once the neural network has been trained, the constructed functionf{•) 
was used to predict a time series with step length T into the future. 
After training the neural network, the neural network was assessed by its 
performance on the test data set. For the convenience of comparison, RMS (here 
denoted as NRMS) is used to measure the performance of our neural network. 
NRMS ~ ~ l)Y(t + T)- x(t + T))2 
Where Y(t+ T) is the network output, the prediction, x(t+ T) is the target value from 
the test data set, M is the number of x(t+ T). 
A software was developed to realise this modelling method. Figure 8.3 is the 
structure of this software. 
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Initialization 
Load Training Data 
Is Error:::;; Error Threshold or 
Error Change:::;; Error Change Threshold? 
y 
N 
For Each Training Pattern Accumulate 
the Weight Change 
Estimate the Best Momentum Term by 
Conjugate Gradient Algorithm 
Change Weight 
Load Test Data 
Results 
Figure 8.3: Structure of DRNN Software 
8.3.4.3 NUMERICAL RESULTS 
The original observation data was taken by a Nov Atel GPS receiver. The DGPS 
correction prediction experiment was performed for GPS satellite PRN 3. There were 
5000 data points (with 1 second interval) in the experiment. 1500 data points were 
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used as the training data set, the remaining 3500 data point as the test data set. Figure 
8.4 shows the original DGPS corrections of satellite PRN 3. 
50 
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v 
<9 \; 0 
-10 
-20 
-30 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 
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Figure 8.4: Example of DGPS Corrections for Satellite PRN 3 
Training and Generalisation Results for Predicting 10 Seconds Ahead 
The DRNN was trained to predict the DGPS corrections 10 seconds ahead of the 
current epoch. The training error is 0.850 m (NRMS), and the test error is 0.793 m. 
Thus, the DGPS corrections can be predicted for 10 seconds with the accuracy better 
than 1 m. Figure 8.5 shows the prediction error (the difference between the prediction 
and real values). It is found that the large errors are at the epochs when the DGPS 
correction curve changes the directions. 
The mean of the errors displayed in Figure 8.5 is 0.034 m. A correlation analysis of 
these errors shows that they are nearly the white noise errors, see Figure 8.6. 
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Figure 8.5: Neural Network DGPS Correction Prediction Error, 10 Seconds 
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Figure 8.6: Correlation of Prediction Errors in Figure 8.5 
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Training and Generalisation Results for Predicting 30 Seconds Ahead 
The DRNN was trained to predict the DGPS corrections 30 seconds ahead of the 
current epoch. The training error is 1.020 m (NRMS), the test error is 1.239 m. The 
latter is quite close to the training error, and over fitting did not occur in this 
particular research. Figure 8.7 displays the prediction error for 30 seconds. 
The neural network trained above was also tested on the data collected from other 
satellites by the same receiver during the same time period. In Table 8.2, the test 
errors of the network on the data collected from satellite PRNs 16, 17, 20, 23,25 are 
listed. The NRMSs are within the range from 1.2 to 3.2 m. This means that the 
pseudorange error data collected from different satellites may share some similar 
dynamics. This suggests that for the practical application of the pseudorange error 
modelling, maintaining one model for all satellites may be an acceptable strategy. 
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Figure 8.7: Neural Network DGPS Correction Prediction Error, 30 Seconds 
173 
T bl 8 2 N IN a e .. eura kT .. etwor rammg an dT E est rrors ~ p d' . 30 s or re 1ctmg d Ah d econ s ea 
Sat 3 Sat 16 Sat 17 Sat 20 Sat 23 Sat 25 
Training Error 1.020 
Test Error 1.239 2.075 2.135 2.469 2.569 3.202 
8.3.5 Summary 
A diagonal recurrent neural network architecture and its training algorithm have been 
presented. This training algorithm and its adaptation rule are guaranteed to converge. 
By using recurrent neural network DRNN, the DGPS correction prediction accuracy 
is higher than those of the usual feedforward neural networks. For the purpose of the 
continuous DGPS service in the case of the DGPS correction generation interruption 
and accuracy degradation, the prediction accuracy of 1.2 m can be reached for a 
period of 30 seconds, and 0.9 m for 10 seconds. 
In summary, due to the high and fast changing dynamic characteristics of the GPS 
SA error, it is quite difficult to precisely predict the DGPS corrections with one 
algorithm. The neural network modelling provides a promising method for DGPS 
correction prediction. 
8.4 DEVELOPMENT OF DGPS GROUND STATION INTEGRITY 
MONITORING SYSTEM 
Based on the research presented in the above two sections, a DGPS ground station 
integrity monitoring system has been developed. This system has the following 
functions: 
1. GPS satellite signal failure detection and isolation. This is aimed at 
excluding the erroneous signals from the navigation solution. 
2. DGPS correction prediction. The DGPS corrections are predicted with the 
neural network technique and can be used in the occurrence of the DGPS 
correction generation interruption or the accuracy degradation. 
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3. Real time navigation performance evaluation. The GPS navigation 
function and RAIM function availability are evaluated based on the real 
time navigation data and the standard deviations of GPS pseudoranges and 
DGPS corrections. 
On the first two functions, they have been tested with AUSNA V GPS Base Station 
on the roof of QUT ITE building. The examples of the signal failure and the DGPS 
accuracy degradation were presented in Section 2.4. The validity of the methods of 
monitoring GPS signal quality from a DGPS ground station and predicting DGPS 
corrections was shown in Sections 8.2 and 8.3. The program performing the third 
function has been successfully applied in the research projects for the Civil Aviation 
Authority. 
8.5 SUMMARY 
Two major topics have been discussed in this chapter: GPS signal integrity 
monitoring from a DGPS ground station, and DGPS correction prediction with neural 
networks modelling. A robust algorithm for monitoring GPS signal has been 
developed based on the application of the LMS estimate of the receiver clock bias. 
The example given in Section 8.2.3 showed the advantage of the developed 
algorithm over the conventional least-squares based failure detection algorithm. 
Furthermore, the neural network modelling algorithm for predicting the DGPS 
corrections have been developed and tested. The prediction accuracy of our 
development is superior to any previously reported prediction accuracy. 
Based on the research results, a prototype on-line DGPS integrity monitoring system 
has been developed and tested. This system will be the basis of further integrity 
monitoring research in Space Centre for Satellite Navigation, and can be easily 
implemented into real DGPS service system. 
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CHAPTER9 
CONCLUSIONS 
The integrity of GPS application in the aircraft navigation is directly related to the 
safety of aircraft. Various aspects of the GPS integrity monitoring in the en route, 
terminal, non-precision approach and precision approach phases of flight in the civil 
aviation navigation have been discussed. What is concerned is how to ensure the 
GPS integrity level for all the phases of flight defined by civil aviation community. 
The thesis research has been focused on the mathematical aspects of GPS integrity 
monitoring, that is, the capability and performance of GPS satellite signal failure 
detection and identification of GPS integrity monitoring system. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the thesis research: 
1. Two examples of GPS navigation performance degradation due to GPS 
satellite signal failure and GPS signal interference were presented (Section 
2.4). The examples demonstrate the significance of the GPS integrity 
monitoring research because of the possibility of GPS navigation 
performance degradation developing into GPS navigation service integrity 
failure. 
2. The accuracy of GPS C/ A pseudorange measurement and its dependent on 
the satellite elevation were analysed. The results showed that the variance 
component of pseudoranges of lower satellites was larger than that of 
higher satellites, their ratio reached maximum when the elevation 
boundary was at 15 to 20 degrees. Consequently, weighting GPS CIA 
pseudorange measurements will affect the satellite geometrical constructs, 
such as DOP and ARP. 
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3. The aircraft tunnel concept and required navigation performance (RNP) 
concept were introduced (Section 3.1 and Section 3.2). The example of 
applying the RNP concept to the aircraft precision approach and landing 
showed that the safety level of aircraft could be achieved by allocating the 
safety risk onto the RNP parameters -- accuracy, integrity and continuity 
(Section 3.3). 
4. The relationship between the probability of GPS navigation service and 
service failure time was studied, and Psafe and Psuccess were proposed to 
be used as the primary optimisation parameter for designing a GPS integrity 
monitoring system. Based on the developed theory, the meanings of the 
minimum detection probability and the continuity risk requirement were 
explained (Section 3.4.1), and it was concluded that they were all conditional 
probabilities. 
5. A rigorous analysis of integrity and continuity risks of the aircraft precision 
approach and landing with the DGPS was presented. The joint probability 
density function of the flight technical error and the navigation system error 
was derived, as well the formulas computing the integrity and continuity 
risks (Section 5.2). The computation results (Section 5.3) showed that there 
existed significant differences both in theoretical methods and computation 
results between our method and the method proposed in DIAS MASPS 
(1993). It was conclude that our method was theoretically rigorous, and the 
results were flexible. The obtained allowable combinations of a 0 and aFTE 
could be used in GPS aircraft navigation application. 
6. The tunnel alarm problem was discussed using the crossing theory of 
stochastic process (Section 5.4). It has shown that the probability of aircraft 
exceeding an alarm limit was significantly different from the probability of 
aircraft being outside the alarm limit. Thus, the definition of the tunnel 
penetration given in DIAS MASPS (1993) should be reviewed 
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7. A rigorous probabilistic approach to analyse GPS RAIM test power was 
developed. This test power actually represents the minimum detection 
probability required by the user community. The relationship between GPS 
RAIM test power and satellite geometry was derived out, and a new set of 
geometry criteria of GPS RAIM which met the minimum detection 
probability was obtained (Section 6.3). The developed analysis procedure 
can be easily expanded to derive the RAIM geometrical criteria for different 
alarm limits and test power, and an example of applying this procedure was 
given to derive DGPS RAIM geometrical criteria for alarm limit of 10 m 
(Section 6.4). 
8. Extensive GPS RAIM function availability results were presented (Chapter 
7). It was found that the GPS RAIM availability, particularly the RAIM 
identification function availability, was sensitive to the change of RAIM 
geometrical criteria and weighting of GPS pseudorange measurements 
(Section 7.2). 
9. It was found that both the barometer altitude aiding and receiver clock 
aiding significantly enhance the GPS RAIM capability (Section 7.3 and 
Section 7.4). In particular, with the aiding of bam-altitude and receiver 
clock, GPS demonstrates the ability of providing the primary means 
navigation service for the en route phase of flight when the Primary 
Constellation is in operation. 
1 O.The RAIM function availability of two W AAS options was evaluated. It was 
concluded that, for the Australia Area of Interest, AAAS was suitable to be 
used as a primary means navigation system for the en route, terminal and 
non-precision approach phases of flight even 100% availability for the 
RAIM identification function was required (Section 7.5). 
1l.A robust algorithm was developed for monitoring GPS signal at a single 
DGPS reference station based on the application of LMS estimate of the 
receiver clock bias (Section 8.2). The example given in Section 8.2.3 
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showed the advantage of the developed algorithm over the conventional 
least-squares based failure detection algorithm. 
12.The neural networks modelling algorithm for precisely predicting short-term 
DGPS corrections was developed (Section 8.3). For the purpose of the 
continuous DGPS service in the case of the DGPS correction generation 
interruption and accuracy degradation, the prediction accuracy of 1.2 m 
can be reached for a prediction period of 30 seconds, and 0.9 m for 10 
seconds. The prediction accuracy of our development is superior to any 
previously reported prediction accuracy 
13.A prototype of an on-line local area DGPS integrity monitoring system 
was developed. This system has the functions of robustly monitoring GPS 
signal integrity, precisely predicting short term DGPS corrections, and 
providing real time GPS RAIM availability. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMPUTATION RESULTS OF 
AIRCRAFT PRECISION AND LANDING RISK ANALYSIS 
The following three tables list the risk probability computation results for the tunnel 
dimensions of 30m, 60 m and 90 m with Equations (5.19) to (5.21). 
Table A.1: Inte~rity and Continuitl: Risk Probabilities for TL-M=30 m, k=1, DOP=1 
m O"FTE (m) ao (m) p2 p3 p4 p3+p4 
1 0.5 0.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 1.5 3.0e-80 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 2.0 7.9e-48 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 2.5 9.0e-32 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 3.0 9.6e-23 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 3.5 3.5e-17 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 4.0 1.6e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 4.5 5.3e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 5.0 3.5e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 0.5 5.5 7.7e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 0.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 1.5 4.3e-62 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 2.0 7.1e-41 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 2.5 1.3e-28 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 3.0 4.1e-21 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 3.5 3.3e-16 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 4.0 6.6e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 4.5 1.4e-10 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 5.0 7.1e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 0.5 5.5e-80 O.Oe-86 4.3e-86 4.3e-86 
1 1.5 1.0 4.6e-62 O.Oe-83 2.9e-83 2.9e-83 
1 1.5 1.5 3.0e-45 5.0e-81 1.3e-80 1.8e-80 
1 1.5 2.0 5.5e-33 2.0e-78 7.5e-78 9.5e-78 
1 1.5 2.5 1.3e-24 2.0e-75 2.6e-75 4.6e-75 
1 1.5 3.0 7.2e-19 8.0e-73 1.2e-72 2.0e-72 
1 1.5 3.5 6.6e-15 4.0e-70 3.8e-70 7.8e-70 
1 1.5 4.0 4.3e-12 1.3e-67 1.4e-67 2.7e-67 
1 1.5 4.5 5.0e-10 4.6e-65 3.8e-65 8.4e-65 
1 1.5 5.0 1.7e-08 1.3e-62 1.1e-62 2.4e-62 
1 2.0 0.5 1.1e-47 O.Oe-49 3.1e-49 3.1e-49 
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1 2.0 1.0 9.6e-41 O.Oe-47 1.2e-47 1.2e-47 
1 2.0 1.5 6.8e-33 1.2e-46 3.4e-46 4.6e-46 
1 2.0 2.0 5.3e-26 3.0e-45 1.3e-44 1.6e-44 
1 2.0 2.5 1.4e-20 2.3e-43 2.9e-43 5.2e-43 
1 2.0 3.0 1.7e-16 6.3e-42 9.7e-42 1.6e-41 
1 2.0 3.5 2.0e-13 2.4e-40 2.2e-40 4.6e-40 
1 2.0 4.0 3.9e-ll 5.4e-39 6.6e-39 1.2e-38 
1 2.0 4.5 2.2e-09 1.8e-37 1.4e-37 3.2e-37 
1 2.0 5.0 5.0e-08 3.9e-36 3.7e-36 7.6e-36 
1 2.5 0.5 9.7e-32 O.Oe-32 3.9e-32 3.9e-32 
1 2.5 1.0 1.6e-28 1.0e-32 4.1e-31 4.2e-31 
1 2.5 1.5 1.6e-24 9.0e-31 3.3e-30 4.2e-30 
1 2.5 2.0 1.4e-20 8.0e-30 3.3e-29 4.1e-29 
1 2.5 2.5 4.3e-17 1.6e-28 2.3e-28 3.9e-28 
1 2.5 3.0 3.1e-14 1.4e-27 2.1e-27 3.5e-27 
1 2.5 3.5 6.1e-12 1.5e-26 1.5e-26 3.0e-26 
1 2.5 4.0 4.0e-10 1.2e-25 1.3e-25 2.5e-25 
1 2.5 4.5 1.1e-08 1.1e-24 9.2e-25 2.0e-24 
1 3.0 0.5 6.7e-23 O.Oe-23 8.2e-23 8.2e-23 
1 3.0 1.0 4.6e-21 O.Oe-22 4.2e-22 4.2e-22 
1 3.0 1.5 7.4e-19 4.0e-22 1.7e-21 2.1e-21 
1 3.0 2.0 1.8e-16 1.7e-21 8.3e-21 1.0e-20 
1 3.0 2.5 3.1e-14 1.9e-20 3.0e-20 4.9e-20 
1 3.0 3.0 3.1e-12 9.0e-20 1.4e-19 2.3e-19 
1 3.0 3.5 1.5e-10 4.6e-19 5.4e-19 l.Oe-18 
1 3.0 4.0 3.9e-09 2.1e-18 2.4e-18 4.5e-18 
1 3.0 4.5 5.8e-08 9.9e-18 9.le-18 1.9e-17 
1 3.5 0.5 1.7e-17 O.Oe-17 3.5e-17 3.5e-17 
1 3.5 1.0 2.7e-16 O.Oe-16 1.2e-16 1.2e-16 
1 3.5 1.5 6.4e-15 7.0e-17 3.2e-16 3.9e-16 
1 3.5 2.0 2.0e-13 3.0e-16 l.Oe-15 1.3e-15 
1 3.5 2.5 6.1e-12 1.4e-15 2.6e-15 4.0e-15 
1 3.5 3.0 1.5e-10 4.2e-15 7.8e-15 1.2e-14 
1 3.5 3.5 2.7e-09 1.7e-14 2.0e-14 3.7e-14 
1 3.5 4.0 3.3e-08 4.9e-14 6.1e-14 1.1e-13 
1 4.0 0.5 4.4e-14 l.Oe-14 1.6e-13 1.7e-13 
1 4.0 1.0 4.2e-13 l.Oe-14 4.1e-13 4.2e-13 
1 4.0 1.5 3.8e-12 1.2e-13 8.8e-13 l.Oe-12 
1 4.0 2.0 3.8e-ll 5.0e-13 2.1e-12 2.6e-12 
1 4.0 2.5 4.0e-10 2.0e-12 4.2e-12 6.2e-12 
1 4.0 3.0 3.9e-09 5.2e-12 9.8e-12 1.5e-ll 
1 4.0 3.5 3.3e-08 1.5e-11 2.0e-11 3.5e-ll 
1 4.5 0.5 l.Oe-11 5.0e-12 5.1e-11 5.6e-ll 
1 4.5 1.0 6.6e-11 l.Oe-11 1.1e-10 1.2e-10 
1 4.5 1.5 3.6e-10 3.0e-ll 2.1e-10 2.4e-10 
1 4.5 2.0 2.0e-09 8.0e-11 4.1e-10 4.9e-10 
1 4.5 2.5 1.1e-08 2.8e-10 7.1e-10 9.9e-10 
1 5.0 0.5 5.0e-10 4.0e-10 3.2e-09 3.6e-09 
1 5.0 1.0 2.5e-09 4.0e-10 6.3e-09 6.7e-09 
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1 5.0 1.5 1.0e-08 2.0e-09 1.0e-08 1.2e-08 
1 5.5 0.5 8.7e-09 1.5e-08 6.7e-08 8.2e-08 
2 0.5 0.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 2.0 1.3e-87 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 2.5 2.5e-58 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 3.0 l.Oe-41 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 3.5 3.4e-31 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 4.0 3.2e-24 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 4.5 2.3e-19 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 5.0 7.6e-16 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 5.5 3.2e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 6.0 3.1e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 6.5 1.1e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 0.5 7.0 1.8e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 0.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 1.5 7.3e-93 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 2.0 6.9e-66 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 2.5 5.0e-48 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 3.0 4.0e-36 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 3.5 5.6e-28 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 4.0 3.1e-22 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 4.5 4.6e-18 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 5.0 6.2e-15 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 5.5 1.4e-12 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 6.0 9.5e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 6.5 2.6e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 7.0 3.8e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 0.5 2.4e-83 3.6e-86 6.5e-87 4.3e-86 
2 1.5 1.0 6.1e-72 5.0e-84 2.4e-83 2.9e-83 
2 1.5 1.5 9.3e-59 l.Oe-81 1.7e-80 1.8e-80 
2 1.5 2.0 9.9e-47 5.0e-79 9.0e-78 9.5e-78 
2 1.5 2.5 4.9e-37 1.3e-75 3.3e-75 4.6e-75 
2 1.5 3.0 1.4e-29 4.0e-73 1.6e-72 2.0e-72 
2 1.5 3.5 6.7e-24 3.0e-70 4.8e-70 7.8e-70 
2 1.5 4.0 1.4e-19 9.0e-68 1.8e-67 2.7e-67 
2 1.5 4.5 2.8e-16 3.7e-65 4.7e-65 8.4e-65 
2 1.5 5.0 l.Oe-13 1.0e-62 1.4e-62 2.4e-62 
2 1.5 5.5 l.Oe-11 2.8e-60 3.1e-60 5.9e-60 
2 1.5 6.0 4.2e-10 5.5e-58 7.5e-58 1.3e-57 
2 1.5 6.5 8.1e-09 1.3e-55 1.3e-55 2.6e-55 
2 2.0 0.5 1.4e-48 2.6e-49 4.7e-50 3.1e-49 
2 2.0 1.0 2.5e-44 2.0e-48 l.Oe-47 1.2e-47 
2 2.0 1.5 6.8e-39 3.0e-47 4.3e-46 4.6e-46 
2 2.0 2.0 3.0e-33 l.Oe-45 1.5e-44 1.6e-44 
2 2.0 2.5 4.6e-28 1.5e-43 3.7e-43 5.2e-43 
2 2.0 3.0 1.4e-23 4.0e-42 1.2e-41 1.6e-41 
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2 2.0 3.5 7.6e-20 1.8e-40 2.8e-40 4.6e-40 
2 2.0 4.0 8.3e-17 3.6e-39 8.4e-39 1.2e-38 
2 2.0 4.5 2.4e-14 1.4e-37 1.8e-37 3.2e-37 
2 2.0 5.0 2.5e-12 3.0e-36 4.6e-36 7.6e-36 
2 2.0 5.5 l.le-10 8.0e-35 9.0e-35 1.7e-34 
2 2.0 6.0 2.4e-09 1.5e-33 2.1e-33 3.6e-33 
2 2.0 6.5 3.0e-08 3.6e-32 3.6e-32 7.2e-32 
2 2.5 0.5 4.2e-32 3.3e-32 5.9e-33 3.9e-32 
2 2.5 1.0 5.9e-30 8.0e-32 3.4e-31 4.2e-31 
2 2.5 1.5 2.5e-27 3.0e-31 3.9e-30 4.2e-30 
2 2.5 2.0 2.0e-24 2.0e-30 3.9e-29 4.1e-29 
2 2.5 2.5 1.6e-21 1.1e-28 2.8e-28 3.9e-28 
2 2.5 3.0 8.5e-19 8.0e-28 2.7e-27 3.5e-27 
2 2.5 3.5 2.3e-16 1.1e-26 1.9e-26 3.0e-26 
2 2.5 4.0 2.9e-14 8.0e-26 1.7e-25 2.5e-25 
2 2.5 4.5 1.8e-12 8.0e-25 1.2e-24 2.0e-24 
2 2.5 5.0 6.2e-11 5.5e-24 9.5e-24 1.5e-23 
2 2.5 5.5 1.2e-09 4.9e-23 6.le-23 1.1e-22 
2 2.5 6.0 1.5e-08 3.5e-22 4.6e-22 8.1e-22 
2 3.0 0.5 4.le-23 7.0e-23 1.2e-23 8.2e-23 
2 3.0 1.0 l.Oe-21 8.0e-23 3.4e-22 4.2e-22 
2 3.0 1.5 3.2e-20 l.Oe-22 2.0e-21 2.1e-21 
2 3.0 2.0 1.4e-18 l.Oe-22 9.9e-21 l.Oe-20 
2 3.0 2.5 7.7e-17 1.1e-20 3.8e-20 4.9e-20 
2 3.0 3.0 3.8e-15 5.0e-20 1.8e-19 2.3e-19 
2 3.0 3.5 1.5e-13 3.3e-19 6.7e-19 l.Oe-18 
2 3.0 4.0 4.4e-12 1.4e-18 3.1e-18 4.5e-18 
2 3.0 4.5 8.8e-11 8.0e-18 1.1e-17 1.9e-17 
2 3.0 5.0 1.2e-09 3.0e-17 4.9e-17 7.9e-17 
2 3.0 5.5 1.3e-08 1.4e-16 1.8e-16 3.2e-16 
2 3.5 0.5 1.3e-17 3.0e-17 5.2e-18 3.5e-17 
2 3.5 1.0 1.1e-16 2.4e-17 9.6e-17 1.2e-16 
2 3.5 1.5 1.2e-15 3.0e-17 3.6e-16 3.9e-16 
2 3.5 2.0 1.4e-14 l.Oe-16 1.2e-15 1.3e-15 
2 3.5 2.5 1.7e-13 9.0e-16 3.1e-15 4.0e-15 
2 3.5 3.0 2.2e-12 2.2e-15 9.8e-15 1.2e-14 
2 3.5 3.5 2.7e-11 1.2e-14 2.5e-14 3.7e-14 
2 3.5 4.0 2.8e-10 3.4e-14 7.7e-14 1.le-13 
2 3.5 4.5 2.5e-09 1.2e-13 2.0e-13 3.2e-13 
2 3.5 5.0 1.8e-08 3.4e-13 5.8e-13 9.2e-13 
2 4.0 0.5 3.2e-14 1.5e-13 2.4e-14 1.7e-13 
2 4.0 1.0 2.3e-13 8.0e-14 3.4e-13 4.2e-13 
2 4.0 1.5 1.4e-12 3.0e-14 9.7e-13 l.Oe-12 
2 4.0 2.0 7.8e-12 l.Oe-13 2.5e-12 2.6e-12 
2 4.0 2.5 4.6e-11 1.1e-12 5.le-12 6.2e-12 
2 4.0 3.0 2.7e-10 3.0e-12 1.2e-11 1.5e-11 
2 4.0 3.5 1.5e-09 l.Oe-11 2.5e-11 3.5e-11 
2 4.0 4.0 8.3e-09 2.3e-11 5.8e-11 8.le-11 
2 4.5 0.5 7.6e-12 4.8e-11 8.0e-12 5.6e-11 
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2 4.5 1.0 4.1e-11 2.6e-11 9.4e-11 1.2e-10 
2 4.5 1.5 1.7e-10 2.0e-11 2.2e-10 2.4e-10 
2 4.5 2.0 6.9e-10 2.0e-11 4.7e-10 4.9e-10 
2 4.5 2.5 2.6e-09 1.6e-10 8.3e-10 9.9e-10 
2 4.5 3.0 9.7e-09 4.0e-10 1.6e-09 2.0e-09 
2 5.0 0.5 3.8e-10 3.le-09 5.le-10 3.6e-09 
2 5.0 1.0 1.7e-09 1.4e-09 5.3e-09 6.7e-09 
2 5.0 1.5 5.8e-09 l.Oe-09 l.le-08 1.2e-08 
2 5.0 2.0 1.8e-08 l.Oe-09 2.0e-08 2.1e-08 
2 5.5 0.5 6.8e-09 7.1e-08 l.le-08 8.2e-08 
3 0.5 0.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 2.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 2.5 2.5e-83 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 3.0 l.le-59 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 3.5 1.2e-44 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 4.0 1.5e-34 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 4.5 1.7e-27 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 5.0 2.2e-22 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 5.5 1.4e-18 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 6.0 1.2e-15 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 6.5 2.5e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 7.0 1.6e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 7.5 1.4e-10 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 0.5 8.0 6.7e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 0.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 2.0 1.6e-83 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 2.5 4.6e-63 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 3.0 1.7e-48 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 3.5 4.5e-38 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 4.0 1.8e-30 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 4.5 7.6e-25 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 5.0 1.4e-20 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 5.5 2.7e-17 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 6.0 l.le-14 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 6.5 1.3e-12 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 7.0 5.6e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 7.5 1.2e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 8.0 1.6e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 0.5 2.1e-84 3.9e-86 3.7e-87 4.3e-86 
3 1.5 1.0 8.2e-76 O.Oe-83 2.9e-83 2.9e-83 
3 1.5 1.5 3.4e-65 O.Oe-80 1.8e-80 1.8e-80 
3 1.5 2.0 1.8e-54 l.Oe-79 9.4e-78 9.5e-78 
3 1.5 2.5 6.2e-45 8.0e-76 3.8e-75 4.6e-75 
3 1.5 3.0 5.3e-37 3.0e-73 1.7e-72 2.0e-72 
3 1.5 3.5 1.4e-30 2.4e-71 5.4e-70 7.8e-70 
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3 1.5 4.0 1.7e-25 6.0e-67 2.1e-67 2.7e-67 
3 1.5 4.5 2.0e-21 3.1e-65 5.3e-65 8.4e-65 
3 1.5 5.0 3.7e-18 8.0e-63 1.6e-62 2.4e-62 
3 1.5 5.5 1.6e-15 2.5e-60 3.4e-60 5.9e-60 
3 1.5 6.0 2.1e-13 4.6e-58 8.4e-58 1.3e-57 
3 1.5 6.5 1.1e-ll 1.1e-55 1.5e-55 2.6e-55 
3 1.5 7.0 3.0e-10 1.9e-53 2.8e-53 4.7e-53 
3 1.5 7.5 4.6e-09 3.5e-51 4.0e-51 7.5e-51 
3 1.5 8.0 4.6e-08 4.8e-49 6.2e-49 1.1e-48 
3 2.0 0.5 6.9e-49 2.8e-49 2.6e-50 3.1e-49 
3 2.0 1.0 1.5e-45 O.Oe-47 1.2e-47 1.2e-47 
3 2.0 1.5 2.6e-41 O.Oe-46 4.6e-46 4.6e-46 
3 2.0 2.0 1.2e-36 O.Oe-44 1.6e-44 1.6e-44 
3 2.0 2.5 4.8e-32 l.Oe-43 4.2e-43 5.2e-43 
3 2.0 3.0 8.9e-28 2.0e-42 1.4e-41 1.6e-41 
3 2.0 3.5 5.5e-24 1.4e-40 3.2e-40 4.6e-40 
3 2.0 4.0 1.0e-20 2.6e-39 9.4e-39 1.2e-38 
3 2.0 4.5 6.0e-18 1.2e-37 2.0e-37 3.2e-37 
3 2.0 5.0 1.3e-15 2.4e-36 5.2e-36 7.6e-36 
3 2.0 5.5 1.2e-13 7.0e-35 l.Oe-34 1.7e-34 
3 2.0 6.0 5.6e-12 1.3e-33 2.3e-33 3.6e-33 
3 2.0 6.5 1.4e-10 3.2e-32 4.0e-32 7.2e-32 
3 2.0 7.0 2.1e-09 4.9e-31 8.1e-31 1.3e-30 
3 2.0 7.5 2.2e-08 l.Oe-29 1.3e-29 2.3e-29 
3 2.5 0.5 3.0e-32 3.6e-32 3.3e-33 3.9e-32 
3 2.5 1.0 2.0e-30 O.Oe-31 4.2e-31 4.2e-31 
3 2.5 1.5 2.5e-28 O.Oe-30 4.2e-30 4.2e-30 
3 2.5 2.0 5.4e-26 O.Oe-29 4.1e-29 4.1e-29 
3 2.5 2.5 1.5e-23 7.0e-29 3.2e-28 3.9e-28 
3 2.5 3.0 3.9e-21 5.0e-28 3.0e-27 3.5e-27 
3 2.5 3.5 7.3e-19 9.0e-27 2.1e-26 3.0e-26 
3 2.5 4.0 8.9e-17 6.0e-26 1.9e-25 2.5e-25 
3 2.5 4.5 6.5e-15 7.0e-25 1.3e-24 2.0e-24 
3 2.5 5.0 2.9e-13 4.0e-24 1.1e-23 1.5e-23 
3 2.5 5.5 8.1e-12 4.2e-23 6.8e-23 1.1e-22 
3 2.5 6.0 1.5e-10 2.9e-22 5.2e-22 8.1e-22 
3 2.5 6.5 1.9e-09 2.4e-21 3.1e-21 5.5e-21 
3 2.5 7.0 1.7e-08 1.4e-20 2.2e-20 3.6e-20 
3 3.0 0.5 3.3e-23 7.5e-23 6.8e-24 8.2e-23 
3 3.0 1.0 5.9e-22 l.Oe-23 4.1e-22 4.2e-22 
3 3.0 1.5 1.1e-20 O.Oe-21 2.1e-21 2.1e-21 
3 3.0 2.0 2.5e-19 O.Oe-20 l.Oe-20 1.0e-20 
3 3.0 2.5 6.6e-18 8.0e-21 4.1e-20 4.9e-20 
3 3.0 3.0 1.9e-16 3.0e-20 2.0e-19 2.3e-19 
3 3.0 3.5 5.0e-15 2.5e-19 7.5e-19 l.Oe-18 
3 3.0 4.0 l.le-13 l.Oe-18 3.5e-18 4.5e-18 
3 3.0 4.5 2.1e-12 6.0e-18 1.3e-17 1.9e-17 
3 3.0 5.0 3.0e-ll 2.4e-17 5.5e-17 7.9e-17 
3 3.0 5.5 3.5e-10 1.2e-16 2.0e-16 3.2e-16 
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3 3.0 6.0 3.0e-09 4.9e-16 8.1e-16 1.3e-15 
3 3.0 6.5 2.2e-08 2.0e-15 2.8e-15 4.8e-15 
3 3.5 0.5 1.2e-17 3.2e-17 2.9e-18 3.5e-17 
3 3.5 1.0 7.8e-17 l.Oe-17 1.1e-16 1.2e-16 
3 3.5 1.5 6.4e-16 O.Oe-16 3.9e-16 3.9e-16 
3 3.5 2.0 5.3e-15 l.Oe-16 1.2e-15 1.3e-15 
3 3.5 2.5 4.5e-14 6.0e-16 3.4e-15 4.0e-15 
3 3.5 3.0 3.9e-13 l.Oe-15 1.1e-14 1.2e-14 
3 3.5 3.5 3.4e-12 9.0e-15 2.8e-14 3.7e-14 
3 3.5 4.0 2.8e-11 2.4e-14 8.6e-14 1.1e-13 
3 3.5 4.5 2.1e-10 l.Oe-13 2.2e-13 3.2e-13 
3 3.5 5.0 1.4e-09 2.7e-13 6.5e-13 9.2e-13 
3 3.5 5.5 8.6e-09 9.0e-13 1.7e-12 2.6e-12 
3 4.0 0.5 2.6e-14 1.6e-13 1.4e-14 1.7e-13 
3 4.0 1.0 1.7e-13 l.Oe-14 4.1e-13 4.2e-13 
3 4.0 1.5 8.8e-13 O.Oe-12 l.Oe-12 l.Oe-12 
3 4.0 2.0 4.3e-12 O.Oe-12 2.6e-12 2.6e-12 
3 4.0 2.5 2.0e-11 7.0e-13 5.5e-12 6.2e-12 
3 4.0 3.0 9.3e-11 2.0e-12 1.3e-11 1.5e-ll 
3 4.0 3.5 4.3e-10 8.0e-12 2.7e-11 3.5e-11 
3 4.0 4.0 1.9e-09 1.7e-11 6.4e-11 8.1e-ll 
3 4.0 4.5 8.2e-09 5.0e-11 1.3e-10 1.8e-10 
3 4.5 0.5 6.4e-12 5.le-11 4.5e-12 5.6e-ll 
3 4.5 1.0 3.2e-11 l.Oe-11 1.1e-10 1.2e-10 
3 4.5 1.5 1.2e-10 O.Oe-10 2.4e-10 2.4e-10 
3 4.5 2.0 4.4e-10 O.Oe-10 4.9e-10 4.9e-10 
3 4.5 2.5 1.5e-09 l.Oe-11 8.9e-10 9.9e-10 
3 4.5 3.0 4.8e-09 2.0e-10 1.8e-09 2.0e-09 
3 4.5 3.5 1.5e-08 7.0e-10 3.2e-09 3.9e-09 
3 5.0 0.5 3.2e-10 7.0e-10 2.9e-10 3.6e-09 
3 5.0 1.0 1.4e-09 4.0e-10 6.3e-09 6.7e-09 
3 5.0 1.5 4.4e-09 O.Oe-08 1.2e-08 1.2e-08 
3 5.0 2.0 1.3e-08 O.Oe-08 2.le-08 2.1e-08 
3 5.5 0.5 5.8e-09 7.6e-08 6.2e-09 8.2e-08 
3 5.5 1.0 2.1e-08 l.Oe-08 1.2e-07 1.3e-07 
3 6.0 0.5 5.1e-08 8.1e-07 6.5e-08 8.8e-07 
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Table A.2: Integrity and Continuity Risk Probabilities for TL-M=60 m, k=1, DOP=1 
m aFTE (m) a 0 (m) p2 p3 p4 p3+p4 
1 1.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 2.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 3.0 4.1e-80 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 4.0 9.5e-48 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 5.0 l.Oe-31 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 6.0 l.Oe-22 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 7.0 3.7e-17 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 8.0 1.6e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 9.0 5.3e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 10.0 3.4e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.0 11.0 7.7e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 2.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 3.0 5.5e-62 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 4.0 8.3e-41 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 5.0 1.4e-28 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 6.0 4.4e-21 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 7.0 3.3e-16 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 8.0 6.6e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 9.0 1.4e-10 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 2.0 10.0 7.1e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 1.0 5.6e-80 O.Oe-86 4.2e-86 4.2e-86 
1 3.0 2.0 5.7e-62 6.0e-84 2.3e-83 2.9e-83 
1 3.0 3.0 3.5e-45 6.0e-81 1.1e-80 1.7e-80 
1 3.0 4.0 6.3e-33 4.4e-79 5.0e-78 9.4e-78 
1 3.0 5.0 1.4e-24 2.4e-75 2.2e-75 4.6e-75 
1 3.0 6.0 7.3e-19 1.1e-72 9.0e-73 2.0e-72 
1 3.0 7.0 6.6e-15 4.4e-70 3.3e-70 7.7e-70 
1 3.0 8.0 4.3e-12 1.6e-67 1.1e-67 2.7e-67 
1 3.0 9.0 5.0e-10 4.9e-65 3.4e-65 8.3e-65 
1 3.0 10.0 1.7e-08 1.4e-62 9.2e-63 2.3e-62 
1 4.0 1.0 1.1e-47 O.Oe-49 3.1e-49 3.1e-49 
1 4.0 2.0 9.6e-41 2.2e-48 9.8e-48 1.2e-47 
1 4.0 3.0 7.0e-33 1.7e-46 2.8e-46 4.5e-46 
1 4.0 4.0 5.4e-26 7.6e-45 8.4e-45 1.6e-44 
1 4.0 5.0 1.4e-20 2.6e-43 2.5e-43 5.1e-43 
1 4.0 6.0 1.7e-16 8.8e-42 7.2e-42 1.6e-41 
1 4.0 7.0 2.0e-13 2.5e-40 2.0e-40 4.5e-40 
1 4.0 8.0 3.9e-11 6.8e-39 5.2e-39 1.2e-38 
1 4.0 9.0 2.2e-09 1.8e-37 1.3e-37 3.1e-37 
1 4.0 10.0 5.0e-08 4.5e-36 3.0e-36 7.5e-36 
1 5.0 1.0 9.6e-32 O.Oe-32 3.9e-32 3.9e-32 
1 5.0 2.0 1.6e-28 7.0e-32 3.4e-31 4.1e-31 
1 5.0 3.0 1.6e-24 1.5e-30 2.7e-30 4.2e-30 
1 5.0 4.0 1.4e-20 1.8e-29 2.3e-29 4.1e-29 
1 5.0 5.0 4.3e-17 1.9e-28 1.9e-28 3.8e-28 
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1 5.0 6.0 3.1e-14 1.9e-27 1.6e-27 3.5e-27 
1 5.0 7.0 6.1e-12 1.7e-26 1.3e-26 3.0e-26 
1 5.0 8.0 4.0e-10 1.4e-25 1.1e-25 2.5e-25 
1 5.0 9.0 1.1e-08 1.2e-24 8.3e-25 2.0e-24 
1 6.0 1.0 6.5e-23 l.Oe-24 8.0e-23 8.1e-23 
1 6.0 2.0 4.6e-21 7.0e-23 3.5e-22 4.2e-22 
1 6.0 3.0 7.4e-19 7.0e-22 1.4e-21 2.1e-21 
1 6.0 4.0 1.8e-16 4.1e-21 5.9e-21 l.Oe-20 
1 6.0 5.0 3.1e-14 2.4e-20 2.5e-20 4.9e-20 
1 6.0 6.0 3.1e-12 1.2e-19 1.1e-19 2.3e-19 
1 6.0 7.0 1.5e-10 5.3e-19 4.7e-19 l.Oe-18 
1 6.0 8.0 3.9e-09 2.5e-18 2.0e-18 4.5e-18 
1 6.0 9.0 5.8e-08 1.1e-17 8.1e-18 1.9e-17 
1 7.0 1.0 1.5e-17 2.0e-18 3.3e-17 3.5e-17 
1 7.0 2.0 2.7e-16 2.0e-17 l.Oe-16 1.2e-16 
1 7.0 3.0 6.4e-15 1.2e-16 2.7e-16 3.9e-16 
1 7.0 4.0 2.0e-13 4.4e-16 7.6e-16 1.2e-15 
1 7.0 5.0 6.1e-12 1.8e-15 2.1e-15 3.9e-15 
1 7.0 6.0 1.5e-10 5.8e-15 6.2e-15 1.2e-14 
1 7.0 7.0 2.7e-09 1.9e-14 1.8e-14 3.7e-14 
1 7.0 8.0 3.3e-08 6.0e-14 5.0e-14 1.1e-13 
1 8.0 1.0 4.3e-14 l.Oe-14 1.5e-13 1.6e-13 
1 8.0 2.0 4.2e-13 6.0e-14 3.6e-13 4.2e-13 
1 8.0 3.0 3.8e-12 2.4e-13 7.6e-13 l.Oe-12 
1 8.0 4.0 3.8e-11 l.Oe-12 1.6e-12 2.6e-12 
1 8.0 5.0 4.0e-10 2.6e-12 3.6e-12 6.2e-12 
1 8.0 6.0 3.9e-09 7.1e-12 7.9e-12 1.5e-ll 
1 8.0 7.0 3.3e-08 1.8e-11 1.7e-ll 3.5e-11 
1 9.0 1.0 l.Oe-11 8.0e-12 4.8e-11 5.6e-ll 
1 9.0 2.0 6.6e-11 2.1e-11 9.9e-11 1.2e-10 
1 9.0 3.0 3.6e-10 6.0e-11 1.8e-10 2.4e-10 
1 9.0 4.0 2.0e-09 1.6e-10 3.3e-10 4.9e-10 
1 9.0 5.0 1.1e-08 3.9e-10 6.0e-10 9.9e-10 
1 10.0 1.0 4.9e-10 7.0e-10 2.9e-09 3.6e-09 
1 10.0 2.0 2.6e-09 1.1e-09 5.5e-09 6.6e-09 
1 10.0 3.0 1.0e-08 2.9e-09 9.1e-09 1.2e-08 
1 11.0 1.0 8.7e-09 2.2e-08 6.0e-08 8.2e-08 
2 1.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 2.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 3.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 4.0 1.8e-87 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 5.0 1.9e-58 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 6.0 1.2e-41 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 7.0 3.8e-31 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 8.0 3.6e-24 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 9.0 2.5e-19 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 10.0 7.9e-16 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 11.0 3.2e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 12.0 3.1e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
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2 1.0 13.0 1.1e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.0 14.0 1.8e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 2.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 3.0 1.1e-92 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 4.0 9.1e-66 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 5.0 6.0e-46 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 6.0 4.6e-36 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 7.0 6.2e-28 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 8.0 3.3e-22 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 9.0 4.9e-18 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 10.0 6.3e-15 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 11.0 1.4e-12 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 12.0 9.5e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 13.0 2.6e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 2.0 14.0 3.8e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 1.0 2.4e-83 7.0e-87 3.5e-86 4.2e-86 
2 3.0 2.0 6.7e-72 2.0e-84 2.7e-83 2.9e-83 
2 3.0 3.0 1.2e-58 4.0e-81 1.3e-80 1.7e-80 
2 3.0 4.0 1.2e-46 3.1e-78 6.3e-78 9.4e-78 
2 3.0 5.0 5.8e-37 1.8e-76 2.8e-75 4.6e-75 
2 3.0 6.0 1.6e-29 9.0e-73 l.le-72 2.0e-72 
2 3.0 7.0 7.3e-24 3.5e-70 4.2e-70 7.7e-70 
2 3.0 8.0 1.4e-19 1.3e-67 1.4e-67 2.7e-67 
2 3.0 9.0 2.9e-16 4.1e-65 4.2e-65 8.3e-65 
2 3.0 10.0 l.Oe-13 1.2e-62 1.1e-62 2.3e-62 
2 3.0 11.0 l.Oe-11 3.0e-60 2.8e-60 5.8e-60 
2 3.0 12.0 4.2e-10 6.9e-58 6.le-58 1.3e-57 
2 3.0 13.0 8.1e-09 1.4e-55 1.2e-55 2.6e-55 
2 4.0 1.0 1.3e-48 6.0e-50 2.5e-49 3.le-49 
2 4.0 2.0 2.5e-44 O.Oe-47 1.2e-47 1.2e-47 
2 4.0 3.0 6.8e-39 l.Oe-46 3.5e-46 4.5e-46 
2 4.0 4.0 3.0e-33 5.0e-45 1.1e-44 1.6e-44 
2 4.0 5.0 4.8e-28 1.9e-43 3.2e-43 5.le-43 
2 4.0 6.0 1.5e-23 6.9e-42 9.le-42 1.6e-41 
2 4.0 7.0 7.7e-20 2.0e-40 2.5e-40 4.5e-40 
2 4.0 8.0 8.4e-17 5.8e-39 6.4e-39 1.2e-38 
2 4.0 9.0 2.5e-14 1.5e-37 1.6e-37 3.1e-37 
2 4.0 10.0 2.5e-12 3.8e-36 3.7e-36 7.5e-36 
2 4.0 11.0 1.le-10 8.9e-35 8.le-35 1.7e-34 
2 4.0 12.0 2.4e-09 1.9e-33 1.7e-33 3.6e-33 
2 4.0 13.0 3.0e-08 3.8e-32 3.3e-32 7.1e-32 
2 5.0 1.0 4.0e-32 7.0e-33 3.2e-32 3.9e-32 
2 5.0 2.0 5.9e-30 1.0e-32 4.0e-31 4.1e-31 
2 5.0 3.0 2.4e-27 8.0e-31 3.4e-30 4.2e-30 
2 5.0 4.0 2.0e-24 1.2e-29 2.9e-29 4.1e-29 
2 5.0 5.0 1.6e-21 1.4e-28 2.4e-28 3.8e-28 
2 5.0 6.0 8.5e-19 1.5e-27 2.0e-27 3.5e-27 
2 5.0 7.0 2.3e-16 1.3e-26 1.7e-26 3.0e-26 
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2 5.0 8.0 2.9e-14 1.2e-25 1.3e-25 2.5e-25 
2 5.0 9.0 1.8e-12 l.Oe-24 l.Oe-24 2.0e-24 
2 5.0 10.0 6.2e-11 7.4e-24 7.6e-24 1.5e-23 
2 5.0 11.0 1.2e-09 5.5e-23 5.5e-23 1.1e-22 
2 5.0 12.0 1.5e-08 4.2e-22 3.8e-22 8.0e-22 
2 6.0 1.0 3.9e-23 1.5e-23 6.6e-23 8.le-23 
2 6.0 2.0 l.Oe-21 2.0e-23 4.0e-22 4.2e-22 
2 6.0 3.0 3.2e-20 4.0e-22 1.7e-21 2.1e-21 
2 6.0 4.0 1.4e-18 2.6e-21 7.4e-21 l.Oe-20 
2 6.0 5.0 7.7e-17 1.7e-20 3.2e-20 4.9e-20 
2 6.0 6.0 3.8e-15 9.0e-20 1.4e-19 2.3e-19 
2 6.0 7.0 1.5e-13 4.2e-19 5.8e-19 l.Oe-18 
2 6.0 8.0 4.4e-12 2.le-18 2.4e-18 4.5e-18 
2 6.0 9.0 8.8e-11 9.0e-18 l.Oe-17 1.9e-17 
2 6.0 10.0 1.2e-09 3.9e-17 4.0e-17 7.9e-17 
2 6.0 11.0 1.3e-08 1.6e-16 1.6e-16 3.2e-16 
2 7.0 1.0 1.1e-17 7.0e-18 2.8e-17 3.5e-17 
2 7.0 2.0 1.1e-16 l.Oe-17 1.1e-16 1.2e-16 
2 7.0 3.0 1.2e-15 6.0e-17 3.3e-16 3.9e-16 
2 7.0 4.0 1.4e-14 2.7e-16 9.3e-16 1.2e-15 
2 7.0 5.0 1.7e-13 1.2e-15 2.7e-15 3.9e-15 
2 7.0 6.0 2.2e-12 4.3e-15 7.7e-15 1.2e-14 
2 7.0 7.0 2.7e-11 1.5e-14 2.2e-14 3.7e-14 
2 7.0 8.0 2.8e-10 4.7e-14 6.3e-14 1.1e-13 
2 7.0 9.0 2.5e-09 1.4e-13 1.8e-13 3.2e-13 
2 7.0 10.0 1.8e-08 4.3e-13 4.9e-13 9.2e-13 
2 8.0 1.0 3.1e-14 3.0e-14 1.3e-13 1.6e-13 
2 8.0 2.0 2.3e-13 3.0e-14 3.9e-13 4.2e-13 
2 8.0 3.0 1.3e-12 1.1e-13 8.9e-13 l.Oe-12 
2 8.0 4.0 7.8e-12 6.0e-13 2.0e-12 2.6e-12 
2 8.0 5.0 4.6e-11 1.8e-12 4.4e-12 6.2e-12 
2 8.0 6.0 2.7e-10 5.2e-12 9.8e-12 1.5e-11 
2 8.0 7.0 1.5e-09 1.3e-11 2.2e-11 3.5e-11 
2 8.0 8.0 8.3e-09 3.2e-11 4.8e-11 8.0e-11 
2 9.0 1.0 7.5e-12 1.5e-11 4.1e-11 5.6e-ll 
2 9.0 2.0 4.1e-11 l.Oe-11 1.1e-10 1.2e-10 
2 9.0 3.0 1.8e-10 3.0e-11 2.1e-10 2.4e-10 
2 9.0 4.0 6.9e-10 l.Oe-10 3.9e-10 4.9e-10 
2 9.0 5.0 2.6e-09 2.6e-10 7.3e-10 9.9e-10 
2 9.0 6.0 9.7e-09 6.0e-10 1.4e-09 2.0e-09 
2 10.0 1.0 3.8e-10 1.le-09 2.5e-09 3.6e-09 
2 10.0 2.0 1.7e-09 6.0e-10 6.0e-09 6.6e-09 
2 10.0 3.0 5.8e-09 2.0e-09 1.0e-08 1.2e-08 
2 10.0 4.0 1.8e-08 4.0e-09 1.7e-08 2.1e-08 
2 11.0 1.0 6.8e-09 2.9e-08 5.3e-08 8.2e-08 
3 1.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 2.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 3.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 4.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
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3 1.0 5.0 3.5e-83 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 6.0 1.4e-59 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 7.0 1.4e-44 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 8.0 1.7e-34 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 9.0 1.9e-27 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 10.0 2.4e-22 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 11.0 1.6e-18 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 12.0 1.3e-15 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 13.0 2.5e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 14.0 1.6e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 15.0 4.5e-10 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.0 16.0 6.9e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 1.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 2.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 3.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 4.0 2.3e-83 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 5.0 6.0e-63 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 6.0 2.1e-48 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 7.0 5.3e-38 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 8.0 2.0e-30 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 9.0 8.3e-25 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 10.0 1.5e-20 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 11.0 2.9e-17 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 12.0 1.1e-14 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 13.0 1.3e-12 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 14.0 5.6e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 15.0 1.2e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 2.0 16.0 1.6e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 1.0 2.1e-84 O.Oe-86 4.2e-86 4.2e-86 
3 3.0 2.0 8.4e-76 1.0e-84 2.8e-83 2.9e-83 
3 3.0 3.0 4.2e-65 2.0e-81 1.5e-80 1.7e-80 
3 3.0 4.0 2.2e-54 2.3e-78 7.1e-78 9.4e-78 
3 3.0 5.0 7.5e-45 1.5e-75 3.1e-75 4.6e-75 
3 3.0 6.0 6.2e-37 7.0e-73 1.3e-72 2.0e-72 
3 3.0 7.0 1.5e-30 3.1e-70 4.6e-70 7.7e-70 
3 3.0 8.0 1.9e-25 1.2e-67 1.5e-67 2.7e-67 
3 3.0 9.0 2.2e-21 3.7e-65 4.6e-65 8.3e-65 
3 3.0 10.0 3.9e-18 l.Oe-62 1.3e-62 2.3e-62 
3 3.0 11.0 1.6e-15 2.7e-60 3.1e-60 5.8e-60 
3 3.0 12.0 2.1e-13 6.3e-58 6.7e-58 1.3e-57 
3 3.0 13.0 1.1e-11 1.3e-55 1.3e-55 2.6e-55 
3 3.0 14.0 3.0e-10 2.3e-53 2.3e-53 4.6e-53 
3 3.0 15.0 4.6e-09 3.7e-51 3.7e-51 7.4e-51 
3 3.0 16.0 4.6e-08 5.8e-49 5.2e-49 1.1e-48 
3 4.0 1.0 6.7e-49 l.Oe-50 3.0e-49 3.le-49 
3 4.0 2.0 1.5e-45 O.Oe-47 1.2e-47 1.2e-47 
3 4.0 3.0 2.6e-41 6.0e-47 3.9e-46 4.5e-46 
3 4.0 4.0 1.2e-36 4.0e-45 1.2e-44 1.6e-44 
3 4.0 5.0 5.0e-32 1.5e-43 3.6e-43 5.le-43 
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3 4.0 6.0 9.2e-28 6.0e-42 l.Oe-41 1.6e-41 
3 4.0 7.0 5.6e-24 1.7e-41 2.8e-40 4.5e-40 
3 4.0 8.0 l.Oe-20 4.8e-39 7.2e-39 1.2e-38 
3 4.0 9.0 6.1e-18 1.3e-37 1.8e-37 3.le-37 
3 4.0 10.0 1.3e-15 3.4e-36 4.1e-36 7.5e-36 
3 4.0 11.0 1.2e-13 8.0e-35 9.0e-35 1.7e-34 
3 4.0 12.0 5.6e-12 1.7e-33 1.9e-33 3.6e-33 
3 4.0 13.0 1.4e-10 3.5e-32 3.6e-32 7.1e-32 
3 4.0 14.0 2.1e-09 6.3e-31 6.7e-31 1.3e-30 
3 4.0 15.0 2.2e-08 1.1e-29 1.2e-29 2.3e-29 
3 5.0 1.0 2.9e-32 1.0e-33 3.8e-32 3.9e-32 
3 5.0 2.0 2.0e-30 O.Oe-31 4.1e-31 4.1e-31 
3 5.0 3.0 2.5e-28 5.0e-31 3.7e-30 4.2e-30 
3 5.0 4.0 5.4e-26 9.0e-30 3.2e-29 4.1e-29 
3 5.0 5.0 1.5e-23 1.1e-28 2.7e-28 3.8e-28 
3 5.0 6.0 3.9e-21 1.2e-27 2.3e-27 3.5e-27 
3 5.0 7.0 7.4e-19 1.1e-26 1.9e-26 3.0e-26 
3 5.0 8.0 8.9e-17 l.Oe-25 1.5e-25 2.5e-25 
3 5.0 9.0 6.5e-15 9.0e-25 1.1e-24 2.0e-24 
3 5.0 10.0 2.9e-13 6.5e-24 8.5e-24 1.5e-23 
3 5.0 11.0 8.1e-12 4.9e-23 6.1e-23 1.1e-22 
3 5.0 12.0 1.5e-10 3.8e-22 4.2e-22 8.0e-22 
3 5.0 13.0 1.9e-09 2.7e-21 2.8e-21 5.5e-21 
3 5.0 14.0 1.7e-08 1.8e-20 1.8e-20 3.6e-20 
3 6.0 1.0 3.0e-23 3.0e-24 7.8e-23 8.1e-23 
3 6.0 2.0 5.7e-22 O.Oe-22 4.2e-22 4.2e-22 
3 6.0 3.0 1.1e-20 2.0e-22 1.9e-21 2.le-21 
3 6.0 4.0 2.5e-19 1.8e-21 8.2e-21 1.0e-20 
3 6.0 5.0 6.6e-18 1.3e-20 3.6e-20 4.9e-20 
3 6.0 6.0 1.9e-16 8.0e-20 1.5e-19 2.3e-19 
3 6.0 7.0 5.0e-15 3.5e-19 6.5e-19 l.Oe-18 
3 6.0 8.0 1.1e-13 1.8e-18 2.7e-18 4.5e-18 
3 6.0 9.0 2.1e-12 8.0e-18 1.1e-17 1.9e-17 
3 6.0 10.0 3.1e-ll 3.4e-17 4.5e-17 7.9e-17 
3 6.0 11.0 3.4e-10 1.4e-16 1.8e-16 3.2e-16 
3 6.0 12.0 3.1e-09 5.2e-16 6.8e-16 1.2e-15 
3 6.0 13.0 2.2e-08 2.3e-15 2.5e-15 4.8e-15 
3 7.0 1.0 9.3e-18 2.0e-18 3.3e-17 3.5e-17 
3 7.0 2.0 7.7e-17 O.Oe-16 1.2e-16 1.2e-16 
3 7.0 3.0 6.4e-16 4.0e-17 3.5e-16 3.9e-16 
3 7.0 4.0 5.3e-15 2.0e-16 l.Oe-15 1.2e-15 
3 7.0 5.0 4.5e-14 9.0e-16 3.0e-15 3.9e-15 
3 7.0 6.0 3.9e-13 3.4e-15 8.6e-15 1.2e-14 
3 7.0 7.0 3.4e-12 1.2e-14 2.5e-14 3.7e-14 
3 7.0 8.0 2.8e-11 4.0e-14 7.0e-14 1.1e-13 
3 7.0 9.0 2.1e-10 1.2e-13 2.0e-13 3.2e-13 
3 7.0 10.0 1.4e-09 3.8e-13 5.4e-13 9.2e-13 
3 7.0 11.0 8.6e-09 1.1e-12 1.5e-12 2.6e-12 
3 8.0 1.0 2.5e-14 l.Oe-14 1.5e-13 1.6e-13 
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3 8.0 2.0 1.7e-13 l.Oe-14 4.1e-13 4.2e-13 
3 8.0 3.0 8.8e-13 4.0e-14 9.6e-13 l.Oe-12 
3 8.0 4.0 4.2e-12 4.0e-13 2.2e-12 2.6e-12 
3 8.0 5.0 2.0e-11 1.3e-12 4.9e-12 6.2e-12 
3 8.0 6.0 9.3e-11 4.0e-12 1.1e-11 1.5e-11 
3 8.0 7.0 4.3e-10 l.le-11 2.4e-11 3.5e-11 
3 8.0 8.0 1.9e-09 2.7e-11 5.3e-11 8.0e-11 
3 8.0 9.0 8.2e-09 6.0e-11 1.2e-10 1.8e-10 
3 9.0 1.0 6.3e-12 8.0e-12 4.8e-11 5.6e-11 
3 9.0 2.0 3.2e-11 l.Oe-11 1.1e-10 1.2e-10 
3 9.0 3.0 1.3e-10 2.0e-11 2.2e-10 2.4e-10 
3 9.0 4.0 4.4e-10 7.0e-11 4.2e-10 4.9e-10 
3 9.0 5.0 1.5e-09 1.9e-10 8.0e-10 9.9e-10 
3 9.0 6.0 4.8e-09 5.0e-10 1.5e-09 2.0e-09 
3 9.0 7.0 1.5e-08 1.1e-09 2.8e-09 3.9e-09 
3 10.0 1.0 3.2e-10 6.0e-10 3.0e-09 3.6e-09 
3 10.0 2.0 1.4e-09 3.0e-10 6.3e-09 6.6e-09 
3 10.0 3.0 4.4e-09 1.0e-09 1.1e-08 1.2e-08 
3 10.0 4.0 1.3e-08 2.0e-09 1.9e-08 2.1e-08 
3 11.0 1.0 5.8e-09 1.9e-08 6.3e-08 8.2e-08 
3 11.0 2.0 2.1e-08 2.0e-08 1.1e-07 1.3e-07 
3 12.0 1.0 5.le-08 2.5e-07 6.3e-07 8.8e-07 
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Table A.3: Inte~rity and Continuity Risk Probabilities for TL-M=90 m, k=1, DOP=1 
m aFTE (m) a 0 (m) p2 p3 p4 p3+p4 
1 1.5 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 3.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 4.5 4.6e-80 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 6.0 l.Oe-47 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 7.5 1.1e-31 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 9.0 1.1e-22 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 10.5 3.7e-17 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 12.0 1.6e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 13.5 5.3e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 15.0 3.5e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 1.5 16.5 7.7e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 3.0 1.1e-99 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 4.5 6.0e-62 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 6.0 8.8e-41 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 7.5 1.5e-28 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 9.0 4.5e-21 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 10.5 3.3e-16 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 12.0 6.6e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 13.5 1.4e-10 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 3.0 15.0 7.1e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
1 4.5 1.5 5.6e-80 1.0e-86 3.2e-86 4.2e-86 
1 4.5 3.0 6.1e-62 l.Oe-83 1.8e-83 2.8e-83 
1 4.5 4.5 3.7e-45 9.1e-81 7.9e-81 1.7e-80 
1 .45 6.0 6.6e-33 5.0e-78 4.3e-78 9.3e-78 
1 4.5 7.5 1.5e-24 2.7e-75 1.8e-75 4.5e-75 
1 4.5 9.0 7.4e-19 1.2e-72 8.0e-73 2.0e-72 
1 4.5 10.5 6.6e-15 4.7e-70 2.9e-70 7.6e-70 
1 4.5 12.0 4.3e-12 1.7e-67 1.0e-67 2.7e-67 
1 4.5 13.5 5.0e-10 5.3e-65 3.0e-65 8.3e-65 
1 4.5 15.0 1.7e-08 1.4e-62 8.6e-63 2.3e-62 
1 6.0 1.5 1.1e-47 6.1e-50 2.5e-49 3.1e-49 
1 6.0 3.0 9.6e-41 4.2e-48 7.8e-48 1.2e-47 
1 6.0 4.5 7.0e-33 2.3e-46 2.2e-46 4.5e-46 
1 6.0 6.0 5.5e-26 8.7e-45 7.3e-45 1.6e-44 
1 6.0 7.5 1.4e-20 3.0e-43 2.le-43 5.1e-43 
1 6.0 9.0 1.7e-16 9.5e-42 6.5e-42 1.6e-41 
1 6.0 10.5 2.0e-13 2.7e-40 1.8e-40 4.5e-40 
1 6.0 12.0 3.9e-11 7.2e-39 4.8e-39 1.2e-38 
1 6.0 13.5 2.2e-09 1.9e-37 1.2e-37 3.le-37 
1 6.0 15.0 5.0e-08 4.7e-36 2.8e-36 7.5e-36 
1 7.5 1.5 9.5e-32 6.0e-33 3.3e-32 3.9e-32 
1 7.5 3.0 1.6e-28 1.3e-31 2.8e-31 4.le-31 
1 7.5 4.5 1.6e-24 2.0e-30 2.2e-30 4.2e-30 
1 7.5 6.0 1.4e-20 2.1e-29 2.0e-29 4.1e-29 
1 7.5 7.5 4.3e-17 2.1e-28 1.7e-28 3.8e-28 
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1 7.5 9.0 3.1e-14 2.0e-27 1.5e-27 3.5e-27 
1 7.5 10.5 6.1e-12 1.8e-26 1.2e-26 3.0e-26 
1 7.5 12.0 4.0e-10 1.5e-25 9.9e-26 2.5e-25 
1 7.5 13.5 1.1e-08 1.2e-24 7.6e-25 2.0e-24 
1 9.0 1.5 6.4e-23 1.1e-23 7.0e-23 8.1e-23 
1 9.0 3.0 4.6e-21 1.2e-22 3.0e-22 4.2e-22 
1 9.0 4.5 7.4e-19 9.2e-22 1.2e-21 2.1e-21 
1 9.0 6.0 1.8e-16 4.7e-21 5.3e-21 l.Oe-20 
1 9.0 7.5 3.1e-14 2.6e-20 2.3e-20 4.9e-20 
1 9.0 9.0 3.1e-12 1.3e-19 l.Oe-19 2.3e-19 
1 9.0 10.5 1.5e-10 5.7e-19 4.3e-19 l.Oe-18 
1 9.0 12.0 3.9e-09 2.7e-18 1.8e-18 4.5e-18 
1 9.0 13.5 5.8e-08 1.1e-17 7.5e-18 1.9e-17 
1 10.5 1.5 1.5e-17 5.3e-18 3.0e-17 3.5e-17 
1 10.5 3.0 2.7e-16 3.3e-17 8.7e-17 1.2e-16 
1 10.5 4.5 6.4e-15 1.5e-16 2.4e-16 3.9e-16 
1 10.5 6.0 2.0e-13 5.2e-16 6.8e-16 1.2e-15 
1 10.5 7.5 6.1e-12 2.0e-15 1.9e-15 3.9e-15 
1 10.5 9.0 1.5e-10 6.3e-15 5.7e-15 1.2e-14 
1 10.5 10.5 2.7e-09 2.1e-14 1.6e-14 3.7e-14 
1 10.5 12.0 3.3e-08 6.3e-14 4.7e-14 1.1e-13 
1 12.0 1.5 4.2e-14 3.0e-14 1.3e-13 1.6e-13 
1 12.0 3.0 4.1e-13 l.Oe-13 3.2e-13 4.2e-13 
1 12.0 4.5 3.7e-12 3.3e-13 6.7e-13 l.Oe-12 
1 12.0 6.0 3.8e-11 1.1e-12 1.5e-12 2.6e-12 
1 12.0 7.5 4.0e-10 3.0e-12 3.2e-12 6.2e-12 
1 12.0 9.0 3.9e-09 7.7e-12 7.3e-12 1.5e-11 
1 12.0 10.5 3.3e-08 1.9e-11 1.6e-11 3.5e-11 
1 13.5 1.5 l.Oe-11 1.3e-11 4.3e-11 5.6e-11 
1 13.5 3.0 6.6e-11 3.1e-11 8.9e-11 1.2e-10 
1 13.5 4.5 3.6e-10 8.0e-11 1.6e-10 2.4e-10 
1 13.5 6.0 2.0e-09 1.9e-10 3.0e-10 4.9e-10 
1 13.5 7.5 1.1e-08 4.4e-10 5.5e-10 9.9e-10 
1 15.0 1.5 4.9e-10 1.0e-09 2.6e-09 3.6e-09 
1 15.0 3.0 2.5e-09 1.6e-09 5.0e-09 6.6e-09 
1 15.0 4.5 1.0e-08 3.7e-09 8.3e-09 1.2e-08 
1 16.5 1.5 8.7e-09 2.8e-08 5.4e-08 8.2e-08 
2 1.5 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 3.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 4.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 6.0 2.1e-87 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 7.5 2.1e-58 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 9.0 1.3e-41 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 10.5 4.0e-31 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 12.0 3.7e-24 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 13.5 2.5e-19 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 15.0 8.0e-16 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 16.5 3.2e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 18.0 3.1e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
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2 1.5 19.5 1.1e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 1.5 21.0 1.8e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 3.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 4.5 1.2e-92 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 6.0 9.9e-66 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 7.5 6.4e-48 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 9.0 4.8e-36 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 10.5 6.4e-28 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 12.0 3.4e-22 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 13.5 5.0e-18 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 15.0 6.3e-15 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 16.5 1.4e-12 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 18.0 9.5e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 19.5 2.6e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 3.0 21.0 3.8e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
2 4.5 1.5 2.4e-83 3.0e-87 3.9e-86 4.2e-86 
2 4.5 3.0 6.9e-72 6.0e-84 2.2e-83 2.8e-83 
2 4.5 4.5 1.2e-58 7.1e-81 9.9e-81 1.7e-80 
2 4.5 6.0 1.3e-46 4.0e-78 5.3e-78 9.3e-78 
2 4.5 7.5 6.0e-37 2.3e-75 2.2e-75 4.5e-75 
2 4.5 9.0 1.7e-29 l.Oe-72 9.9e-73 2.0e-72 
2 4.5 10.5 7.5e-24 4.1e-70 3.5e-70 7.6e-70 
2 4.5 12.0 1.5e-19 1.5e-67 1.2e-67 2.7e-67 
2 4.5 13.5 2.9e-16 4.7e-65 3.6e-65 8.3e-65 
2 4.5 15.0 l.Oe-13 1.3e-62 1.0e-62 2.3e-62 
2 4.5 16.5 l.Oe-11 3.3e-60 2.5e-60 5.8e-60 
2 4.5 18.0 4.2e-10 7.4e-58 5.6e-58 1.3e-57 
2 4.5 19.5 8.1e-09 1.5e-55 1.1e-55 2.6e-55 
2 6.0 1.5 1.3e-48 2.0e-50 2.9e-49 3.1e-49 
2 6.0 3.0 2.5e-44 2.3e-48 9.7e-48 1.2e-47 
2 6.0 4.5 6.9e-39 1.7e-46 2.8e-46 4.5e-46 
2 6.0 6.0 3.0e-33 6.8e-45 9.2e-45 1.6e-44 
2 6.0 7.5 4.8e-28 2.5e-43 2.6e-43 5.1e-43 
2 6.0 9.0 1.5e-23 8.0e-42 8.0e-42 1.6e-41 
2 6.0 10.5 7.7e-20 2.4e-40 2.1e-40 4.5e-40 
2 6.0 12.0 8.4e-17 6.2e-39 5.8e-39 1.2e-38 
2 6.0 13.5 2.5e-14 1.7e-37 1.4e-37 3.le-37 
2 6.0 15.0 2.5e-12 4.1e-36 3.4e-36 7.5e-36 
2 6.0 16.5 1.1e-10 9.6e-35 7.4e-35 1.7e-34 
2 6.0 18.0 2.4e-09 2.0e-33 1.6e-33 3.6e-33 
2 6.0 19.5 3.0e-08 4.1e-32 3.0e-32 7.1e-32 
2 7.5 1.5 3.9e-32 3.0e-33 3.6e-32 3.9e-32 
2 7.5 3.0 5.9e-30 7.3e-32 3.4e-31 4.1e-31 
2 7.5 4.5 2.5e-27 1.5e-30 2.7e-30 4.2e-30 
2 7.5 6.0 2.0e-24 1.6e-29 2.5e-29 4.le-29 
2 7.5 7.5 1.6e-21 1.7e-28 2.1e-28 3.8e-28 
2 7.5 9.0 8.5e-19 1.7e-27 1.8e-27 3.5e-27 
2 7.5 10.5 2.3e-16 1.5e-26 1.5e-26 3.0e-26 
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2 7.5 12.0 2.9e-14 1.3e-25 1.2e-25 2.5e-25 
2 7.5 13.5 1.8e-12 1.1e-24 9.3e-25 2.0e-24 
2 7.5 15.0 6.2e-11 8.2e-24 7.1e-24 1.5e-23 
2 7.5 16.5 1.2e-09 6.2-23 5.1e-23 1.1e-22 
2 7.5 18.0 1.5e-08 4.4e-22 3.6e-22 8.0e-22 
2 9.0 1.5 3.8e-23 7.0e-24 7.4e-23 8.1e-23 
2 9.0 3.0 9.9e-22 7.0e-23 3.5e-22 4.2e-22 
2 9.0 4.5 3.2e-20 6.0e-22 1.5e-21 2.1e-21 
2 9.0 6.0 1.4e-18 3.4e-21 6.6e-21 l.Oe-20 
2 9.0 7.5 7.7e-17 2.1e-20 2.8e-20 4.9e-20 
2 9.0 9.0 3.9e-15 1.1e-19 1.2e-19 2.3e-19 
2 9.0 10.5 1.5e-13 4.7e-19 5.3e-19 l.Oe-18 
2 9.0 12.0 4.4e-12 2.2e-18 2.3e-18 4.5e-18 
2 9.0 13.5 8.8e-11 l.Oe-17 9.2e-18 1.9e-17 
2 9.0 15.0 1.2e-09 4.1e-17 3.8e-17 7.9e-17 
2 9.0 16.5 1.3e-08 1.7e-16 1.5e-16 3.2e-16 
2 10.5 1.5 l.Oe-17 4.0e-18 3.1e-17 3.5e-17 
2 10.5 3.0 1.1e-16 1.6e-17 l.Oe-16 1.2e-16 
2 10.5 4.5 1.2e-15 1.1e-16 2.8e-16 3.9e-16 
2 10.5 6.0 1.4e-14 3.6e-16 8.4e-16 1.2e-15 
2 10.5 7.5 1.7e-13 1.5e-15 2.4e-15 3.9e-15 
2 10.5 9.0 2.2e-12 4.9e-15 7 .le-15 1.2e-14 
2 10.5 10.5 2.7e-11 1.7e-14 2.0e-14 3.7e-14 
2 10.5 12.0 2.8e-10 5.2e-14 5.8e-14 1.1e-13 
2 10.5 13.5 2.5e-09 1.6e-13 1.6e-13 3.2e-13 
2 10.5 15.0 1.8e-08 4.6e-13 4.6e-13 9.2e-13 
2 12.0 1.5 3.0e-14 2.4e-14 1.4e-13 1.6e-13 
2 12.0 3.0 2.2e-13 6.0e-14 3.6e-13 4.2e-13 
2 12.0 4.5 1.3e-12 2.0e-13 8.0e-13 l.Oe-12 
2 12.0 6.0 7.8e-12 8.0e-13 1.8e-12 2.6e-12 
2 12.0 7.5 4.6e-11 2.2e-12 4.0e-12 6.2e-12 
2 12.0 9.0 2.7e-10 6.0e-12 9.0e-12 1.5e-11 
2 12.0 10.5 1.5e-09 1.5e-11 2.0e-11 3.5e-11 
2 12.0 12.0 8.3e-09 3.5e-11 4.5e-11 8.0e-11 
2 13.5 1.5 7.5e-12 1.2e-11 4.4e-11 5.6e-11 
2 13.5 3.0 4.1e-11 2.0e-11 l.Oe-10 1.2e-10 
2 13.5 4.5 1.7e-10 5.0e-11 1.9e-10 2.4e-10 
2 13.5 6.0 6.9e-10 1.3e-10 3.6e-10 4.9e-10 
2 13.5 7.5 2.6e-09 3.2e-10 6.7e-10 9.9e-10 
2 13.5 9.0 9.7e-09 7.0e-10 1.3e-09 2.0e-09 
2 15.0 1.5 3.8e-10 9.0e-10 2.7e-09 3.6e-09 
2 15.0 3.0 1.7e-09 l.Oe-09 5.6e-09 6.6e-09 
2 15.0 4.5 5.8e-09 2.4e-09 9.6e-09 1.2e-08 
2 15.0 6.0 1.8e-08 5.0e-09 1.6e-08 2.1e-08 
2 16.5 1.5 6.8e-09 2.7e-08 5.5e-08 8.2e-08 
3 1.5 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 3.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 4.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 6.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
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3 1.5 7.5 3.9e-83 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 9.0 1.6e-59 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 10.5 1.5e-44 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 12.0 1.8e-34 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 13.5 1.9e-27 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 15.0 2.5e-22 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 16.5 1.6e-18 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 18.0 1.3e-15 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 19.5 2.5e-13 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 21.0 1.6e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 22.5 4.5e-10 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 1.5 24.0 6.9e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 1.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 3.0 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 4.5 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 6.0 2.5e-83 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 7.5 6.5e-63 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 9.0 2.2e-48 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 10.5 5.6e-38 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 12.0 2.1e-30 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 13.5 8.6e-25 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 15.0 1.5e-20 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 16.5 3.0e-17 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 18.0 1.1e-14 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 19.5 1.3e-12 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 21.0 5.6e-11 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 22.5 1.2e-09 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 3.0 24.0 1.6e-08 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 O.Oe-00 
3 4.5 1.5 2.1e-84 O.Oe-86 4.2e-86 4.2e-86 
3 4.5 3.0 8.5e-76 3.0e-84 2.5e-83 2.8e-83 
3 4.5 4.5 4.4e-65 6.0e-81 1.1e-80 1.7e-80 
3 4.5 6.0 2.4e-54 3.3e-78 6.0e-78 9.3e-78 
3 4.5 7.5 7.9e-45 2.0e-75 2.5e-75 4.5e-75 
3 4.5 9.0 6.5e-37 9.0e-73 1.1e-72 2.0e-72 
3 4.5 10.5 1.6e-30 3.8e-70 3.8e-70 7.6e-70 
3 4.5 12.0 2.0e-25 1.3e-67 1.4e-67 2.7e-67 
3 4.5 13.5 2.2e-21 4.3e-65 4.0e-65 8.3e-65 
3 4.5 15.0 3.9e-18 1.2e-62 1.1e-62 2.3e-62 
3 4.5 16.5 1.6e-15 3.1e-60 2.7e-60 5.8e-60 
3 4.5 18.0 2.1e-13 6.9e-58 6.1e-58 1.3e-57 
3 4.5 19.5 1.1e-11 1.4e-55 1.2e-55 2.6e-55 
3 4.5 21.0 3.0e-10 2.5e-53 2.1e-53 4.6e-53 
3 4.5 22.5 4.7e-09 4.1e-51 3.3e-51 7.4e-51 
3 4.5 24.0 4.6e-08 6.2e-49 4.8e-49 1.1e-48 
3 6.0 1.5 6.4e-49 O.Oe-49 3.1e-49 3.1e-49 
3 6.0 3.0 1.5e-45 1.3e-48 1.1e-47 1.2e-47 
3 6.0 4.5 2.6e-41 1.4e-46 3.1e-46 4.5e-46 
3 6.0 6.0 1.2e-36 6.0e-45 1.0e-44 1.6e-44 
3 6.0 7.5 5.0e-32 2.2e-43 2.9e-43 5.1e-43 
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3 6.0 9.0 9.3e-28 7.1e-42 8.9e-42 1.6e-41 
3 6.0 10.5 5.6e-24 2.1e-40 2.4e-40 4.5e-40 
3 6.0 12.0 1.0e-20 5.5e-39 6.5e-39 1.2e-38 
3 6.0 13.5 6.1e-18 1.6e-37 1.5e-37 3.1e-37 
3 6.0 15.0 1.3e-15 3.8e-36 3.7e-36 7.5e-36 
3 6.0 16.5 1.2e-13 9.0e-35 8.0e-35 1.7e-34 
3 6.0 18.0 5.6e-12 1.9e-33 1.7e-33 3.6e-33 
3 6.0 19.5 1.4e-10 3.8e-32 3.3e-32 7.1e-32 
3 6.0 21.0 2.1e-09 6.8e-31 6.2e-31 1.3e-30 
3 6.0 22.5 2.2e-08 1.2e-29 1.1e-29 2.3e-29 
3 7.5 1.5 2.8e-32 O.Oe-32 3.9e-32 3.9e-32 
3 7.5 3.0 2.0e-30 4.0e-32 3.7e-31 4.1e-31 
3 7.5 4.5 2.5e-28 1.1e-30 3.le-30 4.2e-30 
3 7.5 6.0 5.4e-26 1.3e-29 2.8e-29 4.1e-29 
3 7.5 7.5 1.5e-23 1.5e-28 2.3e-28 3.8e-28 
3 7.5 9.0 3.9e-21 1.5e-27 2.0e-27 3.5e-27 
3 7.5 10.5 7.4e-19 1.4e-26 1.6e-26 3.0e-26 
3 7.5 12.0 8.9e017 1.2e-25 1.3e-25 2.5e-25 
3 7.5 13.5 6.6e-15 l.Oe-24 l.Oe-24 2.0e-24 
3 7.5 15.0 2.9e-13 7.2e-24 7.8e-24 1.5e-23 
3 7.5 16.5 8.1e-12 5.4e-23 5.6e-23 1.1e-22 
3 7.5 18.0 1.5e-10 4.0e-22 4.0e-22 8.0e-22 
3 7.5 19.5 1.8e-09 2.9e-21 2.6e-21 5.5e-21 
3 7.5 21.0 1.7e-08 1.9e-20 1.7e-20 3.6e-20 
3 9.0 1.5 2.9e-23 l.Oe-24 8.0e-23 8.1e-23 
3 9.0 3.0 5.7e-22 4.0e-23 3.8e-22 4.2e-22 
3 9.0 4.5 l.le-20 5.0e-22 1.6e-21 2.1e-21 
3 9.0 6.0 2.5e-19 2.7e-21 7.3e-21 l.Oe-20 
3 9.0 7.5 6.7e-18 1.8e-20 3.1e-20 4.9e-20 
3 9.0 9.0 1.9e-16 9.0e-20 1.4e-19 2.3e-19 
3 9.0 10.5 5.0e-15 4.1e-19 5.9e-19 l.Oe-18 
3 9.0 12.0 1.1e-13 2.0e-18 2.5e-18 4.5e-18 
3 9.0 13.5 2.le-12 9.0e-18 l.Oe-17 1.9e-17 
3 9.0 15.0 3.1e-11 3.7e-17 4.2e-17 7.9e-17 
3 9.0 16.5 3.4e-10 1.6e-16 1.6e-16 3.2e-16 
3 9.0 18.0 3.1e-09 5.6e-16 6.4e-16 1.2e-15 
3 9.0 19.5 2.2e-08 2.4e-15 2.4e-15 4.8e-15 
3 10.5 1.5 8.5e-18 l.Oe-18 3.4e-17 3.5e-17 
3 10.5 3.0 7.7e-17 l.Oe-17 1.1e-16 1.2e-16 
3 10.5 4.5 6.4e-16 8.0e-17 3.1e-16 3.9e-16 
3 10.5 6.0 5.3e-15 2.7e-16 9.3e-16 1.2e-15 
3 10.5 7.5 4.5e-14 1.2e-15 2.7e-15 3.9e-15 
3 10.5 9.0 3.9e-13 4.1e-15 7.9e-15 1.2e-14 
3 10.5 10.5 3.4e-12 1.5e-14 2.2e-14 3.7e-14 
3 10.5 12.0 2.8e-ll 4.5e-14 6.5e-14 1.1e-13 
3 10.5 13.5 2.1e-10 1.4e-13 1.8e-13 3.2e-13 
3 10.5 15.0 1.4e-09 4.1e-13 5.1e-13 9.2e-13 
3 10.5 16.5 8.6e-09 1.2e-12 1.4e-12 2.6e-12 
3 12.0 1.5 2.5e-14 l.Oe-14 1.5e-13 1.6e-13 
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3 12.0 3.0 1.7e-13 3.0e-14 3.9e-13 4.2e-13 
3 12.0 4.5 8.8e-13 1.4e-13 8.6e-13 l.Oe-12 
3 12.0 6.0 4.2e-12 6.0e-13 2.0e-12 2.6e-12 
3 12.0 7.5 2.0e-11 1.8e-12 4.4e-12 6.2e-12 
3 12.0 9.0 9.3e-11 5.0e-12 l.Oe-11 1.5e-11 
3 12.0 10.5 4.3e-10 1.3e-11 2.2e-11 3.5e-11 
3 12.0 12.0 1.9e-09 3.0e-11 5.0e-11 8.0e-11 
3 12.0 13.5 8.2e-09 7.0e-11 1.1e-10 l.Se-10 
3 13.5 1.5 6.3e-12 8.0e-12 4.8e-11 5.6e-11 
3 13.5 3.0 3.2e-11 l.Oe-11 1.1e-10 1.2e-10 
3 13.5 4.5 1.3e-10 4.0e-11 2.0e-10 2.4e-10 
3 13.5 6.0 4.4e-10 l.Oe-10 3.9e-10 4.9e-10 
3 13.5 7.5 1.5e-09 2.6e-10 7.3e-10 9.9e-10 
3 13.5 9.0 4.8e-09 6.0e-10 1.4e-09 2.0e-09 
3 13.5 10.5 1.5e-08 1.3e-09 2.6e-09 3.9e-09 
3 15.0 1.5 3.2e-10 7.0e-10 2.9e-09 3.6e-09 
3 15.0 3.0 1.4e-09 7.0e-10 5.9e-09 6.6e-09 
3 15.0 4.5 4.4e-09 2.0e-09 l.Oe-08 1.2e-08 
3 15.0 6.0 1.3e-08 3.0e-09 1.8e-08 2.1e-08 
3 16.5 1.5 5.8e-09 2.2e-08 6.0e-08 8.2e-08 
3 16.5 3.0 2.1e-08 l.Oe-08 1.2e-07 1.3e-07 
3 18.0 1.5 5.1e-08 2.9e-07 5.9e-07 8.8e-07 
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